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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the interface between conflict 
resolution theory and the theology and praxis of the 
church. One purpose is to demonstrate the value of theolo­
gical ethics in the development of conflict resolution 
theory. A second purpose is to select and examine a par­
ticular conflict intervention role and assess its applica­
bility as a potential model for the functioning of the 
church as an intermediary in the resolution of internation­
al conflict.
The particular theory selected comes from the problem 
solving school of conflict resolution. At the same time, 
principled negotiation, developed by the Harvard Negotia­
tion Project of Harvard Law School, has a very pragmatic 
orientation.
This theory's applicability for the church is first 
assessed by examining two case studies, both examples of 
nonofficial third party intervention in some aspect of 
East-West relations during the Cold War. The first case is 
one where the authors of principled negotiation act as 
third party interveners. The second case examines the role 
played by a religious group, the Quakers, in a similar 
context.
The final section of the thesis develops a theology of 
conciliation with which to assess the applicability of 
principled negotiation for use by the church. The result 
is an affirmation of the model's general appropriateness 
for use by the church. However, various adaptations in 
both theory and practice are recommended, in order to 
reflect the theological context within which the church 
operates and in order to make a contribution to the general 
development of conflict resolution theory.
I affirm that this thesis, titled "Role of the Church as an 
Intermediary in International Conflict: A Theological As­
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For centuries international negotiation was almost
exclusively in the political sphere. It was the domain of
diplomacy. In this century there has developed a growing
alliance between the art of diplomacy and social science.
Conflict resolution theorist, Johan Galtung, compares this
development with the nineteenth century alliance between
the art of surgery and natural science. Art was no longer
deemed sufficient as the sole approach, yet science could
prevail only to the extent that it understood and incor-
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porated valid insights of the former perspective. Today 
there is considerable question regarding the state of the 
marriage between medical art and science. There is a 
growing sense that medical science has not provided a large 
enough unifying fabric with which to understand health and 
health care. Classification of observable phenomena as a 
means of improving medical technique does not always result 
in the best care, even of the body. The emotional and 
spiritual dimensions of health are becoming more evident 
and more basic. The same problem is, if anything, even more 
serious when social interaction, rather than the human 
body, becomes the object of research and action. Here, 
ethics is not simply related to the question of external 
treatments, of how to act upon the subject. Rather, the
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question of ethics is integral to the internal dynamics of 
the subject itself. Therefore, it is my contention that 
theological ethics, among other disciplines, has an impor­
tant role to play in providing a healthy foundation for the 
new field of peace studies and international conflict reso­
lution.
While one purpose of this study is to demonstrate the 
value of theological ethics in the development of conflict 
resolution theory, a second equally important aim is to 
assess the value of this theory for church praxis. I 
intend to select and examine a particular conflict inter­
vention role and assess its applicability as a potential 
model for the functioning of the church as an intermediary 
in the resolution of international conflict. Such a role 
must be informed by other disciplines, most notably social 
science, which have contributed to this emerging field. 
However, it is essential that any potential model must be 
adapted before its use by the church. In addition, it will 
need a rationale which is specifically theological in 
nature.
In the recent past, the intervention role most common­
ly used by the church has varied, depending on the context 
of the conflict. In societal and inter-societal conflict, 
the focus has been on advocacy with respect to issues, 
often accompanied by third party partiality with respect to 
the principal parties. The primary paradigm has been the
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prophetic motif. In interpersonal relations, the focus has 
been on conciliation between the parties and impartiality 
on the part of the third party. The primary paradigm has 
been the pastoral counseling motif. This discrepancy of 
role, according to context, is one which became increasing­
ly disturbing to me as a parish pastor who confronted both 
social and interpersonal conflict. As a result, I began to 
ask whether the insights of pastoral counseling could in­
form the role of the church in social conflict.
In the early 1960's, pastoral counselor, Wayne Oates 
attempted to relate the insights of pastoral counseling to 
the process of intervention in social conflict. Oates 
rejected an understanding of prophesy which depends on 
rigid position-taking, denies the validity of dialogical 
process, relies on excathedra pronouncements, exhortation 
or crusade mentality, and removes individual freedom of 
decision through authoritarian, monological communication. 
According to him, such "pseudoprophetic position-taking" 
clearly hurt any prospects for resolving social conflict. 
Instead, he emphasized the necessity of a dialogical pro­
cess which seeks consultation, encourages negotiation be­
tween conflicting interests and intentions, and nurtures a 
willingness to be reconciled —  even when dealing with 
one's worst opponent. He allowed a place for position- 
taking, but was adamant that it could not replace dialogi­
cal process nor be used as a litmus test for determining 
faithfulness to the will of God. At the same time, he
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warned against refusing to take a stand on important issues 
and "shilly-shallying" between two sides, in the name of 
reconciliation. The manipulator who plays both ends a- 
gainst the middle, speaking "smooth sayings" to the party 
with whom he is currently conversing, had no place in 
Oates' conception. However, this did not entail abandoning 
the counseling motif when addressing social conflicts. 
Instead, "Mr. Facing-both-ways" (referring to Bunyan's 
classical metaphor) could be avoided in much the same way 
that the marriage counselor functioned. For Oates, this 
meant entering a covenant to be pastor to both parties and 
not "choosing up sides" or allocating blame. Oates called 
upon both interpersonal and inter-societal conflict inter­
veners to affirm the unique, yet complementary, character 
of each party, to open channels of communication with all 
parties, to see that accurate information and clear state­
ments of the issues are made available to all, to aim for
mutual gain, and to view the "truth" as existing "between"
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contending parties rather than with one side alone.
Since this pastoral care model has clearly been in­
fluenced by social science, it makes sense to assume that 
that discipline can also provide a comparable model to use 
as a basis for formulating a creative role for the church 
vis-a-vis social conflict. Such a model, along with its 
theoretical base, will need to affirm a dialogical process 
similar to that advocated by Oates. In the search for, and
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utilization of, a social science model appropriate to a 
context of social conflict, one will confront numerous 
questions which must be addressed. Is it possible to speak 
of a generic theory of conflict which can be applied to 
both interpersonal and inter-societal settings? Where does 
a particular theory fit within the total spectrum of theo­
ries of conflict and why is this theoretical construct 
better than the alternatives? What are the primary issues 
which any theory must address? For example, what are the 
respective secular arguments for advocacy verses mediation 
(partiality verses impartiality) as roles for third party 
interveners in situations of social conflict? Finally, 
what are the methodological procedures (eg. data collec­
tion) used within this conceptual framework and can they be 
applied or adapted for use in this study? These questions 
will be addressed in detail in part I of the thesis. In 
chapter 1, I will present an overview of conflict resolu­
tion theory. In chapter 2, I will select one particular 
theory for special examination. Principled negotiation, as 
developed by the Harvard Negotiation Project of Harvard Law 
School, provides a pragmatic approach, as well as a theore­
tical framework, which I will use to structure the rest of 
the study.
Part II will move from the level of secular theory to 
praxis. This is essential in order to test out the adequa­
cy of the proposed theoretical construct for the theologi­
cal task of developing a role model and rationale for the
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church as third party intervener in situations of social
y
conflict. The case material will be used to identift gaps, 
inadequacies, or other problems in principled negotiation 
as a theory. In selecting the cases to be researched, I 
was concerned that they represent similar geographical and 
geopolitical contexts, in order that the distinctive 
results due to other variables may be more easily assessed. 
The context I selected was that of East-West relations 
during the Cold War. First, there is quite a wealth of 
Christian tradition on both sides of this divide, providing 
at least the potential for substantial church involvement. 
Second, when I began the study, the East-West schism was 
one which affected the whole world, dividing it into hos­
tile camps. Now that the Cold War has ended, the relation­
ship still has the potential for altering the course of 
history. Hence, a study of the role of the church in the 
context of East-West conflict offers a field where the long 
history of the church has a opportunity to influence the 
unfolding of events at a unique point in history.
I will develop two case studies. The first (chapter 
3) will act as a kind of control case. Here, I will exam­
ine third party intervention as practised by the proponents 
of principled negotiation. The case will examine a rela­
tively confined aspect of U.S.-Soviet relations, the devel­
opment of nuclear risk reduction centers in Moscow and 
Washington. The second case (chapter 4) will be one where
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a religious body has functioned as third party in some 
aspect of East-West conflict.
Before going further, it is necessary to address the 
question, "Why the church?," as opposed to some other 
social institution. I would argue that the church embodies 
a number of features which make it potentially effective as 
a third party intervener. First is the spiritual nature of 
the church. In its message of reconciliation, it has the 
potential to offer hope and the moral authority to chal­
lenge entrenched enmity. Second is the access to ordinary 
people within different substrata represented in a con­
flict. Within the church there is often a point of connec­
tion with basic feelings on various sides of a given dis­
pute. Third is the relationship which the church has with 
the political community. As a social institution within 
any society, it has to have developed some relationship 
with political, and other, institutions which are instru­
mental in the dynamics of international conflict. Fourth, 
is the universal nature of the church. Since the church 
transcends racial, national, political, and ideological 
frontiers, it has the opportunity to provide crosscutting 
cleavages between conflicting parties. Its world-wide 
network of communication can become a channel of informa­
tion or messages across lines of confrontation. As Hun­
garian Reformed Bishop Karoly Toth has written:
The church is metaphysical-spiritual; grass-rooted- 
popular; national-institutional; and ecumenical-insti­
tutional at the same time. This is why the very
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nature of the church makes it possible to contribute 
to conflict resolution on every level of human socie­
ty.3
I will now attempt to set the background for selection 
of a case study where the third party is a religious body. 
First, I must ask if there are any examples of religious 
groups which have consciously used such a role in a 
successful intervention process? If so, which case affords 
the greatest degree of comparison with principled negotia­
tion and with the Harvard case in chapter 3? Consequently, 
I will now turn to an examination of church involvement in 
the resolution of Social Conflict. This will both assist 
in the selection of case material and provide a bit broader 
overview within which to contextualize the present study.
Although the church has dealt extensively with social 
conflict over many centuries, it has functioned as media­
tor/conciliator in a rather limited number of situations.
As already indicated, the advocacy role has been a more 
common function for the church as third party intervener. 
This can be seen, for example, in the recent history of the 
international ecumenical movement, one place where there 
has been a conscious effort to intervene in international 
affairs. The stance adopted by the Commission of the 
Churches on International Affairs (CCIA) of the World Coun­
cil of Churches (WCC), undoubtedly the foremost ecclesias­
tical body with extensive experience in international af­
fairs, illustrates my point. Although an early study on 
the subject, commissioned by the WCC, lists negotiation,
8
consultation, and reconciliation as recommended actions for 
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the churches, the primary thrust of the organization's 
peace activities has been advocacy oriented. The form which 
this normally has taken is pronouncements and resolutions. 
In this way, the commission has advocated on behalf of the 
independence of third world nations following World War II, 
and on behalf of the rights of poor and oppressed peoples 
ever since. Similarly, the CCIA has, since 1975, taken 
numerous stands opposing militarism and advocating disarma­
ment. At the Vancouver Assembly in 1983, where most of the 
issues addressed had to do with problems of peace and 
justice, a resolution passed which stated, "We stand in 
solidarity across the world to call persistently, in every 
forum, for a halt to the arms race." This assembly called 
upon churches to "confront with new vigour the threats to
peace... and engage in struggles for justice and human 
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dignity." Over the past forty years there have been numer­
ous pronouncements or resolutions which indicate that the 
CCIA has taken a stand on a specific case of international, 
or inter-societal, conflict. These include: support for 
the legal status of Jerusalem (1949), support for the legal 
status of South West Africa (1949), support for UN inter­
vention in the Korean War (1950), condemnation of the 
Soviet invasion of Hungary (1956), support for the territo- 
rial integrity and independence of Lebanon and Jordon 
(1958), condemnation of the U.S. intervention in the Domin­
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ican Republic (1964), repeated condemnation of U.S. inter­
vention in Viet Nam (1968-1972), support for liberation 
movements and sanctions in South Africa and opposition to 
western collaboration (early 1970's), condemnation of the 
Philippine government for misuse of power and repression 
(1974), condemnation of the Rhodesian government for op­
pression of blacks (1978), and condemnation of the U.S.
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invasion of Granada in 1983.
However, since the establishment of the CCIA, there 
have been a few attempts to focus attention on conflict 
resolution procedures. Between 1969-1980 three consulta­
tions took place under CCIA Auspices: "Alternatives to 
Conflict in the Quest for Peace" in 1969, "Peaceful Solu­
tions of Conflicts" in 1979, and "Peaceful Resolution of
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Conflicts" in 1980. The report for the 1969 consultation, 
which included secular conflict resolution experts, indi­
cated that the churches should have and promote a better 
knowledge of the conditions, dynamics and techniques for 
the resolution of conflict, noting specifically the dynamic 
nature of peace, the nature of structural violence, and the 
need for human dignity. Furthermore, it indicated a convic­
tion that the national and international institutions of 
the church should explore ways in which they can influence 
political decision making through such means as forums
where conflicts can be debated and on-the-spot investiga-
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tions of trouble areas. The 1980 consultation went 
further, noting the need to identify various perceptions of
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interest, articulate "common interests," promote a more 
critical public opinion, and encourage greater involvement 
in the conciliation process. As a result, there has been 
some involvement of the CCIA as an intermediary in conflict 
resolution efforts. Beginning with the Netherlands-Indone- 
sia dispute of 1949 (where WCC members and staff repre­
sented their governments as advisors), and continuing 
through the Korean War (where the CCIA director served as 
an intermediary), the Viet Nam War (where CCIA officials 
held regular private consultations with all four delega­
tions at the Paris Peace talks), the Sudanese Civil War 
(where the CCIA, along with the All Africa Conference of 
Churches, acted as the official mediation team in 1971-72), 
and concluding with ongoing efforts in Korea, Indochina,
Sri Lanka, Vanuatu, New Caledonia, Israel/Palestine, and 
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Lebanon. These efforts, while commendable, and certainly 
informative with respect to the general topic, do not offer 
a case study where the major conflict was East-West, Cold 
War. In fact, CCIA Director, Ninan Koshy, advised me to 
look elsewhere, specifically recommending the Conference of 
European Churches (CEC).
CEC was conceived in the midst of the Cold War and 
served to bring together, in about equal membership, 
churches from East and West. It was, in many ways similar 
to the WCC in structure and outlook. It gained its legiti­
macy as a fellowship of member churches. It urged member
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churches to fight for disarmament and against the use of 
atomic weapons, as well as to struggle for reconciliation 
between nations and against the climate of distrust between 
the two ideological camps. However, it had a lower pro­
file, thus enabling it to do more things without the glare 
of public disclosure. CEC's most significant peace related 
goal has been the monitoring of the Helsinki Accords of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
CEC was, in fact, the first international organization to 
call for a conference of the heads of all European govern­
ments in order to create dialogue between East and West and
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dismantle the two blocks which divide the continent.
I considered using, as a case study, CEC's role in 
formulating the idea of CSCE and its role in monitoring and 
pointing out violations of the Helsinki Accords. However, 
after considerable research in their archives in Geneva, 
as well as numerous interviews with CEC staff and working 
group participants, I concluded that this case lacked some 
important criteria for which I was looking. First, al­
though there was clearly input into the political process, 
CEC's efforts were primarily directed toward overcoming 
divisions between churches in the East and West. This is a 
very significant work, but does not fit the criteria for 
my study. Second, even where there was input into the 
political process, it was not constant and its effects 
were rarely measurable. These factor would have made it 
difficult to develop any kind of sustained case involving
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the kind of third party intervention which I needed for 
the purposes of this study.
I briefly considered a variety of other ecumenical 
organizations, including the International Fellowship of 
Reconciliation, Moral Rearmament, Aktion Suehnezeichen- 
Friedendienst, and the Christian Peace Conference. Each of 
these failed according to one of the following criteria: 
lack of clear involvement in East-West conflict, lack of 
adequate concern for specifically political goals, the 
primacy of advocacy over mediation roles, or too much 
identification with one side of the conflict. Finally, I 
also considered some denominational organizations, espe­
cially those of the traditional peace churches —  Brethren, 
Mennonite, and Quaker. Of these, the Quakers had both the 
longest record of third party intervention and the best 
case fitting my criteria as described above.
The Quakers have a three hundred year history of 
conciliation efforts in international conflicts. They have 
also contributed significantly to conflict resolution theo­
ry. Adam Curie, a Quaker and former Director of Peace 
Studies at University of Bradford, has written extensively 
on the role of the nonofficial peacemaker, or private 
diplomat. I will utilize some of his material in my theo­
retical assessment.
From the beginning there have been two strands in the 
Quaker peace movement, those attempting to convert world
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leaders and those attempting to reform society and develop 
peaceful institutions. Robert Barkley represented the 
first type when he wrote "The Epistle of Love and Friendly 
Advice" to European leaders in 1677 in an attempt to avoid 
war. William Penn represented the second type in his 
efforts to seek conciliation between the Indian nations and
© T
the European settlers. Over the next couple centuries, 
Quakers were involved in numerous conciliation attempts, 
including the American Revolution (1776), a mission to Czar 
Nicholas I in an attempt to prevent the Crimean War (1854), 
and the conflict between Denmark and the Duchies of Schles­
wig-Holstein (1864). Following World War I, the Quakers 
established the Committee for International Service in 
London and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) in 
Philadelphia in response to a call by Carl Heath for the 
creation of "Quaker embassies" in the capitals of the 
world. These offices oversaw the formation, in many ci­
ties, of Quaker "centers," whose task it would be to help 
build international political institutions for peace. One
of these centers was located in Geneva for the sole purpose
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of collaborating with the League of Nations.
Following World War II, the Quakers looked for better 
ways to influence world leaders. The purpose of the cen­
ters changed from spreading good will to developing con­
crete programs for bringing groups of potential leaders 
together across barriers of culture and national interest, 
exposing them to the new psychological and sociological
insights of conflict resolution theory. Two new programs
were created —  the Washington Seminars in International
Affairs and the Conferences for Diplomats. The former
conducted monthly sessions for U.S. government officials,
congresspeople, diplomats, and journalists. The latter
conducted conferences in Europe and the U.S. for young
foreign service officers. The European conferences focused
more on East-West relations and included participants from
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the Soviet Union and most socialist countries. Yet AFSC
also sponsored numerous dialogues and seminars with the
13
Soviets during the past forty years. In addition to these
efforts, the Quaker United Nations Offices in Geneva and
New York (QUNOs) were set up to serve as a center for
Quaker influence on the world organization. Among its
responsibilities, it was to submit memoranda on a variety
of issues (including disarmament), seek out spokespersons
of opposing sides in conflict situations and attempt to
14
provide interpretation between the parties.
Not all of Quaker peacemaking activity has been fo­
cused around the use of an impartial third party. In fact, 
many Quaker organizations have stressed advocacy rather 
than mediation/conciliation, as can be seen in some of the 
above mentioned activities. Friends Committee on National 
Legislation in Washington is one organization which has 
majored in advocacy work. For example, it has played a 
significant role promoting U.S. legislative action toward
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disarmament. Yet, in the course of fulfilling its mission
it also encouraged arms control negotiations and supported
joint ventures and contacts between officials of each 
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government. Another example of Quaker activity where advo­
cacy prevailed took place during the Viet Nam War when 
there was intense confrontation with the U.S. government. 
Yet, even here, contacts were maintained with both sides. 
So, even when advocacy has been the primary purpose of an 
activity, the Quaker approach required some degree of open­
ness to the offending party, in an attempt to create mean­
ingful dialogue.
However, for the purposes of this study, it is impor­
tant to take a case from the wealth of material available 
where the Quakers functioned as a quiet, unofficial, unin­
vited, off-the-record go-between. Such examples abound —  
from the ongoing conflicts in Northern Ireland, South Afri­
ca, and the Middle East, to more time specific efforts such 
as the India-Pakistan War of 1965, the Nigerian Civil War 
of 1967-70, and the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe 
(1976-80). Fortunately, there is also an excellent example
of the second type of conciliation efforts between the two
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Germanies during the period between 1962-73, which will be 
the focus of my examination in chapter 4.
For both of the cases in Part II, I have used exten­
sive archival material and conducted in-depth interviews 
with all primary participants and some secondary ones. 
Furthermore, I have shared draft copies of the cases with
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all persons interviewed, as well as the archivist at AFSC. 
In all cases I have edited the manuscript in light of the 
feedback I received. Therefore, I am confident that the 
studies reflect an accurate view of the cases presented.
Finally, in Part III, I will return to theoretical 
reflection. This time it will be theological in nature, as 
I prepare to draw conclusions about an appropriate model 
for the church. My initial aim will be to develop my own 
theological ethics regarding reconciliation an as organiz­
ing principle for the functioning of religious third par­
ties in the resolution of international conflict (chapter 
5). Following this, I will examine how the approach of 
principled negotiation can inform this theology and how a 
theological framework, drawn from the wider field of Chris­
tian social ethics, can be used to adapt principled nego­
tiation to fit the needs of the church (chapter 6).
Conflict resolution theory and theology will interact 
in this section through a couple of prisms, one of which is 
the case material in part II. This empirical data will 
help either to confirm, or to guestion, theoretical gener­
alizations (secular or theological). It will also serve as 
an objective measure against which to evaluate any poten­
tial theological adaptation of secular theory. On the 
other hand, both the theology of conciliation and the 
theoretical framework of principled negotiation, will be 
used to draw out the wider implications of the case materi—
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al. The second prism is the discipline of Biblical exege­
sis. Although certainly academic in nature, this disci­
pline still draws upon the experience of people of faith.
It is praxis, though historically removed. As such, it 
becomes another testing ground for determining the adequacy 
of theory. The Biblical stories frequently provide a kind 
of case material which further enlightens the analysis. 
Moreover, it is my conviction that this Biblical material 
is normative for our understanding of faithful life and 
service. Hence, it becomes an essential prism through which 
my analysis must look.
The main body of theological analysis, from which I 
will draw, comes primarily from twentieth century theolo­
gians. It should not come as any surprise that theologians 
from this century have had the most to say about the ethi­
cal concerns which relate to international conflict resolu­
tion in the contemporary world. Furthermore, I shall uti­
lize four diverse schools of theological thought (in addi­
tion to Quaker beliefs), a scheme which will provide con­
siderable diversity of perspective. These schools include 
Christian realism (representing an establishment mentali­
ty) , liberation theology (representing a disestablishment 
mentality), Anabaptist theology (representing a remnant, 
pacifist mentality, and Christian spirituality (represent­
ing a mystical mentality). The first two categories are 
typical political theologies which are concerned for how 
society is structured. The chief goal is either to balance
18
power (Christian realism) or redistribute it (liberation 
theology). Their audience is a particular class —  policy­
makers in the case of Christian realism or the oppressed in 
the case of liberation theology. This tends to give them a 
partisan approach to the resolution of conflict. The se­
cond two categories are not typical political theologies. 
Their proponents are more concerned with the quality of 
witness than with alterations to the structure of society. 
The chief goal is to promote faithfulness and purity of 
both attitude and action. Power is either to be abandoned 
(Anabaptist) or transformed (mystical). Their audience is 
primarily the small group of the faithful (Anabaptist) or 
oneself (mystical). This tends to provide them with a 
measure of critical distance from protagonists in a con­
flict, making it less likely that they will develop a 
partisan approach.
£
As I draw upon these school of theology, I have made 
an effort to select those individual authors whose insights 
will be most informative. When presenting Christian real­
ism, I will primarily refer to the father of contemporary 
realism, Reinhold Niebuhr, who has written extensively on 
the subject matter of this study, and whose work has in­
fluenced a whole generation of political theologians When 
presenting liberation theology, I will refer to numerous 
authors (Jan Sobrino, Gustavo Gutierrez, Leonardo Boff,
Jose Miguez Bonino, Juan Luis Segundo, George Pixley, Fer­
19
nando Belo, Sergio Rostagno, Paulo Freire, etc.), since I 
wish to create a dialogue with the school as a whole, and 
since no one individual has yet become the commanding 
figure. When presenting Anabaptist theology, I shall uti­
lize both better known (John Howard Yoder and Stanley 
Hauerwas) and lesser known (Guy Hershberger and Duane Frie- 
sen) individuals. When presenting mystical theology, I 
will utilize those who have expressed great concern to 
integrate spirituality with social responsibility and avoid 
any pietistic retreat from the world (Henri Nouwen, Thomas 
Merton, and Matthew Fox). This cast of theologians gives a 
breadth of perspective which will provide greater depth and 
enhance the final result.
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THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT INTERVENTION
The study of peace and international conflict, as a 
separate discipline, is a modern occurrence, resulting 
from renewed interest in war and peace research. Follow­
ing World War II, the concept of conflict began to emerge 
as a focal point for studies on war and peace. For the 
first time there were comparative studies being done where 
war was examined as merely one example of a wider social 
phenomenon. These studies were part of the early
development of what is now called a generic theory of 
1
conflict.
Such a development presumes that the processes of 
conflict can be studied as a class of phenomena with 
certain common characteristics which are applicable in 
numerous contexts. The validity of this assumption under­
lies much of this study. Although the particular focus of 
my research is on international conflict, the issues 
raised in attempting to develop an intermediary role, and 
theological rationale, for the church will carry implica­
tions for the understanding and handling of conflict in a 
variety of circumstances. Therefore, I will begin my 
study with a brief examination of a rationale for a gener­
ic theory of conflict.
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A Generic Approach
It is my contention that there is enough similarity 
among the different types of conflict situations to merit 
general theorization as a class of behavior. Drawing upon 
all disciplines and settings is essential in order to 
obtain the comparisons and contrasts which can continually 
sharpen and correct the general theory. Not only is it 
possible to cast a wide net; it is crucial to have a 
general framework from which to deviate. Effective inter­
national negotiation or mediation, as with any situational 
subset, must be built upon at least a tentative broad- 
based theoretical foundation.
There are two basic arguments against this generic 
view of conflict, the idiographic and gradualist perspec­
tives. The idiographic approach holds that "true know­
ledge is of the particulars." Proponents claim that spe­
cial theory, designed for particular settings, provides 
more accurate understanding of the unique properties. 
General theory risks overlooking or distorting critical 
aspects of each particular case. Yet, such idiographic 
arguments would rule out any generalization, including 
sub-categories of conflict such as international, indus­
trial, racial, etc. Even the most limited theory attempts 
to generalize regarding shared characteristics within a 
given category of behavior. If the unigueness of each 
incident does not preclude the development of limited
25
theory about a small set of circumstances, then the 
uniqueness of a small class of phenomena should not pre­
clude the development of general theory with which to 
develop understanding of a number of such classes. The 
idiographic objection can be answered by developing theo­
ries which take into account the variables pertaining to a
2
certain subset and set out appropriate sub-theories.
The gradualist argument states that, while general 
theory is desirable, it is not attainable at this time. 
Instead one must aim for a "middle range" theory which is 
more general than the current theoretical understanding, 
but less broad than one's ultimate goal. The belief is 
that gradually one will broaden the theory, while having 
adequate time to empirically check each step along the 
way. Those who apply this argument to the study of con­
flict believe that the present level of understanding in 
this field only warrants the development of theory at the 
level of sub-units. However, the concept of "middle 
range" theory is rather ambiguous. What constitutes the 
middle? Is not a general theory of conflict but a mid­
point in the quest for theories about general behavior? 
Furthermore, it is not clear why a "middle range" theory 
would necessarily be any more accurate than a general one. 
To concentrate exclusively on special theories would risk
developing sets of hypotheses which are inconsis tent with
3
each other and, therefore, of limited value.
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In addition, there are positive reasons for develop­
ing and utilizing general theory. Having an overall 
framework helps to identify special classes within the 
larger unit, influence the formulation of special theo­
ries, and indicate possible directions for empirical in­
vestigation. Subgroupings, and their concomitant theo­
ries, may be guite different when they are developed in
4
response to a general theory, instead of prior to it. For 
example, peace researcher Johan Galtung develops a classi­
fication of inter-system and intra-system conflict which 
is drawn along rather different lines of categorization 
than distinctions according to setting (eg. industrial, 
racial, international). In Galtung's schema the pro­
perties of interpersonal and international are compared
rather than contrasted, an analysis made possible only
5
by his comprehensive theory of conflict.
Conseguently, it seems valid to me to affirm the 
significance of a generic theory of conflict. This has 
implications, not only for the broad application of my 
conclusions, but also for the methodology of my investiga­
tion. In my argumentation and assessment I will utilize 
insights drawn from a variety of conflict situations. The 
particularities of international conflict will not be 
neglected. However, I will also take into account the 
findings of research in related fields, such as labor/man­
agement disputes, family counseling, race relations, etc.
A variety of disciplines have actively developed
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models in an attempt to conceptualize adequately the 
multiple dimensions of conflict. Biological, mathematical, 
economic, political, sociological, and psychological mod­
els of conflict have all been used as starting points for 
the development of various theories of conflict and con­
flict intervention. In fact, models developed in each of 
the above fields have been applied specifically to the 
international arena. However, two fields in particular —  
political and behavioral science —  have had special im­
pact on the handling of conflict in the international 
context. Therefore, I will begin by examining various 
models arising within these disciplines. This will enable 
the attainment of as much insight as possible from inter­
disciplinary cross-fertilization. It will also serve to 
cast a wider net from which to select a specific model for 
evaluation and application to the church's involvement in 
international conflict.
Sources of Contemporary Models 
In the 1950's, there was considerable controversy 
between theorists representing the disciplines of politi­
cal and behavioral science. Each claimed that the other 
did not show enough interest in its contribution to the
field and did not adequately understand the framework
6
within which international conflict operated. Yet, as 
will be demonstrated in this section, there was considera­
ble interdisciplinary cross-fertilization, in particular,
28
the influence of behavioral science on the development of 
the newest political model. Due to limitations of space, I 
will briefly address the contributions of each of these 
fields. However, I will give emphasis to the behavioral 
model due to its recent influence on political models and, 
in particular, the specific theory which I shall examine 
in the next chapter and which I will use as a basis for 
evaluation in the remainder of the study.
Political Models
Political models have grown out of a long history of
classical statecraft, where analysis has focused on the
historical record of unique events and personalities.
Generalization is made only with great sensitivity to the
context of the particular negotiation and its immediate 
7
history. However, years of precedence have still had a 
lasting effect on the development of general theory and 
practice of international negotiation. Over the last five 
hundred years, a conceptual framework and set of tech­
niques has gradually developed, which still carries great 
influence in contemporary practice. The primary debate, 
arising out of this history, has been between liberals, 
who focused on mutual respect and cooperation between 
states, and realists who relied on the balance of power to 
produce stability and settlement of dispute. In addition, 
more radical structuralist perspectives advocated re­
placement of the sovereign state with other bases of group
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identity. For example, Marxism proposed social class as 
the organizing principle, while anarchism championed the 
existence of a higher law with concomitant commitment to 
universal rights. The religious roots of the latter can be 
traced from the radical Christian communities of the 
Reformation to the influence of Tolstoi and Ghandi. In 
the West, during this century, it is the realist position, 
after a brief interlude of liberalism, which has dominated 
the political perspective on international negotiation. 
This has led to the advent of secret diplomacy, preoccupa­
tion with development of positions which will protect
one's sphere of interest, and the central role of coer-
8
cion and threat. The origins of the realist paradigm 
reach back to Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Clause- 
witz, while modern proponents include E.H. Carr, Hans
Morgenthau, George Kennan, Hedley Bull, Kenneth Thompson,
9
and theologian Reinhold Niebuhr.
Recently the realist perspective has been challenged 
by a new, pluralist school of political thought. Although 
in some ways reminiscent of liberalism, pluralism is based 
more on empirical findings of the behavioral revolution.
It builds on the assumption that the world is highly 
complex, consisting of multi-centric, rather than state- 
centric, systems of relationships. Pluralists point to 
many anomalies within the realist paradigm which they 
claim can be addressed adequately by pluralism. They
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question whether the behavior of states can be described 
accurately by the realists' billiard ball analogy, ie. as 
hard, uniform objects which bounce off one another, rather 
than a model reflecting interdependence. They assert that 
states are not unitary rational actors, nor are they the 
only actors in the international system. Finally, they 
challenge the use of confrontation, as a means of achiev­
ing security, in a changing international political system 
where it is not safe to let war be the final arbiter. All
this leads to a proposed negotiating style which is based
10
upon interdependence, integration, and collaboration.
Proponents of this paradigm shift, and its ramifications
for international negotiation, include John W. Burton,




Behavioral models of international negotiation were
first developed in the late 1950's, but have generated a
great deal of research in the intervening forty years.
There is a now vast literature which has influenced the
writings of many international theorists from outside the
behavioral sciences. The most notable of these behavioral
scientists include Herbert C. Kelman, Bert R. Brown, Dean
G. Pruitt, Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Daniel Druckman, and Morton 
12
Deutsch.
Rather than investigate the essence of bargaining in
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a particular milieu, behavioralists tend to compare spe­
cific characteristics of particular bargaining situations. 
This means that methodology utilized in the collection and 
systematization of data becomes a critical factor in the 
use of behavioral models. Therefore, I will first examine 
the methodology before exploring, in the rest of the 
chapter, the various schools of thought which have devel­
oped within this discipline.
There are three approaches to the collection and 
systematization of behavioral data --investigation, exper­
imentation, and general social-psychological research. 
Systematic investigation of international negotiation is 
difficult because of restricted access to ongoing negotia­
tions. Investigators are usually confined to collection of 
data from past negotiations through analysis of the his­
torical record or interviews with the participants, a 
methodology which I will utilize in researching my own 
case studies in chapters 3 and 4. Yet the process of 
investigating international negotiation is slightly easier 
than that of intra-governmental decision making due to the 
more public nature of the former. Although the results of
such research are not voluminous, they are rather broadly
13
accepted as valid.
Experimentation involving intergroup and interperson­
al conflict is a second source of behavioral data. Exper­
imental studies with volunteer subjects are designed to 
demonstrate the effects of specific independent variables
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on a particular process or outcome. In such a study, 
bargaining is no longer investigated as a process, but as 
a series of relations between outcome and variable charac­
teristics. Consequently, these models concentrate more on 
predictive capability with respect to situational charac-
14
teristics than on formulation of a complete process model. 
This research is often criticized for this very lack of an 
overall framework through which variables can be related 
in a coherent manner. Secondly, its applicability to the 
real world, especially the context of international nego­
tiation, is questioned. Research done with students may 
say very little about the way statesmen interpret, or 
respond to, a similar situation. Even if the subjects are 
not students, it is unlikely that they will naturally 
function in accord with the non-face-to-face context and 
the representative nature of international negotiations,
15
with its accountability to bureaucracy and constituency.
Despite these weaknesses, most theorists recognize a 
qualified role for experimental behavioral research as a 
way of testing the validity of specific components within 
a general model. Therefore, I will occasionally utilize 
such research, especially when assessing contradictory 
assumptions of competing theories of conflict resolution 
theory in chapter 6. However, it must also be noted that, 
certain conditions must be maintained in order for such 
research to be applicable to international conflict. The
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laboratory setting must be structured so as to isolate 
variables crucial to the international setting and to 
incorporate significant conditions which are likely to 
effect the way these variables will be apt to function in 
the international context. In other words, structural 
similarity, but not exact replication, of the significant 
characteristics is sufficient to gain relevant insights. 
The experimental model needs only to operate, rather than 
look, like the international context in the respects rele­
vant to the particular study. This is especially true if 
one's purpose is merely to exclude certain options or 
suggest potential ones. Furthermore, the opportunity af­
forded, in simulation, to keep extraneous factors under 
control makes it possible to discover or confirm some 
things which one could not observe in the actual setting. 
Such research can provide causal information, test theo­
retical propositions, and predict the effects of change in
16
the international system.
A final, but controversial, source of behavioral data 
is general social psychological research on the processes 
of negotiation taken from other settings of intergroup or 
interpersonal conflict, such as industrial, commercial, 
community, racial, and family. Critics warn that the 
dilemmas and rigidities inherent in negotiation increase 
in direct proportion to the size and complexity of the 
parties involved, making the international system the most 
resistant to constructive negotiation. Some specific
34
idiographic objections focus on factors unique to interna­
tional negotiation. One alleged difference is the lack of 
a higher level of social organization. This implies that 
there is no regulatory power or authority, and no common 
body of law or accepted understanding of how to resolve 
conflict. Therefore, the ability to defer to third par­
ties to resolve disputes is frequently diminished and the 
precedence of war as the final arbiter is strengthened. 
Other features of international negotiation, for which a 
claim of uniqueness is made, include: the high level of 
the stakes, the high public profile, the role of ideology 
in distortion of perceptions, the lack of decision making 
capability and negotiating flexibility on the part of
negotiators, and the presence of a multicultural milieu
17
with fewer common values and less natural trust.
Other critics draw the contrast more narrowly between 
war, as one context for international negotiation, and 
industrial or commercial negotiation, the settings which 
have produced the most research on domestic dispute set­
tlement. The most significant difference between peace 
negotiation and labor or business negotiation has to do 
with the on/off nature of the former compared with the 
continuous nature of the latter. This is presumed to 
affect many aspects of the negotiation process when it is 
applied to peace negotiations —  for example, the necessi­
ty of pre-negotiation, a greater tendency to remember
35
previous losses and revoke previous offers, fewer common 
goals and less knowledge of opponents, less likelihood of 
subsequent decisions following from previous ones, greater 
potential for the negotiation process to be viewed as 
treason, and the constant presence of threat in diplomatic 
relations. Additional factors are also assumed to distin­
guish peace from labor/business negotiations —  the fre­
quency of multilateral instead of bipolar negotiations, 
the multidimensional nature of power, the tendency to 
concentrate on specific aspects of the relationship in­
stead of encompassing its entire scope, and the nature of 
weapons used (for example, length of range of the projec-
18
tile and consequent attention given to defensive measures).
Despite these divergent tendencies, most of the writ­
ers who note these distinctions also affirm the existence 
of common attributes in the essential character of the 
various conflict situations. International relations spe­
cialist, Oran Young, suggests that the various types of 
settings overlap substantially, with a large number of
common variables. Dissimilarity exists only at the ends
19
of the spectrum, with the peripheral variables. While 
admitting the need for great care in adaptation to the 
largest of intergroup contexts, with its greater complexi­
ty and impersonal character, Kelman points to racial, and 
even industrial, negotiations as comparable fields from 
which to gain insight for international negotiation. He 
notes that participants in these contexts also act as
36
representatives of larger constituencies, yet have the 
advantage of fewer participants in the negotiation pro­
cess, greater availability for observation, guicker and
more comprehensive identification of relevant elements. 
Other writers list additional similarities, especially 
with industrial negotiations. Some of these, in fact, 
challenge the previously listed "unigue characteristics" 
of international negotiation —  such as lack of any com­
mand structure or final arbiter, affirmation of possibili­
ties for mutual gain, and increased willingness to accept 
outside assistance due to a growing awareness of the high 
cost of conflict. Other similarities with industrial 
negotiations include the presence of powerful organi­
zations with considerable freedom to act and the need for 
internal negotiations within parties. Furthermore, many 
authors cite the presence of numerous factors common to 
all negotiating situations, such as vital interests, 
strong emotions, a large number of potential dilemmas, 
concern for future status, and the deterrent value of 
mutually threatening consequences. Finally, comparison 
between industrial and international negotiation increases 
if one eliminates the violence factor, a significant cause 
of emotional investment, and therefore entrenchment and 
inflexibility, in international conflict. Therefore, the 
more orderly, less complex, environment of peaceful, bila­





Since its inception, the behavioralist approach to 
international negotiation has grown tremendously in quali­
ty and sophistication of research at all three levels of 
investigation, experimentation, and general theory. Coor­
dination with the traditional foreign policy process is 
now seen as crucial. Consistent care is taken to fully 
explore the international context to which one wishes to 
generalize. Furthermore, there is a greater tendency to 
start with questions which arise out of international
conflict and seek insights from behavioral science, rather
22
than impose a ready made model. In light of this assess­
ment, I will assume the validity of much of the social 
psychological research drawn from numerous negotiation and 
mediation contexts. In the evaluation of my own case 
material, I will utilize many of the above insights into 
both the unique and common nature of international nego­
tiation and conciliation processes.
Now, having noted the dependence of the political 
pluralist model on behavioral science research, and having 
examined the methodology of behavioral science, I will 
explore the various behavioralist schools of thought with 
regard to the analysis of conflict. Three distinct topics 
are critical to this overview of alternate theories of 
conflict and conflict intervention —  the nature of con­
flict, the handling of conflict, and the place of third 
party intervention.
38
The Nature of Conflict
A common understanding among the various perspectives
in the study of conflict is that it has to do with change.
Sociologist Lewis Coser describes conflict as an essential
component of socialization, without which any group would
23
be devoid of process and structure. International rela­
tions scholar Anthony de Reuck notes that conflict, with 
respect to social structure and resource allocation, al­
ways involves a process of adaptation to both the nature
24
and costs of change. Both analysts observe that conflict 
is not only the conseguence of change, but often its cause 
as well.
Despite common acceptance of the relationship between 
conflict and change, one of the basic theoretical divides 
is over the understanding of conflict as positive or 
negative. This debate has a long history, as can be seen 
in an examination of ancient Greek philosophy. While 
Homer wishes that all conflict would vanish, Hesiod dis­
tinguishes between creative conflict and evil strife, and
Heraclitus7 doctrine of opposites affirms conflict as
25
essential for the pursuit of true harmony. Like the 
ancients, those in contemporary social science, who hold a 
negative view of conflict, attempt to avoid it or termi­
nate it as soon as possible. They tend to view it as a 
disruption of the natural state of things. Humanity7s 
basic nature is seen as good and harmonious. Conflict is
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seen as akin to natural disasters, an aberration which can
be avoided. It is to be overcome or prevented by learning
26
enough about the causes. Such perspectives can be found
in the cognitive dissonance theories of psychology and
social psychology, in the sociological theories of rank
disequilibrium, and the conflict polarization theories of
27
international affairs. In fact, the sociology of the 
period between World Wars I and II is dominated by the 
avoidance of conflict and the promotion of the Durkheimian
quest for social cohesion, equilibrium, and collaboration
28
in the face of social instability.
On the other hand, postwar sociology reflects a more
positive view of conflict as inherent to human nature, as
29
reflected in the writings of Coser and Georg Simmel.
Coser observes the positive value of conflict as a deter­
rent to social ossification and claims that a well inte­
grated society will not only tolerate, but welcome it. If 
expression of tension and frustration is allowed, this 
will necessitate re-examination of behavior patterns, 
values and norms, resulting in creative innovation, and 
needed social restructuring. However, if such expressions 
are diverted or suppressed, the result will be further ac­
cumulation of tension and the eruption of "destructive 
unrealistic conflict." Coser's distinctions between la­
tent and manifest conflict, as well as his attempts to 
demarcate positive from negative elements, have been the
40
subject of much recent study. Sociologist Galtung builds 
upon this work by distinguishing between conflict and the 
consequences of conflict, which are conflict attitudes and 
conflict behavior. Although he views basic conflict as a 
necessary challenge and motivating force within society, 
he sees the consequences as potentially negative. Both 
conflict attitudes and behavior can be either constructive 
or destructive, though empirical evidence points toward a 
preponderance of destructiveness. According to Galtung 
this is due to the frustration-aggression cycle, a con­
flict triangle where (C) a basic conflict, due to differ­
ences in parties' goal states, leads to (A) an attitude of 
frustration which tends, in turn to produce (B) negative, 
aggressive behavior, which results in an escalation of (C)
the basic conflict, and the spiral of increasingly nega-
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tive (A) attitude and (B) behavior, etc. The initial 
task, then, becomes one of distinguishing between conflict 
as a necessary and positive element of social interaction 
and the negative forms of behavior and attitude which may 
develop.
Advocates of this more balanced understanding of 
conflict are still divided between those who see the 
origins of aggression and conflict within the individual 
and those who see it within social structure. These have 
been referred to as microcosmic and macrocosmic theories 
of conflict. The microcosmic approach is usually the 
starting point for conflict theorists in the fields of
41
psychology, social psychology, biology, game theory and 
decision-making theory. The macrocosmic approach is the 
usual starting point for sociologists, anthropologists, 
geographers, organization and communication theorists, 
political scientists, international relations analysts, 
and systems theorists. This polarity is best seen in the 
contrast between the disciplines of psychology, where 
conflict tends to be seen as arising from the inner psy­
chic structure of the individual and then projected onto 
the external social situation, and sociology, where it 
tends to be seen as arising from the social structures
32
with conseguent effect on the psychic life of individuals.
Alongside this distinction between individual and 
social sources of conflict is polarity in another dimen­
sion, the subjective or objective nature of the conflict.
If the source of conflict is in the psychic structure of 
the individual, then it is a very subjective phenomenon. 
Perceptions become all important. One can, in fact, 
change the very character of the conflict by changing the 
perceptions. If, on the other hand, the source of the 
conflict is in social structures, then conflict is objec­
tive and not amenable to alteration through changed per­
ceptions. It is a matter of incompatibility between real
33
conditions or events. Here, is the heart of the tension 
between the pluralist and the structuralist.
Many theorists, today, believe that it is impossible
42
to gain an adequate theory of conflict without fusing both 
the macro- and micro dimensions, and the objective and 
subjective character, into a coherent whole. Yet the 
study of international conflict still reflects this polar­
ization. Galtung, while recognizing the presence of both 
subjective and objective elements, places emphasis on the 
latter by defining conflict as incompatibility between 
goal states held by the actors in a social system. Ac­
cording to Galtung, these goals can be either objectively 
defined interests or subjectively defined values, though 
the clash of antagonistic interests is the more severe and 
intractable form of conflict. Structural conflict of in­
terests is, therefore, of deeper concern than perceptual
34
conflict of values. On the other hand, international 
relations analyst, John Burton, contends strongly for the 
basic subjective nature of international conflict and the 
need to alter perceptions of the antagonists. For him, it 
is the subjective values, rather than the objective inter­
ests, which are more fundamental. These values cannot be 
negotiated away, yet they can be reperceived. Discovery 
of complimentary, or even, universal, values can result in
mutual gain which substantially alters the conditions
35
under which objective interests are evaluated. Finally, 
social psychologists Dean Pruitt and Jeffrey Rubin are the 
ultimate proponents of the subjective nature of conflict, 
claiming that neither objective interests nor subjective 
values are outside the influence of reperception. They
43
distinguish between interests and values, on the one hand, 
and goals or aspirations, on the other. They insist that, 
before a party's interests, or values, can clash with
those of another party they must be translated into aspi-
36
rations. By tying all conflict to goals rather than 
intractable interests or values, they relegate all con­
flict to the subjective realm of perception.
The objective-subjective polarization is also re­
flected in different perceptions of the range of potential 
outcomes. An objective view of conflict is usually iden­
tified with fixed-sum outcomes, since it believes that 
incompatible interests are at stake and that one party 
must lose what another gains. A subjective view is iden­
tified with variable-sum outcomes, since it believes that 
interests are not necessarily incompatible and that gains 
can be mutual. This distinction, derived from economic 
and game theory constructs, has to do with whether or not 
the total amount of value in the system is constant. Does 
it change, or remain the same, during the period between 
initiation and resolution of the conflict? Here, value 
refers to assets, worth, or desirability rather than prin­
ciples, standards or basic beliefs, as the term has been 
used in the above paragraph. One can speak of the redis­
tribution of either positive value, what each party wishes 
to gain, or negative value, what each party wishes to 
avoid. Galtung claims that positive values are scarce and
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thus tend to create fixed-sum outcomes, whereas negative 
values are more abundant, meaning that variable-sum out­
comes are highly dependent on the impact of negative
37
sanctions or punishments. Burton, on the other hand, 
claims that positive value is no more scarce than negative 
value, when dealing with political conflict, since typical 
political interests, such as security and independence, 
increase in distributable size as each actor has more of 
them. He faults the fixed-sum model for being too tied to 
economic constructs of competition. For Burton, value can 
be more easily created, implying that the potential ex-
38
ists, in most cases of conflict, for a variable-sum outcome.
A final factor to consider in understanding conflict 
is the guestion of symmetry of power. Those who view 
conflict as subjective tend to discount ineguities of 
power between parties. If value can continually be 
created, then the possibilities for mutual gain make the 
guestion of power relationships less important. One need 
not be more powerful in order to gain a desirable outcome. 
However, those who view conflict as objective see symmetry 
of power as a critical issue. If value cannot be easily 
created, and most conflicts are to be viewed as constant- 
sum, then gains are not mutual and the more powerful party 
has the edge. Thus, in situations of power discrepancy, 
which is the more typical state of affairs, the conflict 
resides in the very structure of the situation and cannot 
be adjudicated by any manipulation of interests. Any such
45
attempt at suspension of the conflict in these cases is
39
viewed, not as peace, but pacification.
The Handling of Conflict 
Theorists representing a variety of disciplines have 
developed many different approaches to what sociologist 
Paul Wehr has collectively called the regulation of con­
flict. By this term he meant to include all intervention 
processes with the potential to facilitate creative out­
comes to conflict, including not only resolution and man­
agement, but also prevention, and even limited initiation 
40
of conflict. The earliest formal models of negotiation,
as developed in economic game theory, focused attention
around the zero-sum game in the belief that there could be
41
no determinant solution for variable-sum games. Later 
many game models were developed to assist in the analysis 
of these variable-sum, also called mixed-motive or bar­
gaining, games. These were games in which the interests 
and outcomes of the parties were both in conflict and con­
gruent, so that it was possible, not only for one to win
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and the other to lose, but for both or neither to win. 
Thomas Schelling, who first applied game theory to inter­
national conflict, distinguished between three types of 
games. The pure-collaborative game was one where either 
both or neither could win; the zero-sum game was win/lose;
and the mixed-motive game was a combination of both con-
43
flict and mutual dependence.
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In more recent years many theorists have developed 
categories with which to describe the opposing theories 
and models of negotiation/mediation. These include com­
petitive and coordinative (social psychologist Pruitt), 
competitive and cooperative (social psychologist Morton 
Deutsch), distributive and integrative (industrial nego­
tiators Richard Walton and Robert McKersie), adversarial 
and problem solving (lawyer Carrie Menkel-Meadow), tradi­
tional realist and problem solving (social psychologist
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Herbert Kelman), and many others. Generally the theories 
sift naturally into two camps. The competitive-distribu- 
tive-adversarial-realist approaches tend to be based on 
macrocosmic theories that stress the importance of power 
and the need to claim, rather than create, value. They 
speak in terms of conflict management or settlement, em­
phasizing the reality of conflicting objective interests 
and the necessity of fixed-sum outcomes. The coordina- 
tive-cooperative-integrative-problem solving approaches 
tend to be based on microcosmic theories that minimize the 
importance of power and maximize the potential for creat­
ing value. They speak in terms of conflict resolution, 
emphasizing the role of subjective values and aspirations 
and the reality of variable-sum outcomes. The competitive 
approach stresses quantitative goals, the reality of lim­
ited resources, the need to win, and adversarial tactics. 
The problem solving approach emphasizes qualitative goals,
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interdependence, the possibility for mutual gain, and the
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advantage of mutual strategy. Here, again, is the tension 
between structuralist and pluralist.
Of course the above categorization is somewhat over­
simplified. Many theorists believe that the actual prac­
tice must be a combination of the two approaches. For 
example, business negotiators David Lax and James Sebenius 
emphasize that both creating and claiming value are impor­
tant. According to them, no matter how much creative 
problem solving enlarges the pie, it must still be divid­
ed. Even value which has been created must be claimed. 
Therefore, a dilemma always exists for any negotiator, as 
the tactics used for one approach tend to impede the 
realization of the other goal. In addition, they assert 
that the optimum gain for any party is usually one which 
comes at the expense of the other party. Mutual gains 
tend to produce "good", rather than "excellent" outcomes. 
Yet, to complicate the picture further, each negotiation 
has multiple, as opposed to single, opportunities to
create or claim value, and the line between creating and
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claiming is not always "text book" clear. Furthermore,
other negotiation theorists point to additional factors
effecting value tradeoffs. For example, economist Howard
Raiffa mentions the differences in judgement, both within
and between parties, regarding the value of any specific




However, the basic distinction between competitive 
and problem solving approaches is useful for the purpose 
of evaluating basic differences in the handling of con­
flict. The competitive approach is the traditional one 
which has been employed in international diplomacy. 
Therefore, there is much that has been written from that 
perspective. However, I will briefly examine a non-tradi- 
tional, more extreme, and contemporary, proponent of una­
bated competition. Such a position will provide the best 
point of comparison with the conflict resolution approach 
which is the central focus of this study. The contrast in 
approach can very clearly be seen when comparing the works 
of a structuralist like Galtung, who represents a competi­
tive approach, with pluralists like Burton or internation­
al lawyer, Roger Fisher, of the Harvard Negotiation Pro­
ject, both of whom represent a problem solving posture.
Galtung's theory of structural violence, as previous­
ly noted, is based on the assumption that objective con­
flicts of interest lie at the heart of most conflict 
situations. This leads him to the conclusion that con­
flict resolution is appropriate in some kinds of conflict, 
but not others. The crucial determinant is the question 
of power symmetry. In symmetrical (or what Galtung refers 
to as horizontal) conflict, resolution is possible, even 
desirable. But in asymmetrical, or vertical, conflict, 
resolution strategies are detrimental. Instead, one must
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think in terms of restructuring the system, whereby inter­
ests are altered even at the expense of one or more of the 
parties. This peacebuilding, as opposed to peacemaking, 
is Galtung's preferred strategy in most situations. In­
deed he is suspicious of strategies which attempt to 
freeze a vertical conflict by trying to make the parties 
busy with one another in cooperative, positive-sum activi­
ties. He is convinced that they simply avoid direct con­
frontation and real solutions, rather than gain time for
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any useful purpose.
Peacebuilding, however, is not synonymous with con­
flict management. Conflict management may involve chang­
ing the system, but not in radical ways which would still 
be acceptable in terms of peacebuilding. Both conflict 
management and resolution strategies may produce minimal 
change through expansion of the conflict system to include 
new conflicts, or perhaps new actors. The difference be­
tween these two is that resolution always attempts to 
eliminate incompatibility, whereas management strategies 
may attempt either to eliminate or preserve it. The 
difference between each of these and peacebuilding, or 
restructuring, is that the latter always attempts to 
change the system, in some cases by more than simple 
expansion. Changing relationships among the actors, and 
even elimination of actors, are both possible strategies. 
On the other hand, both conflict resolution and management 
are most unlikely to come up with anything which does not
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preserve the actor system, a subset of the conflict sys-
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tem, because both are actor oriented.
My choice of problem solving over restructuring is 
based on a number of convictions. First, I wish to exam­
ine the potential for facilitating change through the 
alteration of perception within a given conflict system, a 
study which would be severely limited with the adoption of 
a restructuring approach. Second, I suspect a strong 
utopian element in restructuring. My conviction regarding 
the sinfulness of human nature leaves me skeptical of 
utopian theories of radical change which come through the 
manipulation of social structure. I do not exclude this 
approach entirely, but my concern to avoid needless dis­
ruption in the lives of people and nations prompts me to 
look primarily at an approach which operates within, rath­
er than over against, the actor and conflict systems. A 
certain amount of turmoil is usually necessary in order to 
realize meaningful change. However, both pragmatism and 
compassion keep me from placing the emphasis upon an 
approach built primarily upon social upheaval. The ques­
tion of means is as important as the question of ends. 
Third, while there has been much recent exploration of the 
theology of social restructuring, through the advent of 
liberation theology, there has been little contemporary 
theoretical basis laid for the development of a theology 
of conflict resolution or conciliation on the interna­
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tional level. For these reasons I turn now to an examina­
tion of various approaches to problem solving, although I 
shall still use Galtung and others to raise critical 
questions.
In contrast to restructuring, Burton claims that the 
system has more potential for change. Structural violence 
inhibits the development of the powerful as well as the 
powerless. Therefore, impetus for change is built into 
the system if the powerful are able to accurately perceive 
their needs. Thus there is an inevitability of structural 
change that tends toward social order and consensual be­
havior which can potentially counteract any tendency to­
ward dominance. It is misleading to refer to objective 
conflicts of interest, implying static situations, altered 
only by conflict and violence. If one can insert a dif­
ferent hierarchy of values, common and universal needs,
then objective conflicts of interest cease to have any 
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reality. Burton admits that conflicts initially appear to 
be objective. In fact, he claims that, at any given point 
in time, a conflict must be seen as objective. Yet he 
hastens to add that no goal is unalterable. Therefore, the 
objectivity of conflict is merely time relative, since all 
interest elements are related to a given point in time. He 
writes:
... objectives involve preferences, and preferences 
can change. Consequently relationships within a 
situation of conflict can change, and there are 
therefore, possible forms of resolution from which 
both parties can gain. There are also subjective
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influences involved in the different perceptions 
parties have of each other and of the world environ­
ment, and in the consideration they give to the costs 
of conflict involved in delaying settlements. Con­
flict can be transformed from violence and coercion 
into a problem-solving exercise with a positively 
beneficial result once there are opportunities to 
test perceptions and to assess costs of conflict in 
relation to values being pursued.51
The process Burton recommends is a problem solving 
workshop or seminar series. He has very specific crite­
ria, requiring the presence of a third party mediator in 
the form of a panel. Such a group must be academic pro­
fessionals in behavior analysis, but not be experts in the 
particular conflict at hand. They must not present solu­
tions, but initiate and supervise a process whereby the 
participants share their perceptions, analyze the situa­
tion, evaluate and define the conflict, and explore op­
tions which meet the needs of all parties. The process is
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highly regulated, with some fifty six rules of procedure.
The approach to conflict resolution, of international 
lawyer Roger Fisher, is less analytic and more pragmatic 
than that of Burton. His methodology, called principled 
negotiation, has a highly prescriptive orientation, yet is 
clearly based within the problem solving tradition of 
conflict resolution. A detailed description of principled 
negotiation will be presented in chapter 2. In the 
remainder of the study, I intend to assess the usefulness 
of this theory in developing a theology of conciliation 
which, in turn, could lay the basis for a constructive 
intervention role for the church in the context of
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international conflict. I will continue to draw upon other 
theorists, both within and outside the problem solving 
school, for needed analytical assessment of conflict 
resolution, especially in chapters 6 and 7. However, I have 
chosen Fisher's model over Burton's because of both its 
pragmatic focus and the less restrictive nature of its 
practical suggestions. Fisher allows a greater variety of 
parties into the intervener role and gives more flexibility 
to the role definition. Furthermore, he suggests guide­
lines as opposed to a very specific type of problem solving 
context. Such a perspective will be more helpful in 
developing a role model, and accompanying theological 
rationale, for the church. In addition, Fisher's book, 
Getting To Yes, co-authored with William Ury, is now con­
sidered to be one of the most significant books on the
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subject of negotiation. It has become the most referenced 
book in the field, indicating its influence on both practi­
tioners and scholars. Some consider that no other book has
had more influence on contemporary concepts of conflict 
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resolution. Before turning to Fisher, however, I will exam­
ine the role of the third party intervener in conflict 
resolution, since third party intervention, rather than 
negotiation by the principal parties, is the role which will 
be the focus of this study.
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The Place of Third Party Intervention
Factors Affecting Intervention 
Various external and internal conditions of the 
conflict influence both feasibility, and type, of 
intervention in any given situation, as will be illustrated 
in the case material of chapters 3 and 4. These variables 
include the nature of the protagonist parties, the nature 
of the participants representing these parties, the nature 
of the issues, the nature of the interaction, and the 
nature of the third party.
Nature of the Protagonist Parties
The principle parties to a conflict may vary according 
to the number involved, their power symmetry, their 
experience with conflict resolution, the degree of intra­
party unity, and the nature of hierarchical organization 
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within each. The likelihood of third party intervention 
increases among parties with experience in conflict resolu­
tion due to increased willingness to accept intervener legi-
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timacy and expertise. Similarly, prospects are enhanced
among clearly bounded, well-organized parties with a Gen­
s'7tralized decision making apparatus. The type of interven­
tion is clearly affected by all the above factors.
Nature of the Participants
Apart from conflicts between very small parties, 
participants in most negotiation or mediation processes
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function as representatives of their parties. Therefore 
both the outcome and process of selection is a significant 
factor in the nature and success of any intervention.
Again the number of participants and degree of experience 
with the process, are important variables. In addition a 
number of new factors enter the picture:
status of the participants within their own party 
(elite decision makers, persons with informal access to 
decision makers, or rank and file members with little 
access) ,
—  degree of experience with the conflict (those with 
direct experience or those removed from the impact),
—  range of views represented (official view, hard­
line view, or a variety of views) and degree of official 
sanction,
—  degree of previous acquaintance with each other 
(close, brief, or no contact),
—  degree of symmetry in social background (education, 
professional role, formal position, etc.), and
—  process of selection (by principle parties or third
party; and, if the latter, whether or not it is done with
58tacit approval of party leaders).
Nature of the Issues
The complexity of the issues effects both feasibility 
and nature of intervention. The more numerous and 
quantifiable the issues become, the greater is the
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intervener's power to generate movement which will create
new, and desirable, options. In short, the intervener
gains flexibility with increased complexity. However, at
the same time the magnitude of the task increases at each
level of functioning. For example, while data collection
in a single issue conflict may involve one simple intake
interview, it may require much more detail in a multiple
issue conflict with complex psychodynamics. Secondly, the
intervener's expertise with respect to the issues
influences the degree of one's credibility and influence,
as well as the design of an intervention process. The less
knowledgeable the intervener is, the more the role will
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become nondirective.
Nature of the Interaction
The history of the relationship between adversaries is 
a crucial factor in determining intervention feasibility 
and strategy. it is especially important to note the stage 
of the conflict and the character of any 
negotiation/mediation process.
Theorists have charted the course of conflict in 
various ways. However, four basic stages seem best to 
characterize the progression of conflict in terms which 
assist in determining the optimum timing and nature of 
intervention. Though sometimes spasmodic and irregular, 
rather than linear and logical, the basic stages are 
incipient, escalating, stalemated, and de-escalating. The
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first is also referred to as the pre-stage, the middle two
  during-stage, and the last —  post-stage. It is often
asserted that the best time for effective mediation is 
after the conflict has stalemated. Freguently, at this 
point, there is mutual exhaustion, uncertainty, recognition 
of limitations, dissatisfaction with previous efforts, and 
desire for an honorable exit. However, some argue that 
effective intervention is more likely at the pre-stage,
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before parties commit themselves too much to the conflict. 
Furthermore, those who focus more on the subjective aspects 
of conflict claim that determination of propitious timing 
depends greatly on the nature of the intervention. A prob­
lem solving approach can be a channel for altering the 
relationship and de-escalating the conflict Conseguently, 
intervention need not wait until the relationship reaches
the stage where substantive issues can successfully be 
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approached.
The nature of the interaction is also influenced by 
the character of the negotiation/mediation process —  the 
degree, context, and quality, of contact between parties.
The degree of contact varies between those isolated from 
one another, with the intervener shuttling back and forth, 
and those in face-to-face relationship, with everyone 
present. The context varies with interaction size —  
interpersonal or intergroup. The quality varies with the 
changes in psychological climate, determined by need for 
differentiation or integration. Parties still building, or
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struggling to maintain, their identity, and those who 
perceive the costs of accommodation to be to their 
disadvantage, will be concerned about the potentially 
negative pacification role of the intervener. On the other 
hand, some parties with the ability to maintain an inte­
grated, though conflicting, relationship may be capable of 
resolving their own dispute without assistance. While the 
degree of focus on differentiation/integration does not, 
alone, determine the likelihood of successful intervention,
it has been shown to play a significant role, especially in
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international disputes. The presence of cooperative ties, 
such as similarity in perception, attitude, motivation, or 
trust has consistently led to a greater likelihood of inter­
mediary involvement. Furthermore, ability to adopt an inte­
grative focus, along with extent of contact and interaction 
size, also affects the degree of intervener flexibility and
formality with respect to matters such as meeting places,
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agendas, and time constraints.
Nature of the Third Party
Who the third party is becomes a dominant factor in 
the nature of the role one can play. Formal mediation, 
with all parties present, is only possible if the 
protagonist parties agree to invite the third party. Such 
an invitation is dependent on the former's view of the 
legitimacy or credibility of the latter. The question of 
credibility in the protagonists' eyes remains central to
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the intervener role even though the type of third party 
acceptable to the principals may vary according to the 
latter's status. (For example, meeting with unofficial 
representatives, who have little or no access to their 
party's decision making apparatus, becomes an option for a 
wider number of potential intermediaries.) Even uninvited 
interveners must depend on some form of legitimacy, though 
they are restricted to a much less formal context, such as 
information gathering, an unofficial form of shuttle, or a 
completely unplanned and spontaneous response to 
circumstances (being in the right place at the right time).
Legitimacy in all of the above circumstances —  
formal/informal, invited/uninvited —  is tied to the 
identity of the third party. There are three bases of 
identity which are important to examine in this light, 
those which are —  inherent by virtue of natural resources, 
ascribed to the intervener by others, and acguired by the 
intervener's own effort.
Bases of Identity
Identity based on inherent capabilities refers 
primarily to control of physical resources with which one 
can reward or coerce the protagonists. For example, 
potential third parties may be selected on the basis of 
their possession of communication and information pro­
cessing equipment. Likewise, they may be effective due to 
their control over financial or material resources critical
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to the future development of the protagonist parties.
Identity based on ascribed capabilities refers to the
kind of prestige and reputation which is bestowed primarily
by the protagonists, and secondarily by outside observers.
Occasionally, such status is accorded to a renowned
individual, but more frequently is given on the basis of
institutional affiliation and one's office, rank, or other
credentials within the organization. The intermediary as
representative, rather than individual actor, carries all
the benefits and detriments of the affiliation into the
mediation setting. The relative prominence, permanence,
and experience of the institution, and/or individual, is
bound to influence both acceptability and function as inter- 
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vener.
Identity based on acquired capabilities refers
primarily to personal expertise on the part of the
individual intervener. In this case legitimacy is earned
through knowledge and behavior. Knowledgeability about the
specific situation, and the various party positions, is
seen by many as crucial to effective third party
functioning. However, some problem solving proponents
claim that knowledge of the dynamics of conflict is far 
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more important. Conflict resolution skills and attitudes 
(such as articulation, persuasiveness, imagination, unob­
trusiveness, friendliness, impartiality, and sense of tim­
ing) are even more important. Certainly, many protagonists
65
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will value each kind of knowledge, skill, or attitude to va­
rying degrees and will, therefore, expect the intervener to 
perform different functions. Of all these ascribed qualities 
impartiality is the most basic. Some theorists refer to it 
as a definitional characteristic of the intervener role. 
Along with the related concepts of neutrality, non-advocacy
and independence, it is central to the development of any
68
classification of intervention roles. Consequently, I will 
now examine impartiality in greater detail than other varia­
bles which affect intervention role. Furthermore, I will 
examine this issue in the context of each of my case studies 
(chapters 3 and 4) and again in the conclusion of the study.
Impartiality
Traditionally, the problem solving school of conflict
resolution has assumed that any third party to a dispute
will play an impartial and neutral role. Burton asserts
this position by stating that the third party must exhibit
the capacity to identify with all the parties on a
nonjudgmental basis, regardless of their apparent morality 
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or values. The intellectual rationale dates back to Max 
Weber's concept of "value-neutral" sociology, where he pro­
poses that analysis replace value judgement in the process
70of social inquiry. Consequently, professional negotiation 
and mediation have frequently claimed that it is essential 
for the conflict intervener to have minimal (if any) power 
over the parties, credibility with the parties, a focus on
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p r o c e s s  rather than outcome, and a rational approach which 
can facilitate the mutual recognition of relevant informa­
tion. Indeed, if the primary task of conflict intervention
is to facilitate communication between equally valid inter-
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ests, then impartiality is critical.
On the other hand, Galtung points out some of the
problems with this conception of the role, even in the
context of horizontal, or power symmetrical, conflict.
First, he points out that third parties are usually called
in by the dominant party when it fears violence in response
to its dominance, thus biasing the procedure right from the
start. Second, in direct contradiction of Burton's
hypothesis, he claims that the presence of even a
supposedly neutral third party may take away the main
parties' power. In horizontal conflict this would create a
new structure of dominance, with the third party on top.
In vertical conflict this would maintain the underlying
dominance inherent in the structure. Third, he fears that
the resulting "solution" is often not self-supporting,
claiming that only restructuring, something which could
only be facilitated by a biased intervener, can lead to
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permanent solutions to conflict. While important as a modi­
fying influence, these objections do not take into account 
potential influence, on successful intervention, of many of 
the above variables, such as complexity of the issues, stage 
of the conflict, and especially identity of the intervener. 
For example, an intermediary with sufficient institutional
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status may be able to overcome the bias arising from an
invitation by the dominant power, even using this "special"
relationship to influence its "friend." Likewise, the
skilled intermediary should be able to intervene without
taking power away from the principal parties. In fact,
proper expertise in conflict dynamics, on the part of the
intervener, will lead to empowerment, not disfranchisement.
Finally, it can be argued that an intermediary with low
coercive potential and minimal stake in the outcome, but
with adequate skill and status, offers the best chance of
lasting agreement since the resulting solution has not been
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forced on anyone. Clearly, then, Galtung's arguments do not
apply to all situations.
However, all questions over impartiality and
neutrality cannot be dismissed that easily. The
possibility exists that in certain situations (such as
power asymmetry, with its needed phase of differentiation)
some form of advocacy may be important. Some theorists,
such as sociologist James Laue, would limit neutrality to
the strictest technical sense. He does state that, if one
party feels that a mediator is acting unfairly, it could re-
74quire the mediator to withdraw from the process. Yet he 
claims that the concept of neutrality is of second impor­
tance to the concept of power. Conflict interveners cannot 
avoid using power; nor can they blind themselves to its use 
by others. Consequently they cannot be neutral in terms of
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their effect on the parties and the process of social inter­
action. According to Laue:
Conflict intervention is the process in which an out­
side or third party deliberately and systematically 
enters into a conflict with the aim of influencing its 
outcome or course, in a direction the intervener de­
fines as desirable. Every act of intervention alters 
the power configuration in the social system in which 
it occurs, and therefore every intervener is an advo­
cate —  for party, outcome, or process.75
According to Laue, any intervener must necessarily act 
as some kind of advocate, as indicated in the above quote. 
This advocacy may not be obvious, as in process advocacy. 
However, in the case of any intervention in what he calls 
extreme asymmetrical conflict, the desired outcome is de­
pendent on the empowerment of the weak party. Therefore, 
the intervener cannot even appear to be neutral, as one is
responsible for facilitating the empowerment necessary to
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realize mutual gain. Therefore, like Galtung, Laue's ap­
proach to conflict intervention is dependent on the degree 
of power symmetry within the relationship.
Role of the Intervener
Classification of intervention roles varies from
author to author. Some refer to all forms of intervention
as mediation, breaking down different categories into
subgroupings of mediator roles, such as communicator, for-
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mulator, and manipulator. Most classifications limit media­
tion to the middle category, choosing to identify both the 
nondirective and the authoritarian approaches by other des­
ignations. Laue suggests this type of three part clas­
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sification of intervention roles, including one which ob­
serves and reports (eg. fact-finder, observer, inquirer, 
investigator, researcher), a second which serves as a go- 
between (eg. conciliator, mediator, facilitator, problem
solver, consultant), and a third which exercises power over
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the disputants (eg. arbitrator, adjudicator, enforcer).
The problem solving approach to conflict resolution 
generally falls within the middle category, as stated 
above. It may include a range of strategies as diverse as: 
simply being present, inviting parties into a mediation 
process, collecting and analyzing data, encouraging parties 
to explain their positions, inducing a problem solving 
orientation, improving communication, educating the nego­
tiating parties, taking charge of setting and schedule, 
equalizing power relationships, devising new options for 
agreement, encouraging concessions, and supervising the im­
plementation of an agreement. Some, like Pruitt, use the 
term mediation to refer to the entire range of go-between 
roles, distinguishing between content and process
mediation, with only the latter representing a problem solv- 
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m g  approach. Others restrict mediation terminology to the 
end of the spectrum involving more advocacy, utilizing other 
terms to refer to problem solving strategies.
Burton defines mediation as the attempt on the part of 
a third party to suggest a reasonable outcome. His desig-
nation for process oriented problem solving is facilitation.
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Others who make similar distinctions between resolving is­
sues and altering relationships use the terms mediation and
consultation, respectively, with the latter consisting of a
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workshop process led by experts in conflict dynamics. The
most common term, used in contrast with content mediation,
is conciliation. Whereas content mediation aims at resolving
issues through fair settlement, conciliation aims at recon-
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ciling parties through increased trust and cooperation. In 
addition, conciliation is frequently designated as the psy­
chological component of mediation, as defined in the larger 
sense. At times, it has been used to demarcate the less 
formal forums or methods for third party conflict reso­
lution. Finally, it is frequently used to refer to the 
relational aspects of pre-negotiation and pre-mediation
activity, those dealing with communication, emotion, misper-
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ception, legitimacy, and trust.
Various intervention activities are frequently linked
sequentially. A typical flow of intervention stages would
include moving from fact-finding (preparatory investigation)
to conciliation (attempt to dispose parties to a face-to-
face negotiation process) to mediation (facilitation of
negotiation process) to implementation (supervision and
84monitoring of agreement). In this context the fact-finding 
stage may include research of secondary sources, direct 
observation, personal interviews and interpretation of the 
data. The conciliation stage may include contacting and 
inviting participation of the parties, further interviewing,
67
building rapport between other parties by long-range inform­
ing and interpreting, establishing mediator credibility by 
educating and building commitment to the process, and syn­
chronizing levels of readiness for dialogue through exploi­
tation of power over timing. The mediation stage may in­
clude defining issues, setting or altering agendas and rules 
of procedure, providing resources, interjecting outside 
opinion, providing incentive for abandonment of previous 
positions, examining interests, generating and assessing 
options, and suggesting ideas or proposals. The implementa­
tion stage may include identifying steps to operationalize 
an agreement, helping maintain contact and communication, 
evaluating performance, and creating an enforcement and 
commitment mechanism. Certainly, there is some vacillation 
between these stages. However, it is far easier to move 
backward than forward. The difficulty of moving forward from 
one stage to the next is demonstrated by the fact that most
interveners never get to the end and many do not get past 
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the first stage.
Both the kind of intervention attempted, and the 
ability to move from one stage to the next, may be affected 
by the variables listed in the previous section. The 
following illustrations demonstrate the influence, on type 
and stage of intervention, by protagonist parties, partici­
pants, third parties, issues, and interaction processes. 
First, since process mediation need not wait for a
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stalemate, one might expect it to be the preferred type 
during incipient and escalatory phases of conflict. At the 
same time, conditions of extreme power asymmetry between 
the parties may inhibit the persuasion potential of process 
mediation, leading an intervener to adopt a content 
mediation approach. Second, while it is obvious that 
parties which remain isolated will never permit anything 
beyond the conciliation stage of intervention, such a role 
is equally unavailable to the uninvited intervener, even 
when the protagonists do begin formal negotiations. Third, 
the identity of the third party affects its ability to get 
invited as well as its ability to put pressure on 
protagonists. For example, non-governmental organizations 
have virtually no inherent resources with which to reward 
or coerce parties. Therefore, they are less likely to be 
effective in obtaining and enforcing settlement during the 
later stages of formal mediation and implementation, unless 
their reputation for impartiality and/or humanitarianism 
outweighs the lack of physical capability. Nevertheless, 
when they do function as mediators, their low stake in the 
outcome and low coercive potential increase the probability
that any resulting settlement, however unlikely, will last
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due to genuine accommodation.
In this study I will focus on conciliation and content 
mediation. Conciliation will be my preferred terminology 
for referring to the kind of informal, pre-negotiation, 
process-oriented problem solving which is the primary
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subject of this study. Use of this terminology is 
consistent with the definitions given above. Furthermore, 
it is utilized by the interveners in my second case 
(chapter 4) and is closely related to the theological con­
cept of reconciliation. However, Fisher uses the term 
"mediation," including both content and process varieties,
to describe his preferred method of third party interven- 
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tion. Fisher's scheme has the advantage of including both 
the communication/fact-finding functions and some advocacy 
functions traditionally used in more competitive models. 
Therefore, I will, at times, utilize this terminology, espe­
cially when I wish to emphasize settlement of issues more 
than reconciliation of parties.
Summary and Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been threefold.
First, I have endeavored to set the theoretical context in 
which this study, on the role of the church as an 
intermediary in international conflict, will take place. 
Giving an overview of theories of conflict and conflict 
intervention has served a number of purposes: 1) to 
indicate the breadth of perspective on this topic; 2) to 
outline many of the specific issues which I will address in 
subsequent chapters; and 3) to form a basis for my 
selection of both problem solving and principled 
negotiation as the most appropriate school and model to 
assess. Second, a rather detailed examination of
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methodology, as utilized within behavioral science, has 
produced much material which I will use in my own 
methodology and in the evaluation of my case material. As 
in behavioral science research, my investigation will 
include data from historical records and interviews. In my 
analysis, I will test out my own material against selected 
factors from behavioral research regarding a variety of 
issues, such as the supposed uniqueness of international 
conflict or the nature of the intervention process. Third,
I have defended the validity of a generic theory of con­
flict. This affects both my methodology and conclusions.
I have demonstrated the validity of utilizing research from 
a variety of conflict settings. I have also built a case 
for applying the results of my research beyond the limited 
confines of my particular cases, though certainly the 
greatest applicability will be within similar contexts.
Due to the primary significance of behavioral science 
in setting the theoretical context for this study, it is 
important to summarize the fundamental issues which it has 
raised regarding conflict and conflict intervention. One 
basic theoretical divide in the behavioralist study of 
conflict is between those who view it negatively, 
attempting to avoid or terminate it quickly, and those who 
view it positively, recognizing its potential value for 
creative innovation. Recently, most scholars have affirmed 
the positive nature of conflict, while recognizing the
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e x i s t e n c e  of both positive and negative conflict attitudes 
and behavior.
A second major divide exists between those who perceive 
the origins of conflict in individuals, referred to as 
microcosmic theory, and those who perceive it in social 
structure, referred to as macrocosmic theory. In negotia­
tion strategy the proponents of microcosmic theory minimize 
the importance of power symmetry and maximize the potential 
for creating value, or enlarging the pie. They speak in 
terms of conflict resolution, emphasizing the role of sub­
jective values and aspirations, and the reality of variable- 
sum outcomes. They emphasize gualitative goals, inter­
dependence, the possibility for mutual gain, and the advan­
tage of mutual strategy. On the other hand, the proponents 
of macrocosmic theory stress the importance of power sym­
metry and the need to claim, rather than create, value. They 
speak in terms of conflict management or settlement, empha­
sizing the reality of conflicting objective interests and 
the necessity of fixed-sum outcomes. They place emphasis on 
quantitative goals, the reality of limited resources, the 
need to win, and adversarial tactics. In the handling of 
conflict the approach of the microcosmic theorists has been 
the development of various problem solving strategies, in 
significant contrast to the competitive negotiating strate­
gies of macrocosmic theorists.
Each school of thought has left its impression on 
intervention roles as well, with the problem solving
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perspective placing more emphasis on collaborative roles. 
However, perspectives on intervention roles also tend to 
vary according to a number of other variables, including 
the nature of the protagonist parties, participants, 
issues, interaction, and third party. Parties vary ac­
cording to number, experience, symmetry, and hierarchical 
organization. Participants vary according to number, experi­
ence, status, symmetry, previous acquaintance, and range of 
viewpoints. The issues vary according to number, complexity, 
and knowledge of by the third party. The nature of the 
interaction is determined by the stage of conflict (incipi­
ent, escalatory, stalemated, or de-escalatory) and the char­
acter of the negotiation/mediation process (degree, context, 
and quality of contact). Third parties vary according to the 
basis of their identity (inherent -- ie. physical resources; 
ascribed —  ie. reputation or office; and acquired —  ie. 
expertise) and whether or not they are invited into the 
process.
The most basic factor to influence perceptions of in­
tervener role is impartiality or neutrality, an acquired 
basis of third party identity. The degree of advocacy or 
neutrality, attributed to the intermediary by self or oth­
ers, tends to create definitional parameters. Problem solv­
ing strategy leans heavily toward neutrality, though dif­
ferent theorists support various types of advocacy. Burton 
accepts only process advocacy. Fisher accepts both process
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and outcome advocacy. Laue accepts process, outcome, and 
limited forms of party advocacy. Galtung, representing a 
competitive model, recognizes the validity of all forms of 
advocacy, including those which would radically restructure 
the conflict system.
Classification of intervention roles tends to vary 
considerably. In general, there are three commonly accepted 
types: an observer role, a go-between role, and a manipula­
tor role. Most problem solving strategy, the focus of this 
study, fits in the middle category, which can be subdivided 
into conciliation and content mediation. My emphasis will be 
on informal, process-oriented, conciliation, since that is 
the setting most conducive to intervention by the church.
To begin my examination of this role, I will now give a 
detailed presentation of Roger Fisher's principled negotia­
tion. It is my hypothesis that principled negotiation, with 
slight adaptation, provides a challenging, new model for 
utilization by the church in its potential role as an inter­
mediary in international conflict.
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METHODOLOGY OF PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION
Roger Fisher, of the Harvard Negotiation Project, has 
contributed significantly to the problem solving approach to 
conflict resolution, especially through his development of 
guidelines for the practice of negotiation and mediation.
His work has influenced numerous types of conflict situa­
tions, including those occurring in the international con­
text. He, himself, has contributed directly to the resolu-
1
tion of various international disputes.
Fisher is well aware of the constructive role that
conflict can play. The main problem for him is not con-
2
flict, but how to handle it. Although Fisher recognizes the
reality of conflicting interests, his emphasis, without
doubt, is on the subjective nature of conflict. He asserts
that, "Ultimately, conflict lies, not in objective reality,
but in people's heads." His writing also stresses the varia-
ble-sum nature of outcomes, the importance of searching for
mutual gain, and the relative unimportance of power symme- 3
try. Therefore, he clearly falls into the problem solving
camp of conflict resolution.
Fisher refers to his approach as "principled negotia- 4




solving." The very purpose of principled negotiation, or
problem solving, is to determine issues on their merits 
rather than by means of a distributive, positional bar­
gaining process. According to Fisher, a good negotiation/ 
mediation process does not involve pressuring the adversary 
(hard bargaining), through either prolonged negotiation or 
the use of extreme tactics, to come to the position one 
wants. Neither does it involve making concessions quickly
(soft bargaining) so as to avoid conflict. Instead, Fisher
6
advocates being "hard on merits, but soft on people." The 
strategy is to alter the adversary's perception of his or 
her choices, so that the decision will reflect one's pref­
erence. To do this one must take into account one's own 
long range values, as well as the other party's view of the
present conflict, and its political problems, desires, and 
7
fears.
Hard bargaining is inefficient because its extreme 
opening position, and small concession mode of operation, 
create incentives to stall settlement. It endangers the 
ongoing relationship because anger and resentment often 
result from the test of wills. This produces considerable 
strain, sometimes to the point of dissolving the relation­
ship. Soft bargaining is more likely to produce an agree­
ment since the objective of reaching one has replaced the 
goal of victory or winning. However, the agreement may be 
equally unwise. Soft bargaining, unlike hard, is efficient.
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Time and resources are not lost when one party is willing to
aive. However, it makes one vulnerable to the hard bargain- 
y  ‘ 8  
er, since the latter strategy is dominant over the former.
On the other hand, according to Fisher, principled problem
solving tends to be dominant over hard bargaining when the
hard bargainer realizes that pressure does not lead to the
desired result and that his opposite party is flexible and
willing to respond to good arguments made on the merits of 
t 9
the case.
In contrasting principled problem solving and position­
al bargaining, either hard or soft, Fisher has developed 
some prescriptive guidelines. Due to the development of his 
thought, these guidelines have undergone some change over 
time. Yet there is definite consistency in the various 
formulations. He first refers to them in 1978 as three
negotiating problems —  human problems, inventing problems,
10
and procedural problems. In his most influential treatment 
of negotiation in Getting to YES in 1981, he specifies four 
points which define his method —  focus on people (separat­
ing the people from the problem), focus on interests (look­
ing at interests, not positions), focus on options (gener­
ating a variety of possibilities before deciding what to
do), and focus on criteria (insisting that results be based
11
on some objective standard). Since then he has continued to 
revise his formulation of these categories and has added a 
fifth one related to power. I shall use one of the more 
recent renderings, presented in 1983, in order to reflect a
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current understanding of his perspective. He now lists five
g u i d e l i n e s  which form a theoretical framework and methodolo-
12
gical base for principled negotiation.
1) issues: Substantive (objective problems which could 
become terms for a possible agreement) vs. Relational 
(subjective problems such as perception, emotion, and com­
munication ability)
2) Rightful Claims; Positions (demands to be insisted 
upon) vs. Interests (underlying concerns, needs, wants, 
hopes, and fears which the positions are intended to serve)
3) Options: Deciding (committing oneself to accept or 
reject a given option) vs. Inventing (generating a range of 
possibilities which may be worthy of consideration)
4) Criteria for Accepting Agreement: Subjective (what 
each party is willing, or unwilling, to do) vs. Objective 
(what each party ought to do, based on some external measure 
of legitimacy)
5) Power: Imposing (the physical capability to arrange 
and enforce a result according to one's will) vs. Influenc- 
ing (the capability, through negotiation, to sway the deci­
sions of others in one's favor)
Before examining each of these points more thoroughly, 
notice should be taken of Fisher's conscious attempt to 
bring theory to bear on practice. In the analysis of each 
of the above factors, and at every stage in the negotiation 
process, he emphasizes both the theoretical and practical,
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} and the descriptive and prescriptive. He is convinced of
the need to go beyond the activities of the pure scientist 
who confines himself to description, either theoretical or 
practical, the pure theoretician who confines himself to 
theory, descriptive or prescriptive, or the pure practi­
tioner who confines himself to the practical, descriptive or 
prescriptive. Therefore, he has devised a circle chart to 
conceptualize the movement from descriptive practice (the
t problem as seen in facts and symptoms), to descriptive
theory (diagnosis or analysis of cause and effect), to
prescriptive theory (approaches or strategies to correct the
problem) , to prescriptive practice (proposed action ideas or
suggestions about what might be done), and back to descrip- 
13
tive practice.
The stages of the negotiation process reflect this
> movement from identification of the problem, to analysis, to 
planning approaches, to discussion of specific action/agree­
ment. Each of the five categories comprising the negotia­
tion context must be dealt with at each stage. One will 
need to identify, and then analyze, the "people problems," 
the interests, the presently perceived options and criteria, 
and the power realities. Then one will need to plan new 
approaches and discuss possible agreements, both for han­
dling the "people problems," the interests and the power
realities, and for generating new options, power configura- 
. . . 14tions, and criteria for deciding among them.
Finally, prior to describing the tenets of principled
87
negotiation, as listed above, it is important to note Fish­
er's approach to third party intervention since this inter­
mediary role is the focus of examination in this study. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Fisher uses the term 
"mediation" to include both content mediation and concilia­
tion. He definitely portrays the mediator as a process 
advocate who can use his power in an attempt to change the 
{ rules of the game. Occasionally he limits the third party
role to that of process facilitation, with limited opportu-
15
nity to express substantive views. However, he usually goes 
beyond this, parting company with many proponents of problem 
solving conflict resolution. He does clearly reject advoca­
cy of any party, but often asserts the importance of outcome 
advocacy. According to Fisher, one should not fear imposing 
) a settlement, but should advance proposals which can then be
the subject of discussion in an atmosphere which is least
16
likely to be reactionary. In treating the tenets of princi­
pled negotiation, I will elaborate on Fisher's own applica­
tion of each category to this third party mediation/concili­
ation context.
Issues: Snhstantive or Relational
t Fisher claims that positional bargaining is inadequate 
because it focuses on substance rather than process. In­
stead, he emphasizes the validity of both substantive and 
relational issues in any negotiation process. While the 
former deals with the terms of agreement, the specifications
88
likely to be incorporated in the accord, the latter deals 
with the human dimensions of perception, emotion, and com­
munication. His major concern is to avoid entanglement of
17
one with the other. When egos become involved with substan­
tive positions there is lessened opportunity for cooperative 
problem solving. The parties are then more apt to be pre­
pared for a contest of wills than for joint invention of
18
wise solutions to common problems. Fisher warns against 
trading substance for relationship or vice versa. Appease­
ment does not work since rewarding poor conduct is only 
likely to produce more of the same, as B.F. Skinner has 
aptly demonstrated. On the other hand, use of either threat 
or extortion may produce the desired concession, but will
damage the relationship and the possibility of long-term
19
> substantive agreement. Rejection creates both physical and
psychological obstacles to problem solving. In the worst
case, communication is totally prevented by the refusal of
one or more parties to even meet. However, even when this
extreme action is not taken, communication can be hindered
when one party's desire to fully cooperate has been under-
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mined by rejection. 
s In place of the competitive cycle of mutual rejection
which is so common to positional bargaining, Fisher recom­
mends separating substance from relationships and dealing 
with each on its own legitimate merits. Only in this way 
can the substantive issues of alternatives, interests, op-
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s tions, commitments, and legitimacy be handled effectively.
Thus, process becomes more important than specific outcome 
in principled negotiation. The way in which one deals with 
differences is more important than any judgement about a 
given substantive issue. The paramount task becomes defining 
a commonly understood modus vivendi, one which will make it 
easier to handle successive transactions. The purpose for 
this negotiating of the negotiation process is to enhance
f
the prospects for better substantive outcomes, at minimal 
cost, even for parties with inconsistent interests. To im­
prove the mutual problem solving aspect of the relationship 
is the key. Rather than using either substance or relation­
ship as leverage upon the other, Fisher recommends adopting 
an unconditionally constructive strategy in which one 
pursues only those things which are good for both the rela-
! tionship and one's own outcome. This strategy defines win­
ning as "well-being" rather than victory, thus paving the 
way for an inclusive, mutual gain. Yet, if conducted wisely,
it does not require reciprocity, thus reducing the chance of 
21
failure.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Fisher first
addresses the people, or the human, problem in negotiation
and mediation. He is conscious that people are not the only
players in the international arena. Governments and other
institutions play a major role. In fact, personalizing the
negotiation process too much is a danger he would have one 
22
avoid. Yet, he is equally clear in his assertion that, even
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in international transactions, one is not dealing with ab­
stract representatives of the other side, but with specific 
human beings who have strong emotions, deeply held values, 
and different backgrounds and viewpoints. The ability to 
deal with these differences in an unconditionally construc­
tive manner depends on the degree of such factors as ra­
tionality, understanding, communication, honesty and trust,
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noncoercive means of influence, and acceptance. Fisher
generally breaks these down into three major human problems
—  emotion, perception, and communication -- and encourages
24
that they be made explicit to the parties. I will now 
briefly examine each of these, indicating Fisher's recom­
mended ways of handling them.
Emotion
Principled negotiation is based on a "reasoned" ap­
proach to conflict resolution. This rationality also ap­
plies to Fisher's approach to the emotional content. One 
must handle the emotions in such a way that reason will 
prevail. Anger may be expressed, but one must control it 
rather than letting it take control. Emotions are important,
but when it comes to the problem solving aspect of the
25relationship, the degree of rationality is critical. When 
rational arguments are overwhelmed by strong emotions it 
threatens the very interaction process, the modus vivendi.
At this point Fisher recommends measures such as: 1) step­
ping above the fray until rational discussion is possible
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(including frank statement of one's reasons for this action,
tog e t h e r  with a commitment to return to the negotiation
process) ; 2) analyzing, in retrospect, what engendered the
feelings and taking steps to address the causes; and 3)
asking whether or not the direction of a given dialogue
26
serves the agreed-upon purpose of the meeting. He even 
suggests "recruiting constructive emotions" to replace nega­
tive ones. By this he means -- imagining different circum­
stances which condition a different emotional state for 
oneself, or adopting the emotional state one would like to 
see in the other party, or taking actions which would en­
hance in others an emotional state which would improve joint
27
ability to deal with differences.
On the other hand, Fisher also recognizes the problem 
of assuming that the only effective mode of influence is 
rational dialogue. He writes that most people, most of the 
time, are reacting emotionally to things that have already 
happened rather than pursuing rational goals by rational 
means. Deep emotions generated by one problem frequently 
spill over to other situations. Furthermore, emotional 
involvement changes as negotiations proceed, necessitating 
continual rediagnosis and intervention. In addition to 
recognizing and understanding the emotions of the other 
negotiator(s) one must also acknowledge and appreciate the 
emotions of constituents back home (government and public) 
and one's own emotions, even if one is a mediator. The
92
following are some of Fisher's suggested ways of construc­
tively handling emotion. 1) Make the emotions explicit and 
acknowledge their legitimacy by writing down both parties' 
present feelings and desired feelings. 2) Develop a range 
of emotive expressions and relate the tone of the communica­
tion to the substantive issue being discussed. 3) Have a 
session for letting off steam. This could be done in a 
public setting, facilitating the catharsis of constituents 
as well. 4) Give the parties a joint, and non-threatening, 
task which is likely to provide constructive shared experi­
ence. 5) Develop crosscutting cleavages by providing oppor­
tunity for informal contact between persons with similar 
background, but from different parties. 6) Reward con­
structive efforts with personal credit, something a mediator 
is especially well situated to do. 7) Stimulate symbolic 
gestures which one side could perform at little cost to 
itself, but with constructive emotional impact on the other 
party —  for eg. shaking hands, attending a cherished
function, making a statement of regret, eating together,
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giving a present, or singing a particular song.
Perception
Principled negotiation holds that perception is central 
to conflict resolution. Although Fisher recognizes the 
reality of conflicting interests, he sees the primary cause 
°f conflict as lying in the party's different ways of think­
ing. Each party to a conflict is likely to have a different
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estimate of what constitutes the most important issues, 
r elevant history, current facts, acceptable grievances, and 
accurate goals or intentions of all parties concerned. Each 
side tends to focus on those estimates which confirm one's 
own prior conceptions and disregard or misinterpret those 
which call their perceptions into question. This leads to 
the familiar problem of each party overemphasizing the mer­
its of its own position and the faults of the other side, as
well as putting the worst interpretation on what they say or 
29
do.
Fisher stresses that the best way to influence the 
other party is to understand empathetically the power of
their point of view, their partisan perception, and to feel
the emotional force with which they believe it. This is the 
opposite of deducing their intentions from one's own fears 
and assigning blame, a tactic which only leads to defensive­
ness and resistance. Even if one is misunderstood, the 
adoption of this approach by one party, alone, can reduce 
the risk of serious collision. In order to empathetically 
understand one must withhold judgement for a while, while 
one explores inside the others' interests and values or 
tries on their views of the situation and possible solu­
tions. This does not involve agreement with the other party,
even though it may result in a reassessment of one's own
position. If this should happen it is beneficial to all. It
allows one to reduce the area of conflict and advance one's
30newly enlightened self-interest. However, it does necessi­
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tate acceptance of the other as one whose interests and
values deserve serious consideration. It means remaining
open to the possibility that one's adversary may be right,
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and oneself wrong. Acceptance means treating the other as 
equal in basic respects. Differences are not to be ignored. 
However, each partner in problem solving should be viewed as 
"equally human, equally caught up in the situation, equally 
entitled to rights, and equally entitled to have any inter­
ests and views taken into account." One must look behind 
the stereotype and not allow it to damage or preclude a 
working relationship by determining whether or how one in­
teracts with the other. Acceptance should always be ex­
pressed in terms of a willingness to meet with, and listen 
to, any adversary. Fisher even counters objections that 
such an attitude simply encourages bad behavior on the part 
of the adversary or contaminates one's image by "supping
with the devil." Fisher simply argues that "the devil we
32
know is easier to handle than the devil we don't."
In light of his concern for mutual acceptance, Fisher 
suggests illuminating and contrasting participant's percep­
tions in simple and dramatic form. Each set of perceptions 
should be set forth in such a way that the party being 
described can own the statements and the other party will 
perceive them as plausible and illuminating. Giving the 
participants a stake in the outcome, through such a partici­
patory process, is probably the most important single nego­
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tiating procedure. Fisher makes a number of concrete recom­
mendations, including the following. Have the parties write 
out both what they are saying and what they are hearing; ask 
one party to provide, for purposes of discussion, a variety 
of "worst interpretations" of one of its statements; have 
the mediator draft the contrasting "messages" in parallel 
columns for the purpose of clarifying intention and inter­
pretation; set a ground rule requiring parties to speak 
about themselves, not the motives or intentions of others; 
and limit the amount of communication, encouraging partici­
pants to be more purposive in their comments. His primary 
approach is to make the present perceptions of each party 
explicit in writing through a listing of partisan percep­
tions and/or a balance sheet of presently perceived choices. 
A list of contrasting, nonjudgmental, perceptions in paral­
lel columns serves to highlight differences constructively, 
alter overly optimistic expectations through reality test­
ing, and enable parties to make low cost moves to satisfy 
interests important to the other side, but not to one's own. 
A balance sheet performs a similar function by revealing 
perceived consequences, favorable and unfavorable, on each 
side of the choice with which each party sees itself con­
fronted. Such procedures are useful to a mediator, as well 
as the parties in conflict. They can be suggested as a means 
of educating the mediator as to the facts and areas of 
dissension. in fact, they do provide the mediator with an
33
opportunity to immerse oneself in the situation, demonstrate
one's interest in what each party thinks, communicate one's
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of each perspective, avoid the impression of
bias, and increase one's credibility in the eyes of the
parties. One may wish to pursue such strategies through




Negotiation is a process of communication from start to 
finish. Yet this task can be done well or poorly. Fisher 
outlines three basic communication problems —  first, when 
the parties are not speaking to each other in ways that can 
be understood; second, when the message is not being heard; 
and third, when that which is heard is misunderstood. Fish­
er assesses these one at a time, giving prescriptive guide­
lines in each case, regarding speaking, listening, and mis- 
35
understanding. With respect to speaking he encourages the
negotiator or mediator to speak to be understood. This
involves clear, concise statements directed toward the ap-
36
propriate people at the negotiating table. Frequently, 
because participants have given up on the other party, 
communication is really directed toward third parties or 
one's own constituency. To counter this tendency the prin­
cipled negotiator should attempt to establish private and 
confidential means of communication with the other party. 
Fisher recommends doing this by precluding the taking of
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notes and limiting the size of the negotiating teams.
Hearing the concerns of another party is also critical 
to both negotiation and mediation. Fisher continually ad­
vises consultation prior to any decision. Asking for advise 
places parties on the same side of the problem. Yet one 
must go beyond simply initiating a listening process. Two 
kinds of listening are involved, hearing what is said and 
hearing between the lines. Accurate listening is frequently 
precluded by diversions, inattention, or internal screening 
processes which lead each person to hear only what one 
wants. Active listening attempts to overcome these difficul­
ties by interacting in a manner which shows one is paying 
attention. By acknowledging communication received the lis­
tener not only reassures the speaker, but also gives the 
latter a chance to correct the impression. Suggested tech­
niques include —  asking a party to spell something out 
carefully and exactly, asking for repetition of ambiguous
ideas, asking one party to comment on a point just made,
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stopping when someone is diverted, inquiring about reasons
behind statements, and allocating particular times for each 
39
party to listen.
Misunderstanding can be the result of either mispercep­
tion or conscious deception. I have already dealt with the 
former. Regarding deception Fisher is clear in his rejection 
°f any dishonesty. He critiques Kissinger's shuttle diplo­
macy in the Middle East for the Secretary's use of decep-
37
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tion, saying that the cost to his reputation is part of what 
jeopardized the negotiation process. However, his advice 
for one faced with deceptive behavior on the other side is 
not simply to trust. Instead he advocates building compli­
ance features into an agreement, verifying factual asser­
tions, and insisting on reciprocal rights when faced with
40
failure to adhere to a commitment.
Rightful Claims: Positions or Interests
Having separated the relational from the substantive 
and dealing with the former, Fisher then addresses the 
various issues associated with negotiating the substance.
The first of these relates to the question of parties' 
legitimate rights. What are they justifiably due and where 
is this to be found? Are these rights represented in a 
party's positions or in the underlying interests, in the 
decision made or in what has caused one to decide? Fisher 
recognizes that the problem initially appears to be a con­
flict of positions since the goal is to arrive at agreement 
41
on a position. However, as already noted, he is absolutely 
clear in his rejection of positional bargaining and his 
conviction that interests must form the basis of negotia­
tion.
Reconciling interests, as opposed to positions, is 
preferable for a number of reasons. First, there are several 
possible positions which could satisfy an interest. There­
fore, by looking behind one's position for the motivating
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interest, one can frequently find an alternative position
42
which will meet the interests of all parties. However,
Fisher does recognize that this will not always be done to 
an equal degree of satisfaction. While stepping into the 
shoes of a hypothetical negotiator, he writes that "my" 
interests should be well satisfied, "yours" acceptably sat­
isfied, and "the community's" tolerably satisfied. Second, 
it is easier for a party to accept alternative means for
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meeting its interests than to back down from its positions.
Third, compromising between positions rarely leads to an
agreement which will effectively satisfy the human needs and
44
interests which lead people to adopt the positions. Fourth, 
behind opposed positions lie, not only conflicting, but 
shared and compatible interests. Though he admits the macro- 
cosmic contention that there are real, objective situations 
in which interests are substantially opposed, he claims that 
there are many more interests which are shared or compat­
ible. Some obvious examples include interest in preserving 
a good relationship, limiting costs if negotiations break 
down, and taking advantage of opportunities for cooperation 
and mutual benefit. Fifth, some differing interests, unlike
opposing positions, actually enhance potential agreement,
45
rather than inhibit it. Fisher, then, concludes that prin­
cipled negotiation should accommodate the conflicting inter-





After explaining the benefits of looking behind posi­
tions for interests, Fisher addresses the difficulty of 
actually doing so. While a position is concrete and ex­
plicit, interests may be unexpressed, intangible and incon- 
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sistent. He mentions a couple concerns regarding interest 
identification, and suggests a couple techniques for getting 
behind positions.
In the task of interest identification, he reminds the 
negotiator/mediator that each side has multiple, not single, 
interests. One must appreciate the differing interests of 
the various people and factions involved. Second, he as­
serts that the most powerful interests are basic human needs 
which motivate all people. Meeting these needs increases 
the chance of both resolution and compliance. Ignoring
them, or seeing them as the other party's problem, is a
48
common and fundamental mistake. These basic human needs
include: security, economic welfare, belonging or identity,
recognition and equal treatment, and control over one's 
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life. Such a definition of interests actually encompasses 
what Burton refers to as universal values and needs. There­
fore, I would conclude that Fisher shares Burton's conten­




Fisher is adamant in his insistence on not arguing over
101
positions. In fact he recommends ignoring any declared
position except as evidence of an underlying interest. On
the other hand, he insists that an effective negotiator will
be prepared, not only to discuss interests, but to state
those of the other side more convincingly than can that 
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party itself. Acknowledging the other's interests as a part
of the overall problem increases the chance that one's own
53
will receive attention.
In the same way, the negotiator's task is to see that 
the other side correctly understands the importance and 
legitimacy of one's own interests. One can be just as 
assertive talking about interests as one can be talking 
about positions. Furthermore, the wisest, and most crea­
tive, solutions are often produced by strong interest advo­
cacy. Taking a strong stand can be coupled with openness to 
correction in a way that impresses the other party. When 
coupled with concern for the other people and their inter­
ests, it tends to create a cognitive dissonance which in­
creases pressure for a mutually agreeable and effective 
54
solution.
In addition to these general guidelines, Fisher gives 
some specific recommendations for discussing interests.
First, state interests and reasons before conclusions and 
proposals. Second, be specific, but flexible. Concrete- 
detail adds impact and credibility, yet treating suggested 
solutions as illustrative maintains negotiating room. "Il­
lustrative specificity," especially if more than one option
102
is considered, avoids the appearance of rigidity. Third,
look forward, not backward. Interests are better served by
pursuit of future goals than by justifying, or complaining 
55
about, the past.
R e c o n c i l i n g  Divergent Interests
Many interests are divergent rather than opposed. In
fact, as stated above, there are times when a satisfactory
agreement can be made precisely because each side wants
something different. Since agreement is often based on
disagreement, it is important to look for items which are of
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high benefit to one side and low cost to the other.
There are various types of differences which Fisher 
claims can potentially be dovetailed in this manner. In 
addition to differences in interests, he lists differences 
in beliefs, in the value placed on time, in forecasts, and 
in aversion to risk. Among possible differences of interest 
he mentions concern for substance vs. form, symbolic vs. 
practical, internal vs. external considerations, economic 
vs. political benefits, immediate vs. more distant future, 
progress vs. tradition, precedent, vs this situation, repu­
tation vs. results. Differences in belief may lend them­
selves to an agreement to involve a third party, since each 
is confident of its ability to convince an unbiased party of 
the rightness of its position. Differences in time valua­
tion allow one party to be more concerned with the present 
and another with the future. Different forecasts of the
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future may enable the parties to gamble according to differ­
ing stakes. Differences in risk-aversion cause some parties
57
to be more cautious than others.
Fisher, again, recommends practical methodology regard­
ing the reconciliation of these divergent interests. One 
can list the parties' interests in parallel columns, placing 
them in order of priority. Even when interests may be 
completely inconsistent, prioritizing may be an avenue for 
possible reconciliation. A slight variation is to list 
conflicting interests opposite one another, leaving creative 
blank spaces where there is no opposed interest. In con­
structing such a list it must be noted, again, that similar 
interests do not necessarily mean opposed ones. For exam­
ple, two countries primarily concerned with internal poli­




Fisher recognizes that loosening parties from their 
commitments to presently held positions is a difficult task. 
Yet he still gives a wide variety of suggestions for how 
both negotiators and mediators can get others to follow the 
procedures of principled negotiation.
To the negotiator faced with an opposite party who is 
entrenched in positions, Fisher recommends what he calls 
negotiation jujitsu." As in the Oriental martial arts he 
recommends a strategy of stepping aside and channelling the
104
other party's strength into exploring interests rather than
directly confronting it with resisting force of one's own.
59
The key is deflecting rather than reacting.
Fisher's first basic guideline for this situation is to 
look, again, for the interests behind the position rather 
than attack the latter. One should treat a position as one 
possible option, examining the extent to which it meets the 
needs of each party. In addition to sharing one's own re­
flections, one might ask the other party how it perceives 
this solution addressing the complete problem. The second 
guideline is to invite criticism of one's ideas, rather than 
defend them, and ask for advice. One must examine any 
input to discover underlying interests and to adapt one's 
own ideas to fit their perspective. Such a procedure turns 
criticism from an obstacle to an asset and invites the other
party to step into one's own place and confront the other
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half of the problem.
In addition to these basic guidelines, Fisher has a 
number of specific recommendations. He encourages a negoti­
ator/mediator to recognize the tactics being used, make them 
explicit, ask for the justification, state that one is sure 
of the existence of legitimate interests underneath the 
position, make clear what will be lost by the present nego­
tiating strategy, interpret a party's commitment in a way 
that weakens it, de-emphasize it so that the other party can 
gracefully back down, ask why one party has not made the
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choice which it perceives the other as requesting, and
encourage consideration of other ways in which interests 
61
may be met.
Fisher's first word to a mediator is a warning that 
third party presence may even cause an increase in intransi­
gence. One must be careful that a party does not adopt a 
partisan position where it previously had none, or rigidify 
a previously "padded" one, out of the belief that it can get 
a better deal with a mediator. Commitments to positions 
tend to become entrenched to the extent that they are writ­
ten, official, publicly announced, and repeated. Therefore, 
a mediator will want to move parties toward oral, private,
and informal sessions, a process quite the opposite of
62
standard mediating tactics.
Options: Deciding or Inventing
The purpose of negotiation is to arrive at an optimal 
decision. Principled negotiation claims that this occurs 
when the optimal point for all parties is found. Fisher 
wants what he calls an "elegant" solution, the very best 
option possible. Such a solution will have no waste. If 
one party does not care about a specific item, the agreement 
should give all the benefits, on that point, to the other 
party(ies). The terms should be so well crafted that they 
cannot be made better for one party without becoming worse 
63
for another.
Positional bargaining is not optimal because it locks
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the negotiators into positions. It leaves fewer resources 
to ascertain and meet underlying interests and, therefore, 
depends on compromise (claiming value) rather than the 
crafting of alternative solutions (creating value). Craft­
ing an elegant solution requires that invention of multiple 
options precede decision for adoption of any one. If the 
goal is not merely a decision, but the optimal one, then 
decision making must be seen as the desired end product of 
negotiation rather than the whole process. However, invent­
ing options is neither a simple, nor a traditional, negoti­
ating procedure. Fisher lists four major obstacles: 1) pre­
mature judgment; 2) searching for the single answer; 3) the
assumption of fixed sum; and 4) the assumption of singular
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responsibility for one's own problems.
Identifying Obstacles in the Way of Inventing
Premature judgement is the natural state of affairs. A
number of factors contribute to this reality. Precedent
carries great weight since it requires much more time and
effort to consider new alternatives. There is substantial
personal cost to the subordinate who continually raises
unrealistic solutions unless the head of the negotiating
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team is sympathetic. Fear of jeopardizing one's own nego­
tiating position leads to an unwillingness to suggest alter­
nate options due to the risk of disclosing confidential 
interests or priorities. Finally, simple emotional involve-
®ent makes it difficult to achieve the necessary detachment.
i
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Therefore a traditional negotiating team decides on a pro­
posed solution before negotiation begins. Whenever adver­
saries come to the table, each convinced it already knows 
the right answer to the problem, there is very little incen­
tive to devise alternative solutions. Judgement hinders 
imagination and heightens anxieties. The idea-generating 
process needs to be freed from the act of commitment, since 
having a lot at stake inhibits the creative. In fact the 
authority to make binding commitments is more of a handicap
than a help. Negotiators are better off with less official 
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authority.
If the first hindrance to creative process is premature
criticism, then the second is premature closure. This, too
is encouraged by traditional negotiating practice. Rather
than assuming differing viewpoints to discover the benefits
of collective thinking, each person on the negotiating team
is expected to take everything into account and recommend a
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realistic solution. Searching for the one correct answer 
detracts from the primary task of creating negotiating room. 
The latter requires a considerable number of markedly dif­
ferent ideas. However, the temptation is to fear that 
unrestricted discussion will prove unproductive, resulting 
only in delay and confusion. Broadening the options may 
feel like a needless, or even harmful, tangent. But prema­




A third reason why inventing options seldom occurs is 
because each side perceives the situation as either/or.
This fixed-sum game carries the assumption that the size or 
shape of the pie cannot be altered. The result is disin­
terest in devising new solutions if all the options are 
already obvious and one party can gain only at the other's 
expense. Fisher's rebuttal points to the existence of the
many divergent, but unopposed, interests mentioned in the
70
previous section.
The final obstacle lies in each side's preoccupation 
with its own immediate interests. The sense that one has 
enough problems of one's own, without worrying about those 
of the other side, is pervasive. There is a natural psycho­
logical reluctance to legitimate anything on the other side. 
Yet, as indicated previously, this shortsighted sense of
loyalty hinders the very process with the most potential for
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meeting one's self-interest.
Beginning the Inventing Process
Principled negotiation employs a number a techniques to 
initiate the inventing process, to free thought patterns 
from existing constraints. Not only does this involve the 
development of tools, but frequently the adoption of an 
objective stance from which to view the conflict. The first 
technique, for a mediator, is simply to make the inventing 
problem explicit. One can bring to the attention of the 
Parties the lack of fair, operational and competently pre­
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pared solutions, as presented by either side. This can be 
accomplished by presenting contrasting lists of the charac­
teristics of desirable and undesirable proposals (vague 
generalities vs. operational proposals, reflecting interests 
of one side vs. reconciling interests of both, few in number 
vs. numerous, etc). The question on the table would then be 
the desirability of new options. Another possibility, or 
perhaps additional step, would be the preparation of fresh 
proposals which could be evaluated according to the two sets 
of characteristics. These options could be presented by 
either the participants themselves or by the mediator. Ei­
ther of these techniques has the advantage of creating 
agreement, not only on the poor quality of existing propos­
als from both sides, but also on an alternative process for 
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moving ahead.
The discovery of new options can be facilitated by a 
variety of brainstorming techniques. One can utilize the 
circle chart in order to use one desirable proposal to 
generate others. By moving from a good action idea back to 
the general approach, of which the proposal is only one 
possible application, one can often discover other applica­
tions. Likewise, one could go back another step, to the 
diagnosis, and generate alternative approaches which would 
in turn lead to new action proposals. This tool could be 
combined with another Fisher suggestion, that of examining 
the problem, or parts of it, from the perspective of various 
third party experts. Different disciplines, professions or
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organizations will use varied criteria for determining what
is important and evaluating proposals. Each might diagnose
the situation differently or suggest various approaches or
action ideas. Placing oneself in these hypothetical shoes
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can be very enlightening. A variation of this technique 
would be to invite such outsiders to present their spe­
cialized points of view, taking advantage of their recog-
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nized neutrality and legitimacy.
Fisher recommends a variety of commonly accepted guide­
lines for use before, during, and after brainstorming. The 
preliminary guidelines involve questions of purpose, as well 
as who, when, where, and what atmosphere. Guidelines for 
during the process involve seating, ground rules, and re­
cording. Guidelines for follow-up involve selection, im­
provement, and use of best ideas. The sole purpose of brain­
storming is to invent a wide variety of possibilities. 
Therefore wild ideas, outside the realm of the possible, are 
encouraged since the group could generate from these unreal­
istic options, others which are credible. Group size should 
be large enough to stimulate interchange and small enough to 
encourage participation, usually five to eight people plus a 
facilitator who can oversee the process and raise questions. 
It is easiest if participants all come from the same side. 
However, inclusion of two or more sides has the potential of
creating a climate of mutual problem solving and education
75regarding parties' interests. For these reasons, it may be
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advantageous to involve chief negotiators from each side. On
the other hand middle level people may find emotional de- 
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tachment easier. Such a procedure was used during the
successful SALT I talks between the United States and the 
77
Soviet Union. Time, place, and atmosphere can all contrib­
ute to successful suspension of judgement if the context is 
separated as far as possible from the negotiating sessions 
themselves. Informal, shirt-sleeved sessions, at a different 
time and place, on a first-name basis, with mixed seating
are most likely to generate a multitude of beneficial op- 
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tions. Seating should also be side by side in a semicircle,
facing a rapporteur, in order to avoid argument and foster
79
joint response to the external problem. Ground rules should
be implemented only with the consent of the participants.
The primary one is to postpone all criticism and evaluation.
Others may include making the entire session off the record
and refraining from attribution of ideas. The rapporteur
may be given the authority to select which ideas are worth
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recording and, thus, reduce the sense of attribution. At 
the end of the session, however, the no-criticism rule 
should be relaxed, enabling the group to select the most 
promising ideas. These ideas are not decisions, but nomina­
tions of promising proposals, worth further development. The 
task is, then to invent ways to improve them, make them more 
realistic and implement them. Finally, a time must be set
to decide which of these to advance in formal negotiations
81
and how to do it.
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Inventing a New Game
Informal brainstorming must ultimately effect the for­
mal negotiating process. The structure of this process, or 
game, is more amenable to change than is usually thought. 
Furthermore, the impact of such a move is also underesti­
mated. In fact, a mediator's major power is the ability to 
adjust the formal negotiating process or invent a new game.
Two ways of doing this are by altering the players or their
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roles and by altering the standard moves.
The players and their roles may be altered by adding a 
new party, eliminating a party, or dealing with a different 
subgroup within a party. Contrary to traditional practice 
Fisher recommends adding participants who represent the most 
extreme positions. The perspective of these effected third 
parties is important to the process and the desired outcome 
may well depend on their involvement. Parties can also be 
added to provide moderation, reduce bipolar division, bring 
in additional mediators, create crosscutting cleavages, or 
provide additional material resources. On the other hand, 
there are also constructive ways to decrease the partici­
pants. Groups could be represented by one person to reduce 
communication problems. A separate agreement among fewer 
parties may be possible if the larger attempt proves impos­
sible. in some circumstances it is even advisable to pro­
ceed with only one party, requiring that party to assign 
some people to represent the other side's concerns. This
113
approach may be adopted for different purposes —  to present 
an unwilling party with a reasonable solution or as an 
exercise to educate one party regarding the other's inter­
ests. Finally, a mediator can take advantage of the differ­
ent subgroups within a party and decide to treat a particu­
lar person, or even another level of government, as the more 
significant player. Helping a given negotiating team to get
different instructions may be the key to advancing a partic-
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ular negotiation.
Fisher also applies this strategy of changing the play­
ers or their roles to international conciliation, or pre­
negotiation. Whenever one attempts to influence any party to 
move toward any decision, including formal negotiation, one 
ought to recognize the non-monolithic structure of that 
party. Frequently one can influence a smaller subgroup, 
which is sufficiently cohesive, to make a decision on its 
own. Even when this is not the case, a lower official may be 
able to exert influence on a higher one if convinced of a 
needed change. Finally, there are advantages, at times, to 
talking as if one were attempting to influence a different
player than the party, or sub-party, with which one is
84
presently dealing.
The standard moves of the negotiating game can be 
altered in a number of ways which change the process to one 
in which present positions are irrelevant. This could take 
the form of referring the differences to experts for advice,
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perhaps by collecting last best offers and giving the media­
tor the authority to decide. A second example is for the 
mediator to ask for contingent offers rather than demand 
concessions. Each party would be asked to indicate offers 
they would, or might, be willing to render if the other 
party were willing to agree to a particular provision. The 
parties would then be encouraged to exchange these contin­
gent and reciprical proposals. Finally, a mediator could
insist that the only acceptable response to an unacceptable
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contingent offer be a counter offer.
Another variation of changing the standard move is a
process developed at the Harvard Negotiation Project and one
of the favorite techniques used by Fisher. The single
negotiating text procedure involves a series of submissions,
discussions, and revisions of a common draft agreement.
Based on one's own analysis of common interests, as well as
participants' assessment of interests and specific drafts,
the mediator, or a body of non-partisans, would initiate
each draft and determine the point at which a given text
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should be presented for acceptance or rejection. Fisher 
acknowledges that this procedure carries the risks of an 
unfamiliar process, too early a focus on details, reduction 
of participant participation, and a likely ultimatum at the 
end. However, he stresses the positive gains —  ability to 
initiate process without formal agreement, irrelevance of 
extreme positions, avoidance of concession making, ease of 
criticism, concentration on interests, freedom from blame if
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failure occurs, informal process which encourages corridor 
diplomacy, and a resulting concrete proposal which requires 
only one final decision and around which public opinion can 
mobilize. Fisher illustrates the advantages of this ap­
proach, over against a traditional one, by contrasting Kis­
singer's failure at Middle East shuttle diplomacy with the
successful use of the single negotiating text procedure at
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the 1978 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt.
Inventing a New Choice
Principled negotiation asserts that the decisions peo­
ple make depend upon the choices they face and that differ­
ing procedures can create different choices. Mediation as a 
practice presupposes this to be the case. Inventing new 
choices for one's adversary, ones acceptable to all parties, 
is at the heart of Fisher's methodology. He refers to this 
as the development of "yesable propositions", proposals to
which the word "yes" is sufficient, feasible (with at least
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20% probability), and operational.
Fisher recognizes that yesable propositions have their 
limitations. There is the danger of such a proposal feeling 
unfamiliar or sounding like an ultimatum. It also risks in­
cluding details offensive to the other side and may prohibit 
the asking of more favorable terms for one's own side. Yet 
Fisher feels that the advantages far outweigh the disadvan­
tages, provided one understands that this is simply a begin­
ning step. Giving a yes or no choice, rather than a problem
116
to be solved, makes it easier for busy bureaucrats to re­
spond, cuts through suspicion about one's intentions, en­
courages others to evaluate the real costs and benefits of 
the proposed solution, and increases the likelihood that 
ongoing negotiation will avoid positional bargaining. In 
order to ensure this Fisher recommends preparing, and plac­
ing on the negotiating table, at least two such proposals at 
any given time. This avoids the possibility of a yesable 
proposition being viewed as a positional statement by either
side, thus preventing rigidity, as well as reaction and
89
counter reaction.
Three types of choice alteration are the focus of 
yesable propositions —  altering the decision itself, the 
consequences, and the manner of asking. Altering the deci­
sion itself can take a number of forms. First one can make 
the existing options more operational. This could mean
simply restating one's objective in the other party's terms
90
or emphasizing different elements. Often proposals stated 
as general principles need to become more specific. Concre­
tizing existing general proposals may well result in more 
than one yesable proposition. On the other hand, reducing 
the number of decisions can also be useful. One way to 
accomplish this is to accumulate a number of tentative 
proposals and then consider adopting them as a group. Sec­
ond, one can invent agreements of lesser strength —  agree­
ments on procedure rather than substance, on "what is disa-
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greed" rather than "what is agreed", provisional rather than 
permanent, non-binding rather than binding, contingent rath­
er than unconditional, in principle rather than final. 
Changing the goals of the game can be accomplished by help­
ing each side to strengthen the moderate tendencies of the 
other. There will always be some faction within a party
which is concerned about reputation, reciprical compliance
92
or non-compliance, non-intervention, or system breakdown.
If necessary, especially during a pre-negotiation stage, an
international conciliator could lessen the strength to the
extent of proposing a "long-term vision", with specific
suggestions regarding who could do what at this time to move
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toward fulfillment. Third, one can change the scope of an 
agreement. Fisher recommends fractionating the conflict.
This involves separating the issues into smaller, more man­
ageable components. Agreements may be limited in time, 
physical size, parties involved, or subject matter. Such a 
process increases the chance of avoiding stalemate, capi­
talizing on immediate progress, and deciding on the merits 
of the case. The opposite technigue of enlarging or cou­
pling issues may also be beneficial in certain circumstanc­
es. it can be used to make the package more attractive by
■ 94 Doming issues favorable to each side respectively.
Altering the conseguences involves changing the percep­
tions of expected results in either making, or not making, a 
given decision. The task, in this case, is to alter the 
target balance sheet of pros and cons so as to make a spe­
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cific choice more acceptable to a particular party. The 
typical first reaction is to increase the threat. However, 
Fisher argues that this strategy is usually ineffective, 
costly, and lacking in credibility. Instead, he recommends 
focusing attention on making a credible offer, even convert­
ing threats into offers where possible. One can alter the 
magnitude, likelihood, immediacy, legitimacy, or character 
of either of these potential consequences. Some illustra­
tions include: changing the beneficiary, giving the benefits 
sooner, demonstrating that one has detailed plans for imple­
menting it, making a commitment from which one cannot back 
down, offering a fading opportunity with limited availabili­
ty, and decreasing the precedential effect of a decision by 
emphasizing the uniqueness of the case. Furthermore, a medi­
ator can counter the perceived need to stand firm, for the 
purpose of maintaining constituency support, by increasing
awareness, on the part of all, of the high costs of intran- 
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sigence.
The final means of altering the choice is through the 
manner of asking for a decision. One way to do this is to 
assist parties to accept part ownership of an idea. In this 
way, the proposed solution has already begun to be identi­
fied as part of the party's own "interest." One can also 
buffer a new idea by having it conveyed privately, or even 
indirectly. Private contact has the advantage of being less 
threatening and providing opportunity for explanation and
119
response. In addition there is a kind of ladder of threat 
escalation regarding the language used in presenting a party 
with a choice. Asking is less threatening than proposing, 
which is less threatening than demanding. Likewise, there 
is potential escalation in content, as well as actions,
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moving from information to advice to promises to ultimatums.
Commitment to a Decision
Principled negotiation discourages the making of com­
mitments at the beginning of the negotiating process. How­
ever, commitment to a mutual decision is the very purpose of 
negotiation. At the end one hopes to achieve an agreement. 
Decisions need to be specific as to who is going to do what 
and who will refrain from doing what. These commitments 
should be realistic, easy to implement, "compliance prone,"
and no more extensive than necessary to serve the mutual 
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interests. They should be jointly formulated, with care
taken to clarify the formal status and any interdependence
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and to draft an illustrative public statement for each.
Criteria for Accepting Agreement: Subjective or Objective
Principled negotiation does not describe its philosophy 
as "win-win." Despite its emphasis on the value of ongoing 
relationships, the reconciliation of divergent interests, 
and the creation of alternative options for mutual gain, 
benefits are hardly ever equal. One will always confront 
incompatible interests which cannot be reconciled. Tradi­
tional negotiation attempts to resolve these by a contest of
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wills over which side will be either most stubborn or most 
generous. The outcome results from the interaction of human 
wills. It is not based on history, custom, or moral stan­
dard but on the subjective criteria of the parties in- 
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volved. This is particularly disadvantageous to the party 
which wants to change the status quo. If such a party 
desires to proceed quickly, they are in a very weak posi­
tion, unless they have the kind of power needed to impose a
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solution in the particular situation at hand.
Fisher's solution is to negotiate on the basis of 
objective criteria, independent of the will of either side. 
He argues that it is precisely in deciding distributional 
issues that objective criteria are most useful. The more 
one utilizes standards based on reason, legitimacy, and 
practicality, the greater the chance for a wise and fair 
outcome. The more one refers to facts, precedent, and 
community practice, the less vulnerable are all parties and 
the more durable the agreement. The more one relies on 
mutually recognized standards the fewer are the number of 
necessary commitments and the greater the ability to fore­
cast the consequences of a proposal. Furthermore, all these 
advantages increase when dealing with multiple parties who
form coalitions or with negotiators constrained by higher
i d
authorities or constituencies.
An agreement should not only be fair, but must also 
appear to be so in the eyes of all parties. A negotiator
121
needs to justify any distributive proposal in the eyes of
the adversary, not because the other perspective is right,
but because it is the other's action which one is trying to 
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influence. Governments usually formulate demands in exact­
ly the opposite way, legitimating the desired decision in 
the eyes of one's own people. One cannot expect an adver­
sary to make a decision based on "our" standard of fairness. 
This necessitates legitimating both the messages sent and 
the means of communication. In both cases Fisher points to
rule and logic, as the necessary means to justify considera-
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tion of, or resistance to, a proposal. To produce an 
outcome which is not subjective one can apply either fair 
and reasonable standards (rules) for the substantive ques­
tion or fair and reasonable procedures for resolving the 
conflicting interests.
Identifying Objective Criteria
There is usually more than one objective standard a-
vailable. Fisher lists a multitude of possibilities from
which one might look for criteria appropriate to a given
situation. Among these are: precedent, tradition or custom,
reciprocity, proportionality, expert opinion, professional
standards, unavoidable costs, legal decision, scientific
judgement, proceed standards, equal treatment, efficiency,
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and simplicity of administration. He readily admits that 
there is much work to be done in suggesting better objective 
standards and procedures which guide the process of interna-
122
tional negotiation. However, at present, the primary stan­
dard which Fisher likes to apply is precedent. According to 
him this criteria is most effective in facilitating a deci­
sion. The negotiator is encouraged to look, not only for an 
external ruling, but for a precedential decision or state­
ment which the other party made in a similar situation.
Perhaps this request, or something very nearly like it, is 
something they have already promised to do. The adversary's 
need to be consistent will help one generate options which 
are both acceptable to oneself and legitimate to the other.
The fear of setting a harmful precedent by giving way to the 
other side can also be overcome by demonstrating that a
particular decision is consistent with principles already 
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established. Whatever the method or rationale, the re­
sulting criteria should apply to all sides. The test of 
reciprocity can help determine whether or not a given cri-
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terion is fair and independent of the will of either party.
There is also a variety of fair and reasonable proce­
dures which can provide objective criteria. First, there is 
the age old practice of "one cuts, the other chooses." A 
variation of this is to have parties negotiate what they 
think is a fair arrangement before they determine either 
their roles or their piece of the pie. Second, there is the 
practice of taking turns, especially helpful when there is a 
large amount to be divided. There is always the opportunity 
to make the selections tentative, allowing for the possibil-
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ity of trading before finalizing the transaction. Third, 
there is drawing of lots or some other form of chance. The 
results may be unequal, but the opportunity is equal.
Fourth, letting someone else play a role in the decision is 
a procedure with almost unlimited variation. As already 
suggested, one could ask for expert advice, for facilita­
tion, or even for a binding decision. Giving the third party
the authority to decide between each side's final offer puts
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pressure on them to put forward their best efforts.
Negotiating With Objective Criteria
Principled negotiation approaches the question of stan­
dards the same way it approaches the substantive issues.
There must be a joint search for objective criteria through 
a process governed by reason rather than pressure. "Agree 
first on principles, before even considering possible terms" 
is the centerpiece of the approach. Even if substantive
interests are in conflict, parties can affirm the shared
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goal of determining fair criteria.
What makes this joint search possible is coming to the 
table with an open mind. Therefore, Fisher emphasizes that 
each party must recognize the potential validity of criteria 
other than its own. One set of valid standards and proce­
dures does not preclude the existence of others. In fact, 
he suggests that one's case will have much more impact if 
Presented in terms of the other side's criteria. Agreement 
would not be a matter of concession, but of keeping one's
124
word.
Though a principled negotiator may yield to an alter­
nate principle, based on reason and objective standards, one 
must never yield to pressure. Pressure can take many forms
  bribes, threats, personal attacks, stressful environment,
a good-guy/bad-guy team, manipulative appeals to trust, or a 
simple refusal to budge. Whatever the form, Fisher is 
convinced that the principled negotiator can usually shift 
the process from positional bargaining to a search for 
objective criteria. Making the rules of the game the issue 
normally gives the principled negotiator the edge. Reasoned
principle, as one's "stand", is much easier to defend than
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is pressure to conform with someone's will.
The actual process of negotiating the criteria takes 
much the same form as negotiating the substance. First, 
suggest one or more criteria oneself. A good standard 
opening proposal for a principled negotiator should not 
include any suggestion which one would refrain from making 
to an impartial third party. It need not be a middle posi­
tion, nor the one which the negotiator deems that an arbi-
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trator would accept. But it must not undercut one's credi­
bility nor turn the other party off. One must also check to 
make sure that one can disengage from the criteria without 
undue risk, that one perceives a way to move from the cri­
teria toward satisfaction of one's interests, and that the 
end product is realistic. In addition to the criteria which
110
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one presents, a wise negotiator will formulate some "fall 
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back" criteria. Second, invite the other side to present 
criteria. Then ask them what theory underlies their sugges­
tion. Treat them as serious participants in the joint search 
for fair criteria. Yet, realize that each standard they 
propose becomes a tool which can be used to present one's 
own case persuasively. If one should speak as though talking 
to an arbitrator, then one should listen as though one is an 
arbitrator. Third, behave as a judge, or better yet, a 
team of judges. Weigh the merits of each criterion. Look 
for an objective basis for deciding between them. If two 
different standards seem equally legitimate, a compromise 
which splits the difference may be the best procedure. In 
this case the outcome is still independent of the will of 
either party. Fourth, defer to someone both sides see as 
unbiased if the parties are unable to come to agreement 
themselves. Give the third party the lists of proposed 
criteria and ask it to choose the fairest and most appro­
priate. Such a procedure does not give the third party the 
authority to settle the dispute, only to settle the question 
of standards. Finally, quit the negotiation if the other 
side will not budge and if they have not given a persuasive 
reason for their position. The status quo may be better 
than any alternative the other side has presented, but first 
one should check to make sure that no good objective stan­
dard has been overlooked. One should also weigh this "take 
or leave it" move against the cost to one's reputation as a
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n e g o t i a t o r .
Power: Imposing or Influencing
One of the first questions Fisher raises about power is
its relevance to the discussion of negotiation. On the one
hand he does not show any hesitation in legitimating the
continual attempt, on the part of nations, to accumulate
power. He states that any nation wants to have the physical
and psychological resources necessary to insure that one is
in a strong position for dealing with future issues. Since
power is not automatically transferable from place to place
and purpose to purpose, any government is always concerned
to accumulate it anew. Therefore, its actions in a current
conflict will always be designed to acquire or generate
military, economic, political, proceed, or legal bargaining
chips. According to Fisher, such a quest for power is not
improper, ipso facto. Any state ought to want to influence
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events for proceed reasons.
Fisher's answer to the question of the legitimacy of 
power is to ask, "What kind of power?" To that question, he 
answers, "influence," which is exerted by changing the mes­
sage which one party sends to the other. Influence consists 
of three fundamental elements: the demand (the decision that 
is desired) , the offer (expressing the consequences that 
will follow if the action is taken), and the threat (expres­
sing the consequences that will follow if the action is not 
taken) . with each of these elements he raises the subsidiary
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question of: who (which parties are addressed)? what (which 
elements are addressed, credible, attractive)? when (rela­
tive timing of the elements)? and why (which elements can be
legitimated)? This combination of elements constitutes the
116
essential structure of an attempt to influence a decision.
For the third party intervener, as well, this strategy is 
central to Fisher's methodology. He frequently makes refer­
ence to Machiavelli's query, "What is the best advice you
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can give a prince?" as the primary question to be asked.
One central task of the third party mediator is to influence 
one or more aspects of the message sent, or to alter percep­
tion of the message received, in order to change the set of
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choices before the parties.
On the other hand, imposed, coercive, destructive power 
has very little legitimacy for Fisher. Even then, it has 
legitimacy only when it functions as influence or persua­
sion, the legitimate expression of power. He states that 
there is certainly some truth to the assertion that military 
force, coupled with the willingness to use it, can influence 
a negotiation. In fact, he asserts that, before World War 
II, superior physical force was often a critical factor in 
determining who would prevail in international negotiation. 
The reliability of this self-help strategy gave powerful 
nations the option of imposing their will. According to 
Fisher, this has drastically changed with the advent of the 
nuclear age. Asymmetry of traditional power is no longer a
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significant issue since powerful countries often cannot use 
their full force and seemingly less powerful ones have often 
prevailed in conflict. He points to Vietnam, Iran, and many 
other examples, to indicate that most contemporary foreign 
policy objectives cannot be accomplished by use of force. 
Therefore, he asserts that physical superiority, and with it 
the ability to impose one's solution, has become largely 
irrelevant to the negotiation process. The critical balance 
today is not that of destructive force, but the balance 
sheets of presently perceived choice. Diplomatic success now 
depends primarily on the ability to influence another gov­
ernment to do something one desires. This "negotiating
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power" is both legitimate and desirable.
Fisher points out that nations and negotiators still 
attempt to function according to the old coercive power 
model. With respect to military force he feels that it is a 
demonstrably flawed strategy. However, he admits that in 
other respects imposing power does play more of a role.
Those with wealth, friends and connections, good jobs, or 
more time usually fare better than those who are poor, 
friendless, unemployed, or in a hurry. While this is true, 
he claims that it is irrelevant to negotiation strategy. 
Fisher is not impressed with descriptive assessment unless 
it has prescriptive significance. He is interested in deter­
mining what exactly can help the less powerful, as well as 
the more powerful, to find the best mutual solution. He is 
convinced that principled negotiation provides the best ap­
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proach to enhance the persuasive negotiating power of all.
Not only is coercive power ineffective as a guarantee 
of assured victory. According to Fisher, coercion actually 
damages both the working relationship and the quality of an 
agreement. Coercion will destroy effective communication, 
reason, trust, mutual understanding and acceptance. Fur­
thermore, because of it, any agreement is less likely to 
benefit from creative thinking or to meet the coerced par­
ty's needs and standards of fairness. Such agreements are 
also frequently harder to implement and more likely to break 
down. Fisher admits that the line between coercion and 
persuasion is not sharp. The difference is often one of 
degree, especially in situations where there is little time 
or opportunity for persuasion. Nevertheless, Fisher sees 
coercion operating in every aspect of positional bargaining. 
Some of its features include: attacking the actions, 
judgments, honesty, and character of individuals (psycholo­
gical coercion); treating negotiation as a contest to be 
won; early commitment to one's position which requires the 
other party to change; narrowing choices and limiting dis­
cussion to fewer and fewer options; trying to break the 
other party's will rather than search for fair criteria for 
agreement; and worsening the other's alternatives by threat­
ening bad consequences. Virtually every facet of the nego­
tiation process becomes coercive when not viewed as a prob­
lem solving procedure. Persuasive modes of influence, as
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difficult as they may be to ascertain or implement, are the
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only ones which are "unconditionally constructive."
However, Fisher does caution negotiators, and especial­
ly mediators, about the dangers of seeking influence for its 
own sake. To see persuasive power as an end in itself is to 
place more importance on one's ability to influence the 
future than to arrive at a good solution for the present 
conflict. Mediators are especially prone to this in the 
form of concern for success. Some concern for reputation is 
fine. In fact, for one to exercise any influence one must 
be known. However, one must be known as a person of princi­
ple. One's reputation is best based on integrity and com­
passion. This alone will provide the basis for lasting 
122
influence.
The primary question then is how to enhance principled
negotiating power. According to Fisher, one's ability to
influence favorably depends upon six interrelated elements
—  1) the power of skill and knowledge; 2) the power of a
good relationship; 3) the power of a good alternative to
negotiating; 4) the power of an elegant solution based on
the best options; 5) the power of legitimacy; and 6) the
power of commitment, both affirmative and negative. These
categories for generating prescriptive advice are listed in
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a conscious order, each one building on the other. Nego­
tiating power depends not only on competence in each cate­
gory, but the cumulative total. An orchestrated combination
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°f them all is what causes impact. Since many of these
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overlap material I have previously covered I will focus on 
only three —  skill and knowledge, a good alternative to 
negotiating, and commitment.
The Power of Skill and Knowledge
A skilful negotiator is better able to influence others
to make a decision. These skills, which can be learned and
taught, include both interpersonal and analytical skills.
In the first category Fisher lists the ability to listen, to
become aware of emotions and psychological concerns, to
empathize, to be sensitive to other's feelings and one's
own, to speak different languages, to communicate clearly
and effectively, and to become integrated so that words and
behavior are congruent. Analytical skills include logic,
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quantitative assessment, and organization of ideas.
A knowledgeable negotiator is also powerful. General 
knowledge of procedural options, national negotiating 
styles, and cultural differences can add enough to one's 
persuasive ability to offset other power advantages the 
other party may have. Special knowledge pertinent to a 
particular negotiation is even more powerful. Fisher lists 
a number of categories of knowledge which can increase one's 
influence. l) Knowledge about the people (on both sides) —  
their personal concerns, backgrounds, interests, prejudices, 
values, etc. 2) Knowledge about the interests —  group 
needs, hopes, fears —  on both sides. 3) Knowledge about 
the facts —  history, geography, economics, and scientific
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background as well as legal, social, a n d  political impli­
cations. The importance of unknown facts is important enough
to warrant researching a quantity of material in order to
126
gain a few relevant facts.
The Power of an Alternative to Negotiating
This is Fisher's specific answer to the question of how 
to deal with a more powerful party. He suggests developing 
in detail the best option one can create for use in the 
event that negotiations do not reach agreement. Knowing 
what other possibilities are available enables one to have a 
standard against which to measure any other proposed solu­
tion. One must take care, though, not to conceptualize 
these alternatives in the aggregate since one will be able 
to implement only one of the possible choices. This best 
alternative is not the same as a bottom line. It is not an 
arbitrary decision, but one which carefully weighs the 
results one can obtain without agreement. It protects one 
from accepting terms which are too unfavorable and from 
rejecting terms which would be beneficial. Furthermore, it
is flexible enough to allow for imaginative exploration of 
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other options.
Creating such an alternative gives one a great deal of
power. Fisher claims that the relative negotiating power of
two parties depends more on the degree to which each party
willing to not reach agreement than it does on resources
128
ike wealth, physical strength, or political connections.
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For one who knows the best alternative, every negotiation 
can be a success, since any agreement will enhance one's 
position over the status quo. The results might not be the 
best possible, but at least it would not be a loss. Fur­
thermore, this solution is not at the expense of the other 
party. It is not a threat of what one will do to the
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adversary, but a promise of what one will do for oneself.
To develop possible alternatives Fisher outlines a 
three step process prior to negotiation: 1) Invent a list
of actions one might take if agreement is thwarted. 2) Im­
prove some of the more promising ones and convert them into 
specific options. 3) Tentatively choose the option that 
seems best. One may then decide to reveal this alternative 
to the other party during negotiations if it is attractive 
enough. He also advises testing out the possible alterna­
tives one's adversary has. Such preparation helps one to 
know what to expect, to help others be realistic, and even
to consider actions which could alter the other side's best 
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alternative.
The Power of Commitment
There are two kinds of commitment, affirmative offers 
and negative lock-ins or threats. The former has the power 
°f an invitation. It usually focuses attention at the point 
of the offer, but it also ties the hands of the party which 
makes it. The offer may expire or be withdrawn, but while it 
is operative, the party is committed to honor it. Fisher
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recommends that a wise negotiator formulate an offer in ways
that build upon the other categories of negotiating power.
In this way, the choice that is offered is most likely to
confront the other side with a proposal to which they might 
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say y e s .
Fisher still holds out the possibility of negative
commitment as a last resort. One form of this is the lock-
in, a commitment where one is unwilling to make certain
agreements even though they may be better than one's best
non-negotiating alternative. The other is the threat that,
if agreement is not forthcoming, one will engage in purpo-
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sive negative conduct against the other.
Both kinds of negative commitment are controversial and 
troublesome in Fisher's eyes. When used prematurely, they 
have a tendency to interfere with the full realization of 
other elements of negotiating power. The sooner one an­
nounces a threat, or a "take-it-or-leave-it", lock-in posi­
tion, the less chance one has to realize the possible extent 
of one's negotiating power. Negative commitments have be­
come the focus of attention around the negotiating table, 
leaving little, if any, room for affirmative commitments, 
including yesable propositions. The power of knowledge is 
disrupted before one can learn what is the best proposition 
to which to commit oneself. It is obvious that the power of 
a good relationship has been damaged by the ensuing lack of 
trust fostered by a negative commitment. The power of an
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elegant solution is lost because it is now less likely that 
the choices being considered reflect best the interests of 
the other party or even one's own. The power of legitimacy 
has been damaged the most, since the persuasiveness of one's 
future proposals depends on one's past adherence to objec­
tive criteria. Even the power of a good non-negotiating 
alternative has been compromised. The attention of the other 
side is shifted from looking at the objective reality of 
one's most attractive alternative to a subjective statement
regarding what one threatens or locks into. This simply
133
invites a contest of wills.
There is, incidentally, a subtle distinction between
resorting to one's non-negotiated alternative and a lock-in
tactic. The former does not consist of precise terms, which
the other party must accept, in order to prevent one from
undertaking a course of action. It is simply a base line by
which to measure any of the options which one expects to
generate. The non-negotiated alternative is also distinct
from a threat. There is a difference between threatening
another's interests and warning of either an outcome which
would occur independent of one's own decision-making or an
action one is taking for the sake of fulfilling one's own 
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best interests. In each case, the negative commitment 
quickly pushes the negotiator into a positional bargaining 
stance. On the other hand, although the non-negotiated 
alternative is an admission that inventing and influencing 
have not worked, the interests, relationships, and objective
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criteria are still held in respect. Though it is far from 
optimum, it continues to adhere to the "hard on merits, soft 
on people" perspective of principled negotiation.
summary and Conclusion
Principled negotiation clearly falls within the problem 
solving school of conflict resolution. Its third party 
intervention counterpart, called principled problem solving, 
reveals its self-conscious placement within this school.
The five guidelines on which I have elaborated in this 
chapter, all serve to illustrate the relationship of this 
methodology to problem solving, as well as to the pluralist 
model of conflict resolution as developed within political 
science. The emphasis on rational morality also points to 
Fisher's indebtedness to traditional liberalism.
The guidelines, or tenets, of principled negotiation 
are as follows. First, one should separate relational and 
substantive issues. The people problem, consisting of emo­
tions, perceptions, and communication, should be dealt with 
independently from the discussion of the issues to be de­
cided. Second, one should focus on interests, not posi­
tions. Knowing and discussing the underlying concerns and 
needs of all parties is more important to an effective 
negotiation/mediation process than insisting upon one's own 
demands. Discovery of interests reveals many shared and 
compatible ones, in addition to those which are conflicting. 
Third, one should invent options for mutual gain, rather
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than make early commitment to a given option. Instead of 
assuming a fixed pie, one should generate a range of possi­
bilities which are worthy of consideration. Brainstorming 
and other such techniques should replace attitudes of prema­
ture judgment and the search for a single answer. Fourth, 
one should insist on objective criteria for agreement. The 
contest of wills should be replaced by standards and proce­
dures which are determined on the basis of fair, external 
measures. Fifth, one should develop negotiating power in 
order to influence the other party, instead of relying on 
coercion to impose one's will.
The pragmatism of Fisher's approach is one of the 
features which makes it particularly attractive as a metho­
dology which the church may be able to adapt for use in 
conflict intervention. Therefore, I will turn next to an 
examination of praxis. It is important to evaluate princi­
pled negotiation in the context of a case where some of its 
proponents acted as a third party (chapter 3) and compare 
this to a case where a religious group functioned in a 
similar situation (chapter 4). Both of these cases fall 
within the broader context of East-West relations during the 
cold war. in each case I will evaluate the procedures used 
m  light of the tenets of principled negotiation. Such 
reflection on praxis will then be used to inform my theolo­
gical reflection and evaluation of the utility of principled 
negotiation as model for adaptation by the church.
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INVOLVEMENT OF HARVARD'S NUCLEAR NEGOTIATION PROJECT
IN DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS
The Nuclear Negotiation Project, along with the 
Harvard Negotiation Project, is part of the Program on 
Negotiation at Harvard Law School. A variety of projects, 
operating under the umbrella organization, have been 
involved in mediation and intervention activities related 
to superpower conflict. They have explored a mediated 
settlement to the war in Afghanistan and have spent much 
time at efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war, a task 
they consider to be a primary focus of their current work. 
Approaches used to address the latter problem have in­
cluded: 1) Research on superpower relations and negotia­
tions, analyzing effective and ineffective assumptions and 
interactions, 2) Development of Multinational Workshops on 
Improving the International Negotiation Process (with So­
viet negotiation experts included in the faculty), 3) De­
sign and facilitation of U.S.-Soviet cooperation for con­
verting nuclear weapons fuel into civilian use, and 4)
Development and advocacy of various proposals for nuclear 
1
risk reduction.
Efforts by the Nuclear Negotiation Project (NNP) to 
develop nuclear risk reduction centers offers a very good
148
opportunity to examine the application of principled
negotiation to a particular instance of informal mediation
of east-west conflict. The project is directed by William
Ury, co-author with Roger Fisher of Getting to YES, and co-
formulator of principled negotiation. NNP has had a major
impact on the perspectives and actions of policymakers with
2
respect to nuclear risk reduction and crisis management.
In particular, the project was instrumental in the process
leading to establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers
3
in Moscow and Washington in April, 1988.
In addition, the circumstances and dynamics involved 
in facilitation of this agreement, from inception to imple­
mentation, provide many parallels with the mediation/con­
ciliation roles usually performed by religious groups. To 
illustrate this, I shall note some of the "factors affect­
ing intervention" as examined in chapter 1. First, NNP was 
a non-invited intervener in what was mostly a pre-negotia­
tion process, giving it relatively low coercive potential. 
Second, as a non-governmental organization, it needed to 
gain legitimacy based on an ascribed identity bestowed by 
the protagonist parties. Third, the primary focus of its 
efforts was on constructing a new aspect of the relation­
ship between the United States and the Soviet Union, rather 
than on settling old disputes. Fourth, it represented an 
effort to work with a comparable substrata (academic rather 
than religious) within the other party's society in order
149
to r esolve sub-unit differences, create inter-societal 
bonds, and influence government policy o n  both sides.
History
In September 1982, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarma­
ment Agency (ACDA) asked the Harvard Negotiation Project to 
write a report on crisis negotiations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, giving birth to the sister 
organization, the Nuclear Negotiation Project. This 
research project involved examination of the dynamics of 
previous crises, the nature of existing crisis mechanisms, 
and the development of proposals for prevention or avoid­
ance of future crises. Consequently, the initial phase of 
NNP, lasting until publication of the report in March,
1984, focused on conducting interviews and gaining exten­
sive familiarity with the personnel in the field —  policy­
makers, military personnel and academics. The final report 
recommended institution of presidential crisis briefing 
sessions, as well as development of agreements on crisis 
procedures, consultation periods following accidents, 
nuclear crisis control centers in Moscow and Washington, 
regular meetings of U.S. secretaries of defense and state
with Soviet counterparts, and enhanced third party roles in
4
defusing regional conflicts. This report had a significant 
impact on subsequent discussion in both academic and gov­
ernmental circles. It was cited during a U.S. senate hear­
ing on nuclear risk reduction centers in April, 1984 and
150
its executive summary was published in the hearing report. 
Within one year 2,000 copies of the ACDA report were dis­
tributed, including 750 to American and European leaders in
5
government, business and academia. In April, 1985, the 
former director of ACDA, Ralph Earle, gave credit to the 
report for prompting his successful effort to gain the 
support of prominent Soviet and American statesmen a t  a 
meeting of the Consultation on International Security and 
Arms Control at the Carter Presidential Center of Emory 
University. Under their sponsorship, a joint statement 
calling for the creation of crisis management mechanisms, 
especially frequent and regular meetings of senior politi­
cal and military leaders, was signed by Soviet ambassador 
Anatoly Dobrynin and the head of the U.S. President's
Commission on Strategic Forces, Brent Scowcroft, as well as
6
former U.S. officials Carter, Ford, and Vance.
As the project developed beyond the completion of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency report, the primary
focus became the establishment of nuclear risk reduction
centers and the implementation of various crisis control 
7
procedures. Both negotiation and implementation of the
eventual agreement between the United States and the Soviet
Union, signed on September 15, 1987, required overcoming
8
bureaucratic resistance on each side. Throughout the pro- 
cess, NNP was extensively involved as a go-between —  in 
the facilitation of communication between the U.S. gov­
ernment and Soviet academic policy advisers, as well as be-
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tween the legislative and executive branches of the U.S.
government. Beyond this, they contributed counsel and n e w
ideas, and helped shape proposals at various points in the 
9
process. They also contributed significantly to public
education on the issue through public speeches, the use of
media, and support for public interest groups and sympathe-
10
tic local and state governments. NNP was by no means the
only third party intervener on this issue, a fact they
quite willingly recognize. However, according to Ury, they
played a key role at various critical points in the U.S.
intra-governmental dialogue when "ideas were in danger of
11
falling through the cracks." By numerous accounts, they 
played an important role in facilitating communication be­
tween the Soviets and the U.S. government. In fact an 
official of the Soviet Embassy in Washington credited NNP 
with the primary responsibility for shifting Soviet opinion
toward the idea of crisis management mechanisms and dia- 
12
logue. Finally, their monthly seminars on nuclear crisis 
control, with a variety of distinguished guests in atten­
dance, functioned as a useful bridge between academic ex­
pertise and pragmatic action. This forum was used to
generate proposals, make recommendations on implementation,
13
and connect policymakers with academic people and ideas.
lac i l i t a t i n n  of the Process Within the United States
In the United States opposition to the centers came 
over a number of issues. First, the Reagan administration,
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especially the Defense Department, d i d  not trust the
Standing Consultative Commission, an organization set up to
perform a similar function. Second, the intelligence
community feared that an inflexible communication
commitment, as well as the potential for deception, would
compromise American capability and may even create or in- 
14
crease conflict. Third, there was considerable inter­
agency dispute over who would control the newly created 
center and concern for whether the added bureaucratic layer 
would simply complicate decision making. Consequently, 
even after administration commitment to the basic idea, the 
Departments of State and Defense feared the loss of influ­
ence over official communication to foreign governments. 
Finally, there was the fear that the Soviets would demand a
concession in exchange for an "American" proposal which,
15
when implemented, will be little used, if not ignored.
Despite these reservations, there was some support for
specific crisis control measures. In late 1984, Ury
discovered support for the institution of crisis control
briefings for the president and top advisors while
interviewing numerous current and former national security
decision makers. Furthermore, that same year the United
States and the Soviet Union signed an accord updating the
hotline (the first arms control agreement in twelve years)
and the U.S. proposed a joint military communication link 
16
(JMCL) . However, the primary impetus for this growing
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concern with crisis management came from Congress, where 
its two major proponents were Senators Sam Nunn and John 
Warner. A series of legislative actions, initiated pri­
marily by them, culminated in the 1984 passage of a non­
binding senate resolution. This legislation called for the
president to propose negotiation for the establishment of
17
nuclear risk reduction centers.
The turning point, regarding support for the centers
within the United States government, came on March 22, 1985
when Nunn and Warner met for a half day, high level,
executive working session with key administration officials
from the State Department, Defense Department, Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, National Security Council, and 
18
others. NNP was instrumental in both preparation for, and 
execution of, this meeting between executive and legisla­
tive branches of government. In August 1984, Ury and NNP 
staff assistant, Ellen Meyer, began meeting with Warner, 
who had proposed a crisis control symposium the preceding 
May. Their intention was to organize a two day conference 
on crisis control which, according to NNP, would educate 
and involve key people, produce an agenda for action, and
generate media attention. By November, Warner and Nunn had
19
agreed to co-sponsor the event. By December, the con­
ference had evolved into the scaled-down working session 
for executives, with a stated purpose, according to NNP, to 
"Gather together the thinking.... Examine the existing 
obstacles.... (and) Organize a small working level group to
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draft and coordinate a strategy...". Warner's staff ac­
cepted this objective; Nunn's staff found it vague and
20
wanted more structure. However, this formed the basic
outline of what eventually became the schedule of the
executive working session —  examination of obstacles,
possible initiatives, critique, and recommendations to 
21
working group. By January 1985, NNP was clearly centrally 
involved in formulating the design of the meeting; while 
congressional staff for Nunn and Warner handled the admini­
strative process. In fact NNP began to assume the role of 
educating the congressional staff, as personnel had totally
changed since the Senate resolution had been voted in June 
22
1 9 8 4.
Warner and Nunn were actively looking for advice on 
what to do both during and after the executive session.
The primary question was how to get the government to act 
on what kind of center. Therefore, during December 1984 - 
January 1985, NNP devoted one entire Nuclear Crisis Control 
Seminar at Harvard, and a series of meetings in Washington,
to the request from Nunn and Warner staffs for recommenda-
23
tions on process and outcome. The NNP role involved pre­
paring the following: 1) process proposals for the execu-
24
tive working session; 2) a list of functions for the pro- 
25 26
Posed center; 3) a rationale to counter objections; and
4) action-forcing mechanisms which would influence the
administration.
155
The executive working session served to revive the
issue of the centers within the administration, with the
National Security Council (NSC) becoming the White House
advocate. Within two weeks of this meeting, national
security advisor Robert McFarlane indicated t o  Nunn that
the administration would reconsider its position on the 
28
centers. The primary moving force within that agency was
Col. Robert Linhard, who represented NSC at the executive
working session and eventually co-led the U.S. delegation
during formal negotiations on the establishment of the 
29
centers. Linhard was responsible for coordinating an in­
ter-agency working group, including Nunn and Warner, which 
met over the next six months to explore the pros and cons 
and evaluate possible center functions. There was still 
significant difference of opinion between various internal 
parties over the nature, and even feasibility, of the 
concept. For example, the senators wanted to make the
centers part of the Standing Consultative Commission, an
30
idea which the Defense Department completely opposed.
During these months, NNP helped facilitate the process 
of gaining administration support. Linhard utilized, not 
only their ACDA report, but also a concrete list of sugges­
tions, put forward in an August workshop run by NNP. Out 
of this came a shorter list of ideas which, together with 
Ury's informal counsel, shaped the proposals which the 
working group could recommend to administration decision 
31
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makers. During this period, support for NNP's role came
32
from a variety of administration sources. In addition,
evidence of its success in altering public opinion and
33
administration policy also began to appear.
On August 26, McFarlane informed the inter-agency
group that the government accepted a scaled-down version of
the centers and would raise the matter with the Soviets.
The one page agreement, "Outline of Nuclear Risk Reduction
Center Proposal," was based largely on the minimalist
concept encouraged by NNP, as an initial step, at the March
executive working session. Nunn and Warner then presented
this agreement to Gorbachev during a September visit to the
Soviet Union and recommended it be placed on the agenda for
34
the Geneva Summit in November. The same recommendation was 
made to the U.S. administration. Linhard, with the assis­
tance of NNP, was crucial in seeing that it was selected, 
out of a potential thirty six items, by Secretary of State 
Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze at a pre-summit 
meeting. A U.S.-Soviet agreement to study the center pro­
posal, at the expert level, was finally reached at the 
35
Geneva summit.
After the summit it remained possible for the idea to 
get lost, or diminished, amidst the tangle of a still 
skeptical bureaucracy. Though top echelons of the U.S. 
government (Reagan, Schultz, and Weinberger) were now 
favorable, the commitment was not deep. In this context, 
Linhard had the task of forming an inter-agency coalition
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to study the proposal, each member of which had a different 
end point in mind. Throughout the first half of 1986, Ury 
continued to provide him and others with information, work­
ing papers, and public education endeavors in order to,
first, prepare the way for formal negotiations and, then,
37
assist in that process after they began in May. Earlier 
that year Ury wrote a working paper addressing both inter­
nal and external debate over objections and illustrating
the utility of the centers in a wide variety of circum-
38
stances. He then went to Washington during the summer of 
1986 to serve as a consultant to the White House Crisis 
Management Center. During this time support solidified on 
the part of ACDA and the State Department, as Ury met with 
experts and respond personally to objections to the cen­
ters. According to a White House source, Linhard's working 
group used two or three of the major points from Ury's
working paper in developing the version they finally used
39
with the Soviets.
As the centers opened in April 1988, NNP became in­
volved in the task of implementation. The major question 
became expansion of center functions, given the considera­
ble amount of bureaucratic resistance still evident. Be­
fore the Washington center even opened, Ury spent time with 
its new director and with the director of the Bureau for 
Political-Military Affairs in the State Department, where 
the center is located. They discussed next steps in the
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i n c r e m e n t a l  approach —  transition briefing papers which
would assist policymakers to understand both present and
potential functions, reports which might provide access t o
administration officials by the new director, and seminars
40
to review progress and chart further strategy.
Facilitation of the Process Between
united States Government and Soviet Academics
In the Soviet Union there was even greater resistance
to the establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers.
Many Soviet objections actually paralleled American
skepticism. Both were concerned with intelligence loss and
disinformation, complication of decision making, and the
possibility that the centers would be ignored during a
crisis. In addition, the Soviets expressed concern over
outside perception of superpower condominium and the nature
of American support. They were suspicious of both the
endorsement of a known anti-Soviet Senator (Henry Jackson)
and the dependability of coordinated and continuous backing
from the American public. However, the two most common
objections centered on diversion of attention from the more
important task of negotiating arms reductions, and creation
of a "safety valve" which would legitimize limited war and
4 1
"provoke" crises. Georgi Arbatov, of the Institute of USA 
and Canada in Moscow, and a member of the Central Commit­
tee, repeatedly expressed these fears of a dangerous, di­
versionary tactic, to a visiting delegation from Harvard in
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early 1985. He claimed that "political tranquilizers," in 
the form of consultations, had "taken away the feeling of
danger" during arms control negotiations in the early 80's.
At the least, we can conclude that there were significant
differences between Americans and Soviet academics with
respect to the level of priority which should be given to
nuclear risk reduction centers. Such a conclusion is in
keeping with a tendency, on the part of Soviets, to stress
the health of the overall relationship and, on the part of
Americans, to be concerned with details.
Contact between Soviet and American academics, over
the issue of crisis prevention and control, began in Vienna
at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
in the summer of 1983. Four Soviet experts joined half a
dozen western counterparts for a one month study on
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negotiation, coordinated by William Ury. During this ses­
sion a proposal was developed for further study of nuclear 
risk reduction, especially establishment of a crisis con­
trol center and a periodic joint crisis consultative group
44
where senior ministers might talk.
The next year such a study was begun under the 
auspices of the Avoiding Nuclear War Project of the John F. 
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and the 
Institute of USA and Canada (ISKAN) of the Soviet Academy 
°f Sciences. With Ury functioning as associate director of 
the Avoiding Nuclear War (ANW) Project and ANW research 
fellow, Bruce Allyn, serving as associate director of NNP,
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the two Harvard organizations formed a close working rela­
tionship in order to more effectively pursue overlapping 
purposes. This Joint Study on Crisis Prevention and 
Settlement involved a series of biannual discussions by
experts pooled primarily, but not exclusively, from Harvard
45
University and ISKAN. Soon after Soviet leader Chernenko 
called for "urgent consultations to prevent a nuclear con­
flagration," as part of a set of norms to govern superpower 
relations, the constituting meeting of the Joint Study was 
held at Harvard in May 1984. Both parties agreed to pre­
sent any findings to policymakers in their respective coun­
tries, a process facilitated in the Soviet Union by the 
attendance of policymakers at meetings held in Moscow, the 
close relationship between a number of researchers and
policymakers, and the overlap of roles on the part of a 
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few.
Following the opening meeting there were a number of
individual research exchanges which supplemented the
sessions. Harvard researchers Ury and Allyn spent three
weeks in Moscow in November, conducting seminars on crisis
prevention and interviewing scholars as well as members of
the Central Committee, Foreign Ministry, and advisors to
the Politburo. They explored Soviet concerns and ideas by
discussing a series of Allyn's working papers on Soviet
47
views toward crisis prevention and settlement. During this 
visit they obtained the cooperation of a well known politi­
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cal commentator, and advisor to Krushchev during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. This Soviet ally not only attended the 
next meeting of the Joint Study in Moscow (February 1985), 
at which he called for the creation of mechanisms for 
consultation in times of crisis, but also discussed the 
centers idea with people in the Foreign Ministry. Further­
more, in a departure from official policy, he wrote an 
article (August 1985) calling for instant communication in 
crisis situations. Upon return to the U.S., a report on
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the Ury/Allyn trip was given to Senators Nunn and Warner.
The research exchange was reciprocated in December 1984
when Harvard hosted two members of ISKAN, including its
director (also a member of the Central Committee) and a
retired General. Pros and cons of the center idea were
49
specifically raised.
The critical turning point for Soviet support came, in 
the opinion of Ury and Allyn, as a result of two events in 
early 1985. First, the second Joint Study meeting in 
February precipitated initial openness on the part of 
ISKAN's director and other prominent Soviets; and second, 
Gorbachev came to power in March. During the study meeting 
these key Soviets came to realize that a safety valve may 
in fact be of significant use. The crucial moment seems to 
have been following two illustrations, one by Ury and 
another by a highly placed Soviet, arguing for the crisis 
intervention value of a city fire department and 
paramedics, respectively. In neither case does crisis
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mechanisms replace the need for measures to improve the
general situation. The same Soviet who suggested the
illustration then called for a threefold approach to
nuclear crises: 1) communication in crisis, 2) limits on
especially dangerous weapons systems, and 3) better under-
50
standing of each others perceptions of strategic balance. 
This combination of crisis control measures with signifi­
cant progress on arms control gained gained considerable 
acceptance among the study participants. Following the 
study meeting, Allyn and Ury met with a series of individ­
uals and discovered increased concern over accidental war 
and interest in crisis control, even on the part of one 
prominent military official. This changing Soviet perspec­
tive was then communicated by Ury to U.S. administration 
officials at the executive working session sponsored by 
Senators Nunn and Warner in March. A series of supportive 
quotes by prominent Soviets was given to the senators and
the director of ACDA for use when engaging Soviet officials
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in serious talks on crisis management.
Clear evidence of progress in Soviet thought and
actions, regarding inadvertent war, could be seen in many
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quarters during the next few months. The most dramatic 
event occurred in July when ISKAN's deputy director con­
tacted Ury in Paris to inquire how interested the U.S. 
government really was in the center idea, a question raised 
a nu®ber of times subsequently. The Soviet kept saying he
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was looking for practical ideas upon which they could agree 
and took copious notes on Ury's suggestions. Ury concluded 
that he had been asked for background information on this
option as a possible agenda item for the Geneva Summit, at
53
which he later was present. In addition, the wide distri­
bution of NNP's ACDA report, and its positive review in the
ISKAN journal in October, reflected openness to the idea at
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high levels of Soviet decision making.
Still, progress on this issue owed much to Gorbachev's
pragmatism and growing concern over inadvertent war, as
demonstrated in various statements made by him just prior 
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to the summit. In fact, the relatively swift decision to 
study the center concept came as a result of need, on the 
part of both presidents and key advisors, for an easy and 
positive result at their first meeting. Without this event 
it is likely that more time would have been required for 
agreement, since the bureaucracies of both were still quite 
skeptical. After this, both bureaucracies were compelled 
to take the idea seriously. In the Soviet Union this meant 
that both ISKAN and the Foreign Ministry, to whom primary 
government responsibility for the centers idea was as­
signed, were now obligated to do research and assign per-
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sonnel to the subject.
During the period between the summit and formal
negotiations, there were still numerous intra- and inter­
s’7party differences to face. NNP continued to facilitate 
dialogue between the Soviets and the U.S. reciprocated It
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also continued its efforts, in cooperation with ISKAN, to
promote the centers within resistant sectors of the Soviet
reciprocated In January 1986, during a third trip to the
Soviet Union, Ury and Allyn conducted another seminar se-
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ries on crisis control. They discussed in detail the 
centers proposal with ISKAN's deputy director, focusing on 
the document of agreement between U.S. administration and 
Senators. Ury provided a paper, similar to the one later 
circulated within the U.S. administration, outlining Soviet 
and American views on the centers and recommending a frame­
work for dialogue. The deputy director then requested per­
mission to circulate it within ISKAN and the Foreign Minis­
try. In addition, Ury reaffirmed U.S. administration en­
dorsement and answered queries about its interpretation of 
the summit agreement.The deputy director responded with 
unqualified support for the centers and proposed that the
Joint Study be seen as a form of negotiation that would
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ease naturally into formal negotiation.
It is fair to conclude that the Joint Study process
played a crucial role in facilitating movement by Soviet
policymakers on the issue of linkage, the factor which had
formed their primary objection to the centers. By the time
initial negotiations began in May 1986, the official Soviet
position favored pursuing simultaneous efforts on crisis
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management and arms control, a shift in attitude which Ury 
later reported to U.S. officials at a nuclear crisis simu­
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lation exercise held in Washington. The specific influence
of NNP/ANW on Soviet perspectives was later confirmed by
the head of the official Soviet delegation. In preparation
for the second set of formal negotiations in August, he
told Linhard that they had some "new ideas" as a result of
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conversations with Ury. Finally, public acknowledgement of
the role of "experts", as well as "private groups and
individuals," was finally given by both governments at the
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signing ceremony for the agreement.
The continuing role of NNP is evident in the implemen­
tation process as well. While the formal agreement adopted
a minimalist interpretation of center functions, limited to
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notification of ballistic missile launches, this concep­
tion quickly broadened in accordance with the incremental 
process envisioned by NNP. By the time the centers opened 
in April 1988, one of their initial roles was to function
as the communication link for verification of the INF
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Treaty signed in December 1987. Ury's perspective regard­
ing further evolution of functions continues to be heard 
and respected, not only by the American officials responsi­
ble for running the center in Washington, as indicated 
earlier, but also by influential Soviet academics at ISKAN,
as indicated by a recent report issued by the ANW/ISKAN
65Joint Study Group.
Analysis
I will now assess whether the role played by NNP
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within this process is consistent with the theory of prin­
cipled negotiation. One must remember that principled 
negotiation was designed primarily to guide the behavior of 
parties in formal negotiations. However, as indicated in 
chapter 2, Fisher and Ury claim that it can be applied to 
third party intervention. Indeed, much of their own ef­
forts involve the functioning of their respective Harvard 
organizations as third parties in informal mediation. 
Therefore I will be looking to see, not only if practice 
fits theory, but also the points where principled formal 
negotiation may need modification when it becomes "princi­
pled informal mediation." The assessment will follow the 
main tenets of principled negotiation, concluding with an 
evaluation of the specific nature of third party function­
ing in this case.
Separation of Relational From Substantive Issues
It is very clear from the evidence that NNP succeeded 
in turning the attention of potential adversaries, both 
U.S. and Soviet, toward joint problem solving. As 
indicated previously, this problem solving approach 
necessitates viewing the adversary as a partner, rather 
than as part of the problem. This attitude of partnership 
was demonstrated by NNP's determination to include all the 
players, to the extent possible, in both private consul­
tations and group process, and acknowledge the ways in
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which each had been supportive. This inclusion and coop­
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eration represents a considerable achievement, especially 
in relations with the Soviets, where cultural differences 
would naturally make such a mutual endeavor that much more 
difficult. Still, it is not possible to conclude that 
people problems were totally separated from substantive 
issues. NNP was not able to separate attitudes and value 
systems from the way various parties dealt with issues.
This was apparent in attitudes such as the Soviet prefer­
ence for principle over pragmatism which surfaced in their 
desire to place greater value on the reduction of tension 
in the overall political relationship. Even at the end, 
many Soviets still expressed more concern for arms control 
than for crisis control. However, the Joint Study Group was 
able to keep these culturally determined values, and the 
resulting personal perspectives of participants, from de­
stroying progress on the centers proposal. From the begin­
ning they agreed to set aside recriminations and accusa­
tions, rhetoric and propaganda, allowing Americans to disa­
gree with Americans and Soviets with Soviets. Consequently, 
it was possible to "insulate divisive issues from the
working relationship," as Ury proposed at the February 1985 
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meeting.
None of the meetings, either with U.S. administration 
or Soviet academics, was structured for the sole purpose of 
dealing with emotional interpersonal issues. However, an 
mformal, off-the-record atmosphere was created in sessions 
with both. For example, the seating pattern at Joint Study
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meetings interspersed Americans and Soviets at random.
Furthermore, on a couple occasions they shared leisure
activity together, fishing in Siberia and golf in Florida.
According to Allyn, one of the most enduring results of
this process was the deepened personal and working rela-
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tionships between ISKAN and Harvard academics. Such a
development was no small feat, given the initial Soviet
skepticism over what they referred to as the "western
absolutization of the psychological element" in negotiation
theory. While recognizing this, NNP/ANW counted on Soviet
beliefs that cooperation was a key to regulating a chaotic 
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world.
Facilitation of communication, both inter- and intra­
party, became one of the primary tasks of NNP. Initially 
they spent a great deal of time in 1984 and early 1985 
listening to the views of a wide spectrum of Soviets and 
Americans. They were very concerned to know who had been 
involved and what perspective they brought to the issue.
This active listening was later combined with clear 
presentation of NNP's perspective, a tactic which 
frequently helped legitimize the issue for people on all 
sides. For example, during the second Joint Study meeting 
in February 1985, Ury demonstrated his understanding of 
Soviet concerns prior to presenting his rationale for the 
centers and again at the conclusion of the meeting. In so 
doing, he drew upon Soviet statements, both those made
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within that meeting and previous public ones, to support 
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his position. Similarly, in relation to the U.S. adminis­
tration, he demonstrated equal facility with communication 
skills. At the beginning of the executive working session 
sponsored by Nunn and Warner, he was able to hear the 
pessimistic assessment by some administration officials,
acknowledge the difficulties they raised, and reframe the
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issue in a more positive light.
In addition to facilitating communication within one 
party by such methods as listening to people's perspec­
tives, breaking impasses, and summarizing discussions, NNP 
also translated and clarified many issues for all partici­
pants in the process. Though a few arguments were kept in- 
house in order to avoid any detrimental influence on the
other party or on a third party, such instances were infre- 
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quent. Some of the translation and clarification was done 
through the various background and policy recommendation 
papers referred to above. Other times it was done through 
dialogue with individuals or small groups. Two previously 
mentioned examples include Ury's translation of American 
perspectives on the summit text to ISKAN's deputy director 
and Ury's report on changing Soviet views to the Senator's 
executive working session. Accurate perception was also of 
crucial importance when dealing with American-American 
dialogue, as can be seen in NNP's planning efforts for the 
executive working session. During preparatory seminars
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they made great efforts to understand the perceptions of
potential administration participants by role playing offi- 
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dais from the various government agencies.
Fnr.us on Interests Rather than Positions
The existence of common interests between Soviets and
Americans w a s  a large factor in the successful negotiation
of nuclear risk reduction centers. Unquestionably, the
most important common interest was the desire to avoid
nuclear war and the resulting destabilization or
destruction of both states, something acknowledged by both
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sides even before the start of the study. In addition, a 
sense of commonalty was enhanced by the existence of the 
common objections —  intelligence loss and disinformation, 
complication of decision making, and possibility of the 
centers being ignored in a crisis. Both sides had an in­
terest in avoiding negative consequences and ensuring that 
promised ones would, in fact, occur. Furthermore, as aware­
ness developed regarding skepticism on the other side, this 
helped reduce fears of deception, and diversionary tactics. 
The ability of NNP to facilitate the awareness of common 
interests and skepticism enabled the parties to change 
their opposed interests into ones which were merely diver­
gent.
Such a transformation is best exemplified by the 
change in adversary perspective toward both Soviet interest 
lr> linking arms control and crisis management and American
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interest in avoiding Soviet demand for concessions. Ini­
tially the two interests seemed totally at odds. Soviet 
insistence on linkage was seen by Americans as evidence of 
the very concession demand which they feared. However, 
eventually both sides came to see that the existence of 
overriding common interests outweighed the importance of 
these conflicting interests and even changed their nature. 
For example, during the Nunn/Warner executive working ses­
sion, Ury directed attention away from concern over Soviet 
intention to hold confidence building measures hostage to 
concessions. He did this by pointing to the even greater
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importance of common interest in avoiding inadvertent war.
The attempt by NNP to nuture awareness of interests 
came at a historical moment when radical changes in Soviet 
thinking were just beginning to clear the way for open dis­
cussion of national interest for the first time. In fact, 
the transition in Soviet thinking can be seen in the course 
of the interactions between NNP and ISKAN personnel, a 
dialogue spanning the years 1983-1987. As recent as 1982, 
Allyn was writing about the incompatible nature of Soviet 
and American ideology regarding validity of national 
interests. According to classical marxism, one's con­
sciousness of true interests was distorted by economic 
concerns. Therefore progressive class interests were more 
valid than national interests. However, Allyn now points 
to the radical transformation whereby the Soviet President,
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himself, has proposed the need for a balance of interests. 
During the Joint Study, qualified reservations regarding 
validity still found expression in questions about accuracy 
and subjectivity. However, there was widespread acceptance 
of legitimacy among Soviet participants. As early as 1984 
one Soviet interviewed by Allyn and Ury indicated that 
acknowledgement of one another's interests was a precondi­
tion to meaningful talks on crisis prevention. By the time 
of the second meeting in February 1985, ISKAN's associate 
director was speaking of the need for equality in defini­
tion of interests, while another Soviet suggested replacing 
national interests with common international interests. By 
1986 a key Soviet at ISKAN was defending the center propos­
al on the basis that it creatively changed the balance
between competitive and common interests of the two coun- 
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tries.
The process by which NNP helped parties to identify
and accept underlying interests was, with few exceptions,
in line with principled negotiation's admonition to help
each party state the interests of both. First, with all
parties, they stressed the need to hear and accept all
concerns. For example, in planning for the Nunn/Warner
executive working session, Ury suggested that it be
designed so as to educate all participants about the
concerns of all constituent agencies and see where 
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interests align. Second, NNP encouraged more resistant 
Participants to assert their own interests as they saw
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them. For example, NNP participants recognized, and agreed
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with, Soviet concerns for progress on arms control. They 
also affirmed the interests of U.S. administration offi­
cials regarding the separation of negotiations over the
centers from other forums so as to prevent the hostage 
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phenomenon. Third, they encouraged those on each side who 
accepted the primacy of the common interest of preventing 
nuclear war to assert this among colleagues. This strategy 
is readily apparent in relation to key figure within the 
American government, such as Nunn, Warner, and Linhard. It 
is also clear in relation to a very few Soviets who caught 
the vision early in the process. However, most of the time 
those participants who did catch the vision, as well as NNP 
itself, failed to separate assertion of these common inter­
ests from assertion of the particular position or solution 
they were promoting, namely the center concept. At the 
same time their proposals/positions did have a degree of 
flexibility. Meyer suggested during an NNP seminar, in 
preparation for the Nunn/Warner executive session, that
while NNP should clarify the goal, it should leave the 
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details.
In addition, NNP helped to extricate parties from 
previous positions. This process was made easier by the 
fact that there were no official positions opposing the 
center idea, even on the part of governments. Yet, nonof­
ficial positions of particular agencies or individuals can
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still be problematic. Therefore NNP utilized various means 
recommended by principled negotiation. First, they fre­
quently asked for advice and invited criticism. Second, 
they utilized positive statements within a party to press 
for more movement. For example, one Soviet participant 
during the second Joint study meeting proposed building a 
concrete proposal based on Chernenko's norms, a standard 
frequently referred to as an indication of official Soviet 
willingness to consult in the event of crises. Later vari­
ous NNP participants picked up on this and made even more 
specific suggestions. Third, they asked parties whether 
their solution addressed the complete problem. For example, 
at one point ISKAN's director defended his position that 
risk reduction centers are merely political tranquilizers 
by comparing the situation to the likelihood that no-fault 
automobile insurance would increase reckless driving. In 
response, one Harvard participant challenged him by asking 
how utilization of a seat belt would harm his real inter­
ests. Fourth, they challenged participants over whether a 
particular position had been helpful or harmful in the 
past. For example, during one of the Joint Study meetings 
Ury asked one of the Soviets whether it would have been 
better to consult before the invasion of Afghanistan. A
response of qualified agreement indicated that the position
82had been effectively challenged.
Invent Options Before Making Commitments
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NNP clearly intended to be a catalyst for creation of
new options. A memorandum from a planning session for the
second Joint Study meeting indicates NNP aimed to "separate
inventing from deciding" and develop a "framework for
a g r e e m e n t ,  not necessarily a specific commitment or
83
decision, ... (but one) with holes to fill in." A general 
strategy memorandum by Ury, in May 1984, set forth the same 
purpose by calling for the use of questions rather than 
statements so as to play a facilitative role during inter­
views and seminars. However, at the same time, Ury pro­
posed use of the single text negotiating procedure whereby
a draft agreement and presidential speech would be circu- 
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lated. In addition to the implementation of these specific 
examples, other evidence of the use of this procedure has 
already been described above. The initial center function 
list developed by NNP provided the basis for later propos­
als discussed at the Nunn/Warner executive working session, 
with Gorbachev prior to the Geneva Summit, and with ISKAN's 
deputy director following the summit. Furthermore, Ury's 
1986 working paper on the centers again circulated a single 
text of functions within the upper echelon of both govern­
ments. Although the single negotiating text is a tried and 
recommended procedure of principled negotiation, it is a 
process which presents both framework and specifics of a 
decision in an attempt at "illustrative specificity." At 
best, it is the presentation of one quite specific option,
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with the belief that this will generate other proposals. 
Under more controlled circumstances, where the third party 
functions as an official intermediary, it may be able to 
restrict the creation of rival positions as a result of u s e  
of this strategy. However, that is not the context in which 
it is being employed here.
This case illustrates one of the potential problems 
inherent within principled negotiation. On the one hand it 
professes to discourage early commitment to decisions, 
while on the other hand some of its favorite strategies, 
such as creation of the single negotiating text and 
"yesable propositions," rely heavily on presentation of 
potential solutions rather than brainstorming techniques.
In this case NNP was convinced that it knew at least the 
basic outline, as well as much of the detail, for what was 
needed. A comment by Ury illustrates the dilemma. He 
attempts to justify this "option presentation," rather than 
"option creation," process with the claim that "Soviets
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hate choices. Don't burden them with endless options." In 
making this assessment, it is necessary to note that there 
was more emphasis on inventing options during the first 
phase of the project, than there was during the later 
period. Such an observation does fit with principled nego­
tiation's admonition to invent "first" and decide later. 
However, as noted above, there were also some very early 
indications (1984) of "option presentation" in the form of 
a draft agreement. Furthermore, the early option invention
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took place among a limited network of people. Many key 
players entered the picture after "option presentation" was 
clearly predominant.
This case demonstrates sufficient emphasis on "option 
presentation" to call into question the fundamental validi­
ty of principled negotiation's "invention before decision" 
maxim, at least as it applies to any negotiation with the 
Soviets. Yet, Ury would undoubtedly, and rightfully, re­
ject this assessment as a challenge to the overall validity 
of principled negotiation. It is possible that use of the 
option presentation approach can, in this case, be justi­
fied by the claim that NNP was acting as a third party 
which was focused on construction of a new aspect of the 
relationship, rather than attempting to settle old dis­
putes. Hence the situation was one where a presented option 
might well meet with less opposition and might even create 
openness. However, the key here is whether or not this 
process enabled the primary parties to respond with crea­
tive invention and whether third parties can function by 
different standards than the principals. More will be said 
on this subsequently, under both this and the last section.
Despite premature judgement, the endeavor succeeded.
NNP was able to fulfill its purpose as stated by Ury in 
preparation for the Nunn/Warner executive working session,
namely to reach agreement on what's needed to get the U.S.
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and the Soviet Union to "buy off on" the center concept.
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To accomplish this, NNP altered the choices facing the 
superpowers by offering them a feasible decision at a time 
when both needed a low cost agreement at a crucial summit. 
They avoided the danger of making it sound like an ultima­
tum, a warning made by Fisher when utilizing these proce­
dures, since they had no power to issue such a warning.
Yet, they chose not to follow a second piece of Fisher 
advice —  to produce more than one yesable proposition in 
order to make them look less like positional statements. 
Inventing one new choice and convincing the key players of 
its mutual benefit and feasibility was the primary task.
However, there was an ongoing, though limited, 
inventing process in order to fill in the framework with 
necessary specific details. In pursuing this task, NNP 
utilized most of the techniques recommended by principled 
negotiation. The only tactic they were unable to employ 
was altering standard moves in a negotiating game. First, 
NNP altered the scope of the agreement by limiting it to a 
minimalist concept of the centers. Possible expansion at a 
later date was always left open. However, this limitation 
of formal agreement freed up discussion and enabled widely 
divergent groups of people, both within and between gov­
ernments, to reach consensus over a smaller number of 
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issues. Second, NNP altered perception of the consequences 
on the part of both governments. They increased the sa- 
liency of the centers idea primarily by emphasizing pros 
over cons and demonstrating the likelihood and magnitude of
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potential benefits. Ury outlined numerous operational 
situations in which the distinctive features of the centers
could play a pivotal role in mutually beneficial management
88
of nuclear accidents. Instances of NNP's resort to threat 
to alter perception of consequences were limited to the 
principled negotiation ploy of offering a fading opportuni­
ty. This was done only in relation to the U.S. government
89
through the limited use of action-forcing mechanisms.
Third, NNP altered the nature of the game by including
different players in the process. They introduced Soviet
academics to the issue and even made suggestions to ISKAN
regarding the presence of certain sympathetic Soviets in 
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the Joint Study. They also exercised influence in the
selection process for U.S. administration participants in
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the Nunn/Warner executive working session. However, it is 
noteworthy that those solicited by NNP tended to be moder­
ate in their views, contrary to Fisher's recommendation to 
include participants representing the most extreme posi­
tions. They then brought their influence to bear on these 
lower, accessible officials and cohesive subgroups (like 
NSC and ISKAN) who were, in turn, able to influence higher
officials as well as make some critical decisions on their 
own.
Even if NNP's strategy was to alter various aspects of 
the pre-negotiation game, it is still important to ask to 
what extent the tactics employed utilized option-inventing
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t e c h n i q u e s .  N N P  personnel utilized interviews to both
stimulate option creation and collect options for incorpor-
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ation into its own perspective. However, brainstorming
t e c h n i q u e s  are the most beneficial structure. These were
very apparent within NNP internal preparation, but largely
absent in actual meetings with other players. The NNP
seminar in January 1985 which developed plans for the
Nunn/Warner executive working session was an excellent
brainstorming meeting. Options were discussed for executive
session process, the broader process of influencing the
administration, and the development of proposed center
functions. However, the format envisioned for the working
session itself is much more controlled, with NNP personnel
assuming that they have to be the ones to come up with the
center functions. The seminar report concludes with, "No
one is going to be able to work out the concept of the
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Center better than the people in this room." The working 
relation with the senator staffs comes closer to a brain­
storming process. For example, at a planning meeting for 
the executive working session, the initial functions pro­
posal presented by one of Senator Nunn's staff was criti­
cized as too narrow. Ury's suggestion to call it one of 
many options and make it more flexible, less specific,
became the consensus of the meeting and informed the final
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proposal used in the working session. As for meetings with 
the Soviets, there is some evidence of brainstorming.
During the 1983 IIASA summer study on Negotiation, in which
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Ury laid the groundwork for the subsequent Joint Study,
n s and Soviet academics brainstormed action ideas regard-
95
ing crisis procedure. During the study itself, there was 
less indication of a fully structured brainstorming proce­
dure. However, some common ground rules for such processes
—  elimination of all criticism and evaluation plus pres-
96
ence of a rapporteur —  were observed.
Search for Objective Criteria
The search for objective criteria as a basis for 
agreement was hardly needed by the time formal negotiations 
began. On the basis of this case, it appears that the such 
a search may be unnecessary when there is obvious mutual 
need or interest. However, the process whereby both 
principal parties recognized common interest in the center 
proposal, was one which included the investigation of 
mutually acceptable criteria for fairness. NNP had to 
operate with some sense of what was fair in order to 
convince Soviet academics and both governments of the 
merits of their proposal. The use of objective criteria as 
a valid form of persuasion is as significant in the 
exploratory phase of pre-negotiation as it is in the 
distributive phase of formal negotiation. Consequently, it 
will follow that the search for objective criteria, in this 
case, was limited to the discernment of standards for a 
fair resolution of substantive issues. Discovery of crite­
ria for negotiating procedures, one of the stated aims of
182
p r i n c i p l e d  negotiation, was irrelevant.
NNP made great efforts to legitimize the center 
proposal in the eyes of the U.S. administration and ISKAN 
academics on the basis of mutual benefit, expert and public 
opinion, and precedent. Since much has already been said 
about NNP's role in establishing consciousness of mutual 
benefit, I will limit comment at this stage to one such 
instance. In Ury's 1986 working paper, outlining Soviet and 
American views and recommending a framework for dialogue, 
he illustrated the unique utility of the centers in a wide 
variety of past and hypothetical circumstances. The paper, 
circulated within both governments and ISKAN, concluded 
that there was a critical gap in the sufficiency of exist­
ing crisis control mechanisms at the point of preventing 
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inadvertent war. Thus legitimacy was established, in the 
eyes of all parties, by addressing mutual objections with 
the presentation of mutual benefits.
The use of expert opinion to legitimize the centers is
apparent within the same working paper for governments.
Ury utilizes crisis experiences of both American and Soviet
government officials to document near accidents and
indicate the support of these former officials for
98additional communication mechanisms. Furthermore, due to 
the rather exceptional circumstances of this case, NNP 
itself became part of the panel of experts used by Senators 
Warner and Nunn to convince the U.S. administration. The
183
extensive utilization of NNP in the executive working ses­
sion, and inclusion of their ACDA report in Congressional 
testimony, aptly demonstrate this. Likewise, officials at 
ISKAN used their writings to both introduce and legitimize 
the concept to the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The effective 
education and use of public opinion by NNP has also been 
noted previously. Again the senators are encouraged to
refer to both domestic and foreign public opinion to give
99
credence to their argument. Finally, Ury even claimed that
U.S. public opinion polls, showing inadvertent war to be
the greatest American fear, helped convince the Soviets
that the U.S. was genuinely interested in crisis control
100
and not using it simply as a tranquilizer.
Precedent is considered to be the primary means of 
legitimation in principled negotiation. This case bears 
out that pattern. Numerous precedents are repeatedly used 
to justify the centers proposal. The Standing Consultative 
Commission (SCC), set up during SALT I negotiations, was 
designed to clarify and define specific rules of behavior 
regarding strategic force structure. In providing 
background information for the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Meyer cites this as an example of a body having 
responsibility for implementation of other agreements. She 
even makes reference to a statement by a former SCC 
commissioner, drawing an analogy between the SCC and a 
Potential nuclear risk reduction center. According to him, 
the flexible charter regarding operating regulations and
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procedures, together with the commitment to regular
consultations, was a perfect model. As noted previously,
the SCC was initially promoted as a model, and even an
umbrella agency, by NNP and Senators Warner and Nunn.
However, resistance from the U.S. Department of Defense
made this impossible. Even some of the American delegation
to the Joint Study questioned whether or not precedent
taken from a monitoring and enforcement agency for arms
1 0 2
control would be suitable for crisis control. Hence, it 
becomes clear that precedent was used by more than one 
party in the search for objective criteria.
The center proposal was also compared with a number of 
formal agreements. The Hotline Agreement of 1963 broke 
fifteen years of deadlock in U.S.-Soviet relations, a 
situation comparable with that of the early stage of pre­
negotiations for the center proposal. Furthermore, this 
communication was first used by the Soviets, a fact Ury
mentions to counter U.S. administration fears that such an
103
institution would, in fact, be ignored. The Incidents at
Sea Agreement (INCSEA) of 1972, which encoded rules of
naval behavior and procedures for handling accidents,
served both crisis prevention and management purposes.
INCSEA was used by NNP to legitimize the mutual recognition
of prevention and management preferences on the part of
104
Soviets and Americans respectively. Furthermore, NNP and 
one supportive Soviet even proposed that the centers could
185
serve as the implementation of the Accidents Agreement of
1971 and the Agreement for the Prevention of Nuclear War
(APNW) of 1973, both of which call for consultation in the
event of crisis. By presenting the center proposal as an
extension of previous treaties, the second of which was
pushed by the Soviets and the first of which they agreed to
105
readily, its credence was enhanced with both governments.
However, again the criteria of precedence was used against
the proposal by both Soviets and Americans, even among
Joint Study participants, who pointed to APNW compliance
106
failures as justification for reservations.
Informal agreements and unilateral actions also
provided useful precedent. In the former category, one
supportive Soviet suggested the development of "mechanisms
of consultation" at the second Joint Study, based on the
Basic Principles Agreement (BPA) of 1972, a loose and
generalized accord which defined the basis of the detente
relationship. In the latter category, during the same
meeting, conservative Soviet participants referred to the
Chernenko norms. These norms, which include a call for
crisis consultation, were later suggested as an additional
107
basis for proposed "mechanisms of consultation."
The interplay regarding criteria, between NNP and 
various resistive parties, noted above to some extent, must 
be examined in closer detail. How NNP related to both 
their own and other's criteria, and how a final set of 
criteria was determined, are crucial questions for
186
evaluating NNP's adherence to principled negotiation. Was 
this t r u l y  a joint search? Did NNP ask for alternative 
criteria? Did it utilize them or dispute them? Could NNP 
disengage from its own proposed criteria when necessary?
To evaluate these questions I will limit the
examination to one set of divergent criteria employed by 
Soviets and Americans in the course of the Joint Study.
One of the main issues hindering reconciliation of criteria 
was the different value systems referred to above under 
separation of relational and substantive issues. Despite 
NNP's declared intention, prior to the second meeting, to
discover the objective criteria as understood by each
108
side, the dialogue made clear Soviet preference for a- 
greements of general principles versus American preference 
for pragmatic agreements with detailed substantive propos­
als. The two value systems formed quite divergent sets of 
"subjective" criteria for judging both outcome and process. 
This tension emerged in the opening session of the second 
meeting when a generally supportive Soviet participant 
responded to Ury's call for mutual consultations on re­
gional conflict by insisting that consultation without 
agreement on principles could be ineffective. In this 
context, NNP demonstrated its willingness to discuss gen­
eral principles. Most of the discussion in that three day 
meeting was devoted to an evaluation of general norms or 
principles to guide behavior. Americans as well as Soviets
187
contributed to the search for mutually acceptable written 
and unwritten norms. It was an American who first itemized 
a "ten commandments" of U.S.-Soviet relations, to which 
Soviets then made addition. Within this more general, less 
threatening context, NNP was able to introduce its own 
objective criteria in the form of analogies (fire depart­
ment and seat belts) to validate its claim that crisis 
management was important. It is not insignificant that the
crucial Soviet illustration of the paramedics was made in
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this "general principle" context. Consequently, NNP de­
monstrated, at a crucial point, that it was committed to a 
joint search for objective criteria. It had disengaged from 
its own predisposed criteria and affirmed that of the 
Soviets.
At the same time NNP was able to effectively communi­
cate the reservations of the American government over re­
liance on general principle agreements and declarations.
One U.S. participant stressed that, though he agreed per­
sonally with the need to start with general principles, 
detente and BPA had become symbols of ineffectiveness which 
tainted all such approaches within the American mindset. 
Another basis for negotiation would have to be found in 
order to interest the Reagan Administration. American 
participants also questioned the limitations of general
principle agreements, which cannot be sensitive to the
110
unique demands of a particular situation.
It is clear that both Soviets and Americans contri­
188
buted to a joint search for objective criteria. The final
report of the Joint Study comments that Soviet views helped
Americans appreciate the value of general principles and
Soviets listened carefully to American concerns about uni-
111
form, codified ground rules. Furthermore, each group
noted instances when the other had adopted its preferred
criteria. NNP pointed to an Andropov call for "concrete
deeds." One Soviet participant recalled that a declaration
of no-first-use of nuclear and conventional force was made
recently in Stockholm in order to assuage western fears of 
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Soviet invasion.
Conclusions Regarding Nature of the Intervention 
This case clearly demonstrates the utility of 
principled negotiation in at least certain contexts. I 
shall begin by examining this case in light of selected 
"factors affecting intervention," as outlined in chapter 1. 
It is worth mention, first, that this context was clearly 
one of pre-negotiation. Second, the principal parties 
involved were ones with strong identities and approximate 
power symmetry. Consequently, they did not need empower­
ment through party advocacy. Third, the aim of the 
intervention was to construct a new aspect of the rela­
tionship, rather than settling old disputes. Fourth, the 
informal, nonofficial nature of the intervention helped 
avoid the danger that third party presence would increase 
intransigence among principal parties, a reservation of
189
Fisher's, as observed in chapter 2. However, the accom­
plishment is still significant and holds the potential for 
modeling an intervention role for other nongovernmental in­
stitutions wishing to intervene creatively in international
conflict.
In this light, it is all the more important to examine
carefully the exact blend of advocacy/neutrality which NNP
employed in this case. Ury's own analysis was that NNP had
functioned as neutral with respect to party, advocate with
respect to process, and a combination of both with respect
113
to outcome, where it had a general idea of what was best.
Each of these areas of advocacy/neutrality must be examined 
to see whether this assessment is accurate.
NNP's claim to party neutrality appears generally to 
be supported by the evidence, despite the fact that they 
are citizens of one of the two countries concerned. They 
spend as much effort to convince the U.S. government of 
benefits of the center proposal as they do the Soviet 
academics. If anything, they appear closer in personal 
relationships to their Soviet professional colleagues than 
to their fellow citizens in government service. Collegial 
bonds may well be as significant as national ones in 
determining partiality. In this case, NNP's behavior 
clearly demonstrates a positive relationship with all 
Parties. They show a skilled ability to identify with all
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concerns and interests on a nonjudgmental basis. Their 
universally acknowledged credibility and legitimation 
testifies to the accuracy of the assessment.
Process advocacy, as indicated in chapter 2, is an 
inherent part of principled negotiation. Therefore, 
problem solving process is clearly advocated in theory as 
well as demonstrated in practice. Informational and go- 
between roles can be observed in much of NNP's activity in 
this case. They collected and analyzed data. They 
facilitated both inter- and intra-party communication by 
translating and clarifying intentions, as well as breaking 
impasses. They encouraged awareness of common interests and 
skepticism and facilitated understanding of divergent ones. 
They showed an ability to welcome and utilize the criteria 
of others, while disengaging from their own, in a search 
for objective criteria. There were some limits to their use 
of this methodology, such as limitation of most brain­
storming to internal sessions and lack of many option 
creation procedures.
Ury's claim to operate with a combination of outcome 
advoca-cy/neutrality is basically accurate. However, the 
balance appears to be much further in the direction of 
advocacy. Their aim to create a framework for agreement, 
with details to be filled in by others seems to have 
overachieved its goal. The yesable proposition they 
created contained a great many details. It is true that 
some of their original specifications, such as incor-
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poration of the centers within the structure of the SCC,
were later abandoned. It is also the case that many
details came clear in the context of interaction with and
between the principal players. However, on balance, the
proposals put forward by NNP could hardly be said to be
neutral in character. The single negotiating text
procedure, by necessity a process designed to convey
specifics, was used to circulate proposed lists o f  center
functions as well as a presidential speech, a joint
communique, and even a center agreement. This is a very
creative process, but it is not impartial. NNP had a
solution clearly in mind and, in the words of Allyn, lob- 
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bied for it. This analysis is further supported by the
recommendation of a member of NNP's crisis control seminars
who recommended to Ury, early in 1984, that NNP should play
the political "insider" game and public "outsider" game,
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gathering endorsements across the political spectrum. In 
fact, this is exactly what NNP did, as demonstrated in 
Meyer's background information paper which was "aimed at
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interested advocates... both 'insiders' and 'outsiders.'"
Furthermore, this same pattern of advocacy and lobbying has
been traced in the process of Soviet decision making on the
centers. There were informal advocacy channels both from
NNP to ISKAN and from ISKAN to the Soviet government, as
117
Previously noted.
At the same time, NNP's use of some problem solving
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techniques, in the pursuit of their desired outcome, 
necessitates viewing the process as a combination of 
approaches. They presented their own proposals with 
clarity and sensitivity. They extricated other parties 
from positions by asking for advise and criticism of NNP's 
proposal, utilizing positive statements by the other party, 
challenging whether their position had been useful in the 
past, and asking if their solution addressed the complete 
problem. To gain support, they altered the scope of the 
agreement by limiting it to a minimalist concept of the 
centers, one far less than their own ultimate hopes. They 
altered the players and their roles to gain the most 
assistance from moderate forces in and around both 
governments. However, they limited brainstorming primarily 
to internal processes and interaction with sympathetic 
factions within the principal parties. In short, they 
frequently altered various aspects of the pre-negotiation 
game, but utilized option invention techniques within the 
limitations of presenting a solution.
Assessment of outcome advocacy/neutrality necessarily 
brings to mind this previously noted theoretical 
inconsistency within principled negotiation, the tension 
between option presentation and option invention. The 
attempt to provide a solution is consistent with some of 
Principled negotiation's central pragmatic techniques, such 
as creation of "yesable propositions." However, it is
193
inconsistent with the principled negotiation maxim "to 
invent before deciding" and inhibits any wide use of brain­
storming techniques. The dilemma is accentuated when
118
functioning as a third party in a mediation process. The 
lack of theoretical clarity becomes even more apparent with 
examination of the tension between outcome advocacy and 
neutrality. The heavy balance in favor of the former 
suggests that, in third party mediation, the authors of 
principled negotiation become more directive than they 
would recommend for a participating party in a negotiation 
process. Modification of the theory is especially apparent 
in the utilization of the "single negotiating text" proce­
dure. This process, which can only be used in a mediation 
context, is limited to presentation of a single solution at 
any given time.
However, despite accentuation of a significant 
theoretical inconsistency, this case provides an excellent 
illustration of creative conflict intervention. In fact, 
the combination of problem solving and lobbying techniques 
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CHAPTER 4
INVOLVEMENT OF AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE 
IN CONCILIATION BETWEEN 
THE TWO GERMANIES
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) is a Quaker 
organization, established in 1917, for the express purpose 
of functioning in what Quakers call international con­
ciliation. The initial vision of Quaker "embassies," with 
resident "ambassadors" in the capitals of the world, proved 
unrealistic. However, AFSC in Philadelphia, and its 
London counterpart, the Friends Service Council, oversaw
the formation of Quaker "centers" in many cities, especial- 
1
ly in Europe. The individuals involved in this work were 
initially referred to as Quaker representatives and re­
ceived the official title "Quaker International Affairs 
Representative" (QIAR) in 1953. These people, usually aca­
demics, sometimes businessmen, were given special missions
2
during times of conflict in a country or region. Given a 
call to a ministry of reconciliation, they focused on 
clarifying perceptions on each side of the conflict. Fol­
lowing World War II, AFSC started a complementary program 
ln order to maximize leverage upon world leaders. They 
developed Conferences for Diplomats, bringing together 
groups of young foreign service officers who would later
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rise to leadership positions within their respective coun­
tries. These conferences, held in both Europe and America, 
were designed as informal contexts in which cultural, na­
tional, and ideological barriers might be lowered and psy­
chological/sociological insights of conflict resolution ex­
plored. Between 1952-1977 nearly 2000 diplomats partici­
pated in these conferences, including representatives from
3
most socialist countries.
The most important and best known Quaker effort at 
East-West conciliation took place through the QIAR assigned 
to Berlin. Between 1962-1973 QIARs attempted to facilitate 
communication between the two Germanies and, to a lesser 
extent, between East and West blocks. They engaged in a 
variety of activities - from listening, to message- 
carrying, to assessment, to proposal making, and even to 
advocacy. The initial functions very much parallel the 
methodology of principled negotiation, while the last again 
raises the central issue of third party neutrality, a 
factor which led some Quakers to question whether it
4
represented a departure from the role of conciliation. 
Furthermore, the setting is comparable, on many levels, to 
the Harvard case presented in chapter 3 (with regard to the 
"factors affecting intervention," as presented in chapter 
1) • Both were uninvited, nongovernmental interveners, 
dependent on an ascribed identity, in what was mostly a 
pre-negotiation process. The similarity between Fisher's
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p rin c ip le d  negotiation and AFSC methodology may not be 
complete coincidence. During the period of QIAR activity 
in Berlin, Fisher acted as a consultant member of an AFSC 
group which travelled to the Middle East, exploring peace 
possibilities between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Such 
a relationship may well have introduced some of Fisher's 
ideas into Quaker circles even if his work had no direct 
influnce  on the QIARs in Berlin. Cross-fertilization of 
ideas between Fisher and AFSC can definitely be seen today,
for example in negotiation workshop training materials used
6
by the AFSC Regional Office in New York. Consequently QIAR 
involvement in Berlin becomes an excellent test case for 
the application of principled negotiation to the role of 
religious intermediaries in East-West conflict.
History
The end of World War II found a diminished German
nation divided into American, British, French, and Soviet
zones. In 1949, the three western zones united to form the
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, or the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG), while the eastern zone became the Deutsche
Demokratische Republik, or the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) . in addition, nearly one quarter of former German
territory, to the east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers, was
to be administered by Poland and the Soviet Union. This




A similar process happened concurrently in the City of
Berlin , with the western sectors joining together and
linking themselves to the FRG and the eastern sector
becoming the capital of the GDR. The communist challenge
to this relationship of West Berlin to the FRG was at the
heart of one of the two most critical events in the Cold
War. The application of West Germany's currency reform to
West Berlin in 1948 led to Soviet and German Communist
leadership closing the land access to the city and an
8
eleven month western airlift.
A second critical event, the erection of the Berlin 
Wall in 1961, was an act to plug the only opening left 
after the 1952 sealing of East Germany's borders.
According to an eastern perspective, the "anti-fascist 
protective wall" was necessary to prevent infiltration and 
subversion by the FRG. The latter's intentions to wrench 
the GDR from the Soviet sphere and isolate it from its 
allies were made clear by the FRG's policy of nonre­
cognition of the GDR and by the Hallstein Doctrine of 
severing diplomatic relations with any other country which 
recognized it. Furthermore, the FRG transacted all its 
"Eastern Zone" business with the Soviet Union, which it 
considered the legitimate authority long after the Soviet 
High Commission was withdrawn. This led to the GDR charge 
of revanchism —  a claim that the FRG wished to acquire the 
territory of other states in a manner similar to the Third 
Heich. The charge of revanchism also extended to the FRG's
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claims to the territories administered by Poland and the
Soviet Union. Consequently, the GDR denounced the FRG for
im p erialism , revanchism, unwillingness to negotiate, and
n e o - N a z i s m .  In similar vein, the FRG denounced the GDR for
being tools of Soviet occupation, imprisoning its own
population, and preventing free elections and formal German 
9
unification.
After the erection of the Wall, AFSC accepted a long
standing invitation from German Quakers to send a QIAR to
Berlin. Although they worked with many political entities
in both Germanies, as well as other NATO and Warsaw Pact
countries, the most influential relationships forged were
with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the FRG. The
relationship began with Willy Brandt and his aides and
advisors when (in 1962) Brandt was the Lord Mayor of West 
10
Berlin. Their ability to influence perceptions and per­
spectives within the FRG increased with Brandt's rise to 
the chairmanship of the SPD in 1964, and the positions of
11
Foreign Minister of the FRG in 1966 and chancellor in 1969. 
Brandt then presided over the implementation of his ost- 
politik policy with the negotiation of numerous treaties: 
treaties on the renunciation of force between the FRG-USSR 
and FRG-Poland in 1970, the four power agreement on Berlin 
in 1971, the Basic Treaty establishing diplomatic relation­
ships between the FRG-GDR in 1972 (also accompanied by 
various traffic and telecommunication agreements), and the
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renunciation of force treaty between FRG-CSSR (Czechoslova- 
12
kia) in 1973. The Quakers played a significant role in 
developing  and nurturing the political context in which 
these treaties arose, were negotiated, and ratified.
During the eleven year span of the work, there were 
three QIAR representatives in Berlin, each in successive 
terms of service, with a period of two years, autumn 1966 
until autumn 1968, when there was no representative.
Although there was a general commonality of approach and 
objective throughout the entire work, each term of service 
made a unigue contribution due to both changes in the 
situation in Germany and differences of skill and approach 
of the individual QIAR. Therefore, it seems most appro­
priate to examine the history of this period, and the 
Quaker involvement in it, according to the terms of QIAR 
service. These terms were as follows: Roland Warren (1962-
1964), Robert Reuman (1964-1966), and William Beittel 
13
(1968-1973) .
Roland Warren: Quaker Representative. 1962-1964
When Warren arrived in Berlin in the Spring of 1962 he 
found a reservoir of goodwill toward the Quakers in light 
of the prior forty years of their relief work and 
reconciliation efforts in Germany. The most memorable of 
these included a child feeding program after World War I, 
assistance to Jewish and political refugees during the 
early days of Nazi power, rehabilitation following World
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War II to b°th East and West zones, and even assistance to 
suspected Nazi leaders in internment camps after the war.
In the 1950's the focus of the work changed from reha­
bilitation to East-West mediation, with the German Quakers 
taking the leading role. When the wall restricted the 
movements of German Quakers, it became clear that an
"outsider" presence could more easily work toward construc-
14
five contacts between the sides.
To this situation of near complete communication 
breakdown, the first QIAR came with a background in 
sociology and expertise in conflict interaction. These 
credentials enabled Warren to develop a procedure of 
interviews with numerous high level German and foreign of­
ficials in West Berlin, the FRG and GDR, as well as many
15
other influential people. In addition, he gave lectures
and wrote papers/reports, circulating copies to officials
within and outside the two Germanies. He often used them
as discussion starters during his interviews, since they
dealt with issues and presented perspectives the readers
15
were not used to hearing.
The most significant single event, especially in 
relation to the GDR, was the visit of an AFSC team, 
composed of Warren and seven others, to West Berlin and 
various locations in both FRG and GDR for three weeks in 
September, 1963. The purpose was to discuss viewpoints and 
common interests with government officials and others, 
encourage and support peaceful and conciliatory elements,
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and communicate and interpret to the American public. The 
initial invitation to visit the GDR came from the East 
German Peace Council which arranged for them to have unlim­
ited movement within the country. Dialogue with the Peace
Council itself proved to be a kind of negotiation between 
17
third parties.
During the actual visit, the team not only listened, 
but asked pointed questions, conveyed information, 
corrected misunderstandings, passed suggestions for 
accommodation across the divide, and even made some small 
proposals. The issue they most pursued was the question of 
travel restrictions, imposed by both sides, which brought 
great hardship to many people. In the West, these 
restrictions were imposed by the Allied Travel Office 
(ATO) . After the visit, the team sent a document, 
challenging ATO travel restrictions, to the German Affairs 
Office of the State Department in Washington, with a copy 
to the Office of East German Questions in the FRG Foreign 
Office. Discussion with three U.S. officials ended with 
American support for whatever Bonn would decide. An FRG 
official indicated that the memo had been taken very 
seriously, that he was trying to apply the policy with some 
flexibility, and that the policy was undergoing a process 
of change which he was unable to discuss. A few months 
later, in March 1964, restrictions were lifted for non- 
political groups. Warren was convinced that the Quaker team
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played a significant part in this policy change, a
co n victio n  echoed by GDR, FRG, and American officials. In
the East, during a visit with Walter Ulbricht, Chairman of
the GDR Council of State, the AFSC team offered a proposal
to relax travel restrictions for certain categories of
people in both the FRG and GDR. During the session,
U lbricht did not respond. Later, Warren drafted a l e t t e r
outlining four specific measures. Although no policy
change was announced, the actions called for were fulfilled
over the course of time, on a case-by-case basis, through
the Red Cross. Furthermore, there was great interest
expressed by each side in the proposal sent to the opposite
party. A U.S. spokesman said that if Ulbricht accepted the
Quaker proposals, then the Allies should remove the ATO's
restrictions. The East Germans, on the other side,
expressed appreciation for the AFSC position on the ATO
after relaxation of restrictions began. Finally, a report
of the visit, written by the team, was distributed to all
parties visited, resulting in wide press coverage. Despite
criticism by some on both sides, the report provided
another basis for discussion of issues covered in it —
especially the proposals about travel restrictions and the
possibilities for negotiations regarding recognition of the 
18
GDR.
As mentioned earlier, the greatest influence the 
Quaker presence enjoyed was on Willy Brandt and his asso­
ciates, who at Warren's time were in the city government of
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West Berlin. This period has been described by one Brandt 
biographer as "marking time," a time of personal and pro­
fessional reassessment for Brandt. Consequently, it is not 
surprising that, during 1962-63, Brandt, along with Mayor 
Heinrich Albertz and information officer, Egon Bahr, start­
ed to move slowly toward accommodation It was in July 1963 
that Bahr first enunciated a new approach to the GDR. In a 
speech given at the Evangelical Academy he presented the 
case for pursuing change through rapprochement rather than 
nonrecognition, and claimed that this must be arranged with 
the Soviet Union. This view was later echoed by Brandt as 
part of the growing climate of detente. The new policy 
finally began to have practical results with the negotia­
tion of Christmas passes allowing West Berliners to visit
19
East Berlin for eighteen days in December 1963. This
suggestion, though not specifically proposed for Christmas,
was one which Warren had previously made to high level
20
officials on both sides.
Warren was in touch with all three of these West 
Berlin leaders. However, the primary contact was Albertz, 
who was trained as a theologian and had served as a pastor 
before entering the government. When Warren first met him 
in 1962, he was Commissioner of the Interior Department, 
with responsibility for the police. In this capacity, he 
was very much concerned with incidents at the wall.
However, despite his personal acknowledgement of some
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credibility in the GDR position, he dispelled any hope for
2 1
n e g o t ia t io n s  a t  t h a t  t i m e .
During the next year, Warren was able to use two of
his QIAR reports to facilitate creative discussion with
Albertz. In "Background on the Berlin Wall," Warren
outlined official views of both East and West in ways that
were persuasive to the opposite number. He then suggested
areas in which progress might be made. In "Possibilities
for a Berlin Settlement," he analyzed statements by Brandt
and Ulbricht on the stalemated relationship and developed a
22
basis for negotiating a partial solution for Berlin. In
discussing this with Albertz, the latter endorsed Warren's
perspective, indicated that an attempt at negotiation was
being made, and expressed interest in using Warren should
23
an occasion for a direct third party role arise.
Warren has assessed the influence on Albertz, and
through him Brandt, to be very strong, although recognizing
that pinpointing causes of policy development is very
difficult. Albertz has credited Warren as being the only
person who supported them in thinking through alternatives
on the hard issues, while Brandt has acknowledged the
importance of the Quaker role throughout the process. When
Brandt became Foreign Minister, and Albertz succeeded him
as Lord Mayor, in 1966, the former implemented "all the
24things we had talked about," according to Warren.
Egbert Rfiiman; Quaker Representative, 1964-1966
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Reuman, like Warren, came with an academic background.
However, while Warren brought skills in conflict
interaction, Reuman's expertise was in moral and social
philosophy. He utilized this background to examine the
forces and values which underlaid the conflict. Therefore,
during his tenure, QIAR efforts shifted focus from
perception clarification to an attempt at extraction from
25
positions, especially within FRG foreign policy. To accom­
plish this, he continued much of the strategy adopted by 
Warren, including interviews, lectures, and projects. The 
central focus was still interviews with government offi­
cials, political officials, religious people, academics, 
and journalists. Increasingly, the interviews centered 
around Quaker projects or QIAR reports, written by Reuman
to stimulate ideological, political, or philosophical dis- 
26
cussion.
The most significant single project of this period was 
a special conference for members of scholarly institutes of 
international affairs. Representatives of the foreign 
policy think tanks of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries 
met in equal numbers at Gars-am-Kamp, Austria in April 
1966. Although they had read each others' papers for 
years, many of them met face-to-face for the first time.
With two participants from West Germany and one from East 
Germany, it was also the first successful Quaker attempt to 
get formal, though non-diplomatic, representation from both
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Germanies. Previous GDR representation at one of their
c o n f e r e n c e s  had been limited to the roles of guest o r
consultant. The Quaker role was to provide an atmosphere
and facilitate a process whereby people could get to know
one another and where new perspectives, or even options,
27
might emerge.
The process developed for this conference was quite
relaxed and informal in order to maximize open
communication, mutual understanding, and new thinking.
This loose structure, led by sensitive leadership, was
able, not only to keep participants from personal attacks,
but resulted in what the conferees termed an "escalation of
optimism." Remarkable areas of agreement were reached as
participants even discussed a possible peace treaty
proposed by a West German participant. So positive was the
response that participants overwhelmingly recommended a
28
second conference.
This conference would have been insignificant, 
however, without Reuman's ongoing efforts to help move the 
FRG toward recognition of the GDR and prod the GDR toward a 
change in relation to its own people. In both of these 
endeavors, Reuman's QIAR reports made a significant 
contribution. Officials on both sides indicated that, 
while they could not raise many of the points made in these 
QIAR reports, this perspective needed to be heard. Some 
officials and journalists sought him out and distributed 
the reports. In other cases, Reuman initiated the distri­
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bution and used them to steer conversation toward
29
substantive issues a n d  t o  make proposals.
In his first report, "Attitudes in the DDR (East
Germany)," written in June 1965, Reuman challenged one of
the fundamental assumptions of the FRG's nonrecognition
policy. Reuman concluded that there was more support for
the GDR government than acknowledged in the West, though
less than purported in the East. He claimed that the
majority of the people of the GDR had at least accommodated
themselves to the realities and, furthermore, saw Western
30
nonrecognition as detrimental to their welfare. This re­
port was well received by many in the FRG who wanted to
31
know what their fellow Germans were really thinking. The 
reception was also positive in the GDR where Reuman judged 
that it freguently served as a bridge between non-communi­
cating groups and helped move conversations more rapidly
32
beyond a superficial level.
In a second report, on the Hallstein Doctrine, written
in November 1965, Reuman criticized western isolation of
the GDR by questioning whether this policy had inhibited,
rather than enhanced, the goal of reunification. He also
noted the potential for diplomatic blackmail inherent
within the Doctrine. Finally, Reuman challenged the GDR not
to adopt a reverse Hallstein Doctrine, a policy which
Ulbricht unsuccessfully tried to implement in 1967. This
report, however, met with very little response, though it
33
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was widely read in both East and West.
The third report, "Proposals on German Reunification," 
written in December 1965, was very valuable as a 
springboard for discussion on the kinds of action which 
might reduce tension. In this report, Reuman called upon 
both the FRG and the GDR to reduce the causes of fear on 
the other side, develop positive relationships with the
34
other block, and treat each other as negotiating partners. 
Positive western response came from at least three organi­
zations/parties: the SPD, which was developing similar 
ideas; the Free Democratic Party (FDP), which was soon to 
break its coalition government with the CDU over some of 
the issues Reuman raised; and an influential nongovernmen­
tal organization called Kuratorium Unteilbares Deutschland 
(KUD or Caretaker for Indivisible Germany), which was in­
terested in unofficial East-West dialogue on similar is- 
35
sues. Although the West appreciated the proposals for 
their fresh approach to the perennial goal of reunifica­
tion, the East was not so appreciative. GDR officials, as 
well as nongovernmental leaders, criticized the proposals 
for advocating meager steps instead of outright recognition 
of the GDR. Though they were positive toward changes 
proposed for the West, they tended to ignore calls for 
internal change in the East. Yet, Reuman concluded that
they considered the changes proposed for their own society
36
with more seriousness than they admitted. Despite GDR 
reservations, he was able to use the report to encourage
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them toward dialogue with the West.
The fourth report, "New Trends in West Germany,"
further confirmed the changes underway in FRG perspectives
by the time Reuman left in August, 1966. Reuman mentioned
numerous FRG personalities and organizations as now
advocating various degrees of conciliation with the East.
Though he cautioned that it was still far from being a new
governmental policy, Reuman saw an increasing tendency to
38
take eastern interests into account. In fact, there were 
great changes in FRG foreign policy immediately after Reu- 
man left. The new CDU-SPD coalition government, which took 
power in December 1966, abandoned the Hallstein Doctrine
and increased contact with the GDR government, fulfilling
39
many of Reuman's suggestions. Meanwhile, the GDR also 
began to change in directions proposed by Reuman. Politi­
cal, economic, and psychological stability increased. Po­
litical and cultural repression decreased. Consequently, 
in a retrospective assessment, Reuman concluded that the
GDR government had acquired a greater degree of genuine
40
support and even pride in certain accomplishments.
Finally, it is important to note the contacts 
developed with Soviets and Americans, as each of these 
nations influenced the incentive for their respective 
German allies to follow the pattern of detente. The most 
significant Soviet contacts were actually made by a 
nonofficial American Quaker who developed a relationship
37
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with Yuli Kvitsinsky, the embassy official who later 
chaired the Soviet negotiating team in the Quadripartite 
Negotiations on Berlin. This "unofficial Quaker representa­
tive," as he called himself, also facilitated a meeting
between Khrushchev and a West Berlin churchman, where they
41
discussed the human difficultties caused by the Wall.
The most significant American contact was a briefing
and short visit to the GDR in 1964, coordinated by Reuman
for U.S. Congressman Henry Reuss, a leading expert on
Germany in the House of Representatives. Reuss met and
spoke with both officials and ordinary citizens in an
attempt to gain first hand impressions of the GDR, and
criticisms of the U.S., which could better inform U.S.
42
policy. At the end of the trip, Reuss gave a lecture to 
the West German SPD party convocation, at the invitation of 
Brandt. In addition to facilitating Reuss' contacts with 
Germans, this experience gave Reuman an excellent oppor­
tunity to discuss the German issue with an influential 
American congressman —  in fact, one who had developed a
proposed peace treaty dealing with the question of recogni-
43
tion and other related issues.
William Beittel: Quaker Representative. 1968-1973
Beittel came after a two year hiatus, during which the 
QIAR work was sustained at a minimal level by a volunteer 
German Quaker, named Lore Horn, who had previously worked 
with both Warren and Reuman. Consequently, the final QIAR
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came with the task of rebuilding, rather than just
continuing, the work. Beittel brought with him, not only
an academic background in political sociology, but also
44
recent experience in Europe. During his tenure Beittel 
engaged in much the same types of activity —  conversa­
tions, conferences, informal meetings, and written reports. 
However, for the first time, the most significant FRG 
contacts were now in positions of power, with the rise of
45
Brandt to the positions of Foreign Minister and Chancellor.
Beittel's conversations with key FRG officials in
early 1969, before Brandt was elected Chancellor, reflected
greater openness to the east block, including the GDR, than
either Warren or Reuman had detected. At the Ministry for
All-German Questions, officials spoke of encouraging
nonofficial contacts and even gradual movement toward
46
mutual recognition in some form. Bahr even told Beittel
that he recommended negotiations with the GDR for extension
of economic and cultural ties and access to West Berlin.
However, over the question of recognition, he was still
47
adamantly opposed.
Beittel concentrated his early efforts on FRG
officials in order to communicate accurately the change to 
48
GDR officials. However, despite FRG openness, this new 
policy was interpreted, in the GDR, as simply a more clever 
expression of old policies. They feared that small improve­
ments would benefit western politicians without affecting 
any substantial changes with respect to recognition.
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Furthermore, Bonn's overtures toward other east block coun­
tries appeared to be new attempts to isolate and undermine 
the GDR. The atmosphere of increased suspicion was notable 
even in the treatment of the QIAR, as demonstrated in the 
grilling he received during his first interview in the GDR 
Foreign Office. Beittel was warned against secretive or 
undercover behavior, told he should clear every activity in
advance, and informed that he would be accompanied on his
49
visits in the GDR.
In the spring of 1969, one particular confrontation
threatened to end detente even before it began. The FRG's
Federal Assembly planned to meet in West Berlin in March to
elect a new FRG president. Although the previous three
elections had been held there, the GDR decided to challenge
the view that West Berlin was, de facto, a part of the FRG.
They disrupted traffic, raising the spectre of another
blockade. Beittel discovered that the West was not
enthusiastic about holding the election in Berlin, but
feared backing down to GDR demands. Various unsuccessful
face-saving proposals were made by Ulbricht and the Soviet
ambassador to cancel the election in exchange for border
passes for West Berliners. Beittel visited all the
parties, including U.S. and Soviet embassies, in order to
50
interpret the proposals. At one point he floated a possi­
ble tension reducing idea through the Soviet embassy, the 
U.S. Mission in Berlin, and former Lord Mayor Albertz.
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Though finally discarded, the suggestion was seriously
5 1
considered at the highest levels of government.
By the time Beittel came to Berlin, it was conceivable
for U.S. officials to have informal contact with GDR
officials and church leaders. Consequently, Beittel found
himself in the position of facilitating such contacts. In
addition, unsuccessful attempts were made to hold luncheons
52
for numerous diplomats. However, the biggest breakthrough 
of this kind occurred in the context of the Conferences for 
Diplomats program. GDR diplomats were finally granted full 
participation in 1969 and FRG officials, after a one year 
boycott and election of a new government, finally accepted 
joint participation. Attendance at these conferences was
an important step in the process of challenging the stereo­
typical thinking of GDR officials and opening them to the
53
process of detente.
After Brandt became chancellor, in October 1969, he 
sought to pursue ostpolitik more openly. In his initial 
speech to the Bundestag, he acknowledged the existence of 
two German states as part of one nation, offered to discuss 
outstanding issues with the GDR and to negotiate 
nonaggression pacts with other East European states. FRG 
agencies now began a process of revising their image and 
mission. Within a year, it was widely, though privately, 
acknowledged that recognition of the GDR would come in a
couple years when public opinion had changed. This
atmosphere created even better opportunities for Beittel to
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share Quaker concerns with a new government and new
54
opposition, each learning new roles. At the same time, 
B e itte l  attempted to communicate to GDR officials how fast 
the FRG was changing. With the GDR still attached to old 
suspicions and well-worn demands, this was not an easy 
task. He dialogued with GDR officials himself when there 
was no openness to contact with officials from the FRG.
Plus he worked especially hard to keep GDR involvement in
55
the Conferences for Diplomats.
The first diplomatic thaw which occurred as part of
Brandt's ostpolitik was in Soviet-FRG relations. In a
conversation with Beittel, Bahr specifically targeted the
Soviet Union as the focus of FRG foreign policy as early as 
56
May of 1969. Overtures also came from the Soviets who were
looking to ease tensions with the West at a time when they
were heightening with China. By early 1970 there had been
talks on exchange of technical and scientific information
and agreements on trade. By May, there was an agreement to
enter into negotiations on a nonaggression pact. In
August, as a culmination of forty sessions between Bahr and
Gromyko, the two countries signed the pact. However, at
the FRG's insistence, the agreement could not be ratified
until the four powers (U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K., and France)
had formed a satisfactory agreement on the future of Ber- 
57
lin. Quaker involvement included quiet support for this 
process within the FRG and an unsuccessful attempt to
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encourage greater expression of support for ostpolitik on
58
the part of the U.S. government.
A similar rapprochement developed between the FRG and 
Poland. Talks began in February, 1970 and concluded with a 
mutual nonaggression treaty signed in December. Again,
there were trade agreements along the way and the same
59
condition placed on ratification. Just prior to the start 
of these talks, Beittel went to Warsaw to explore Polish 
points of view, attitudes, and aspirations. There he en­
couraged the positive attitudes he found and was able to
60
establish considerable rapport. Later, at a time when the 
FRG-Polish talks were at an impasse, two diplomats from the 
Polish Embassy at the Military Mission in West Berlin con­
tacted Beittel to talk with him about any American respon-
61
sibility for slowing things down.
In August 1970, Beittel began his one year partial
62
leave from QIAR work. Consequently, during this period
there was minimal Quaker involvement. Priority was given
to maintaining contacts in East Berlin in preparation for
63
the FRG-GDR negotiations which were certain to come. How­
ever, the primary development during this period was the 
Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, or Four-power Agreement, 
in which neither Germany was a participant. The treaty, 
signed in September, 1971, determined a temporary status 
for Berlin and allowed limited access to the GDR by West 
Berlin citizens. Responsibility for implementation of the
64
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agreem ent was given to the two Germanies.
When Beittel returned to full time QIAR work, the 
Four-power treaty was being signed and attention was now 
focused on FRG ratification of the Eastern Treaties with 
Moscow and Warsaw, which was necessary in order to put all 
three treaties into effect. The CDU opposition mounted a 
stiff campaign for non-ratification in early 1972, 
promising to renegotiate better terms should they be 
returned to power. Despite broad public support for 
ostpolitik and Soviet refusal to consider renegotiation, 
the CDU nearly succeeded in toppling the SPD government and 
did succeed in passing an interpretive resolution. After
Moscow reluctantly accepted this codicil, the treaties were
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finally ratified on May 17.
During the ratification process Beittel spent 
considerable time with sympathetic FRG officials in order 
to plan a strategy for advocacy of the treaties. He also 
contacted CDU Bundestag representatives who had expressed 
some openness. His quiet advocacy extended to embassy
staff of Allied governments and to various officials in
66
Washington, New York, and London.
It is difficult to assess exactly how much influence
Beittel had on the development or ratification of any
treaties. However, by the time he left in the summer of
1973, it is quite clear that relations had improved greatly
67
between GDR officials and the Quakers. This led to an 
increase in opportunities for Beittel to function as chan-
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nel for contact between GDR and western officials. These 
face-to-face contacts were important, not only to rati­
fication of the Eastern Treaties, but also to the process 
of direct FRG-GDR negotiations, culminating in the Basic
69
Treaty, signed in December, 1972 and ratified in June, 1973.
Analysis
I will now assess how the role played by the QIARs in 
the two Germanies compares with the methodology of 
principled negotiation. There will also be comparison with 
the practice of principled negotiation, as seen in the 
previous case study on the role of the Nuclear Negotiation 
Project of Harvard University in the development of Nuclear 
Risk Reduction Centers in Washington and Moscow. The 
assessment will follow the main tenets of principled 
negotiation, concluding with an evaluation of the specific 
nature of third party functioning in the Quaker case.
Separation of Relational from Substantive Issues 
The fact that the QIARs attempted to turn the 
attention of all the parties toward joint problem solving 
is distinctly evident. They continually endeavored to 
bring East and West out of stereotypical enemy imaging and 
into a partnership. Their efforts to bring together 
officials from both sides, either in informal private 
meetings or at Conferences for Diplomats (as documented 
above) , demonstrated their commitment to involve all the
6 8
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parties . Gaining, in the end, the participation and
cooperation of all parties, was a major achievement. It
c o n s t i t u t e d  one of the most significant accomplishments of
the QIAR efforts, as it created a unique and necessary
channel for dialogue.
The Quakers also made considerable effort to separate
the people from the problem. In their final statement to
officials in Bonn, at the end of the Quaker visit to the
two Germanies in 1963, they wrote:
Quakers believe that there is that of God in every man 
and that we are commanded to speak to it in hope and 
love. This has been the starting point for our whole 
mission.70
This hopeful Quaker perspective toward people informed, not 
only that particular endeavor, but also the attitude of 
QIARs during the whole of the eleven years. They con­
sciously looked for that which they could affirm, even in 
rather hardened individuals. Reuman exemplified this atti­
tude by looking beyond the "cold warrior" positions of a
British diplomat to perceive a "quick, vigorous, keen mind,
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and ... a sufficiently original manner." Focusing on the
problem rather than attacking the person can also be seen
in some very difficult situations. In the midst of an
attack on both the QIAR work and the stance of the U.S.
government, it was pointed out to the GDR official involved
that he should be talking with the U.S. government about
the latter, an aim toward which the QIAR effort was di- 
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rected. Beittel's persistent courting of this GDR offi-
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cial, and the latter's final cooperative spirit, demon­
strated the long-term value of this approach. At the same 
time, the QIARs did perceive certain attitudes to be at the
heart of the problem. These problems had to be addressed,
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even if people were sensitive and aggressive. Conseguent- 
ly, much of their efforts consisted in attempts to address 
people problems —  to give opportunity for appropriate 
ventilation of emotion, to facilitate communication, and to 
clarify, and hopefully alter, perceptions. This part of 
their work, then, was entirely consistent with principled 
negotiation.
As in the Harvard case, separation of substantive and
relational issues was not achieved by constructing separate
occasions for addressing people problems. Most of the
Quaker contacts were one-on-one, a context where one could
more easily shift gears to allow for emotional ventilation.
Yet, even here, great care had to be taken not to place
premature strains on a relationship. Warren showed special
sensitivity to the emotional factor by refraining from
highly inflammatory issues until he had established rapport 
74
and trust. Quaker sensitivity to emotional dynamics was
also present within group contexts. Following the rather
negative first encounter with the GDR Peace Council in
1963, they concluded that "blowing off steam" was necessary
before their hosts could enter into significant dialogue.
75
The second session proved them right. Finally, Quaker use 
°f leisure activity to bring about bonding was a recogni­
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tion of the importance of emotional factors. The Warrens
and the Reumans frequently held social evenings in their
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homes in order to create a non-threatening atmosphere. In
the Conference for Diplomats at Gars, leisure outings did
as much as any formal session to enable inclusion, even of
77
hardliners, in constructive substantive dialogue.
It was quite clear that the personal relationships
developed at these conferences were still valued long
afterward. On many occasions, individuals expressed a
desire to have contact even when it was prohibited by
governments, as demonstrated by the desires of American
diplomats to make contact with their fellow conference
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alumni from the GDR. Until this direct communication could 
take place, the QIARs maintained indirect communication by 
functioning as a channel of information between a multitude 
of contacts on both sides of the wall, as has been docu­
mented throughout the case. Initially, each QIAR spent a 
great deal of time listening to a wide spectrum of views.
Later this active listening was combined with efforts to
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present either the other side's, or their own, perspective. 
Frequently, this presentation was done with great sensi­
tivity to the viewpoint of the party with whom they were 
speaking, drawing, where possible, on statements made by 
the other. When Beittel went to Bonn to lobby for the 
Eastern Treaties, he spoke with a CDU Bundestag represen­
tative who had many sympathies for reconciliation with
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P o la n d , but could not support all the measures. Throughout
the conversation Beittel incorporated the other man's
suggested "next steps" in developing his rationale for 
80
ratification.
One primary purpose of the listening and presentation
of Quaker concerns was the correction of misperception.
Due to the very great amount of stereotypical thinking on
both sides, there was constantly a need for translation and
clarification of one side's views to the other. As the
Quakers soon learned, this was a difficult process,
frequently necessitating the adoption of language which was 
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foreign to them. However, the work came to be appreciated 
by many who were hungry to know what their opposite numbers 
really thought and valued the insights of someone who had 
actually talked with "the enemy" in person. This work of 
clarification was sometimes done through the writing of 
background papers, an approach used especially by Reuman. 
However, all three QIARs saw this interpretive work as a 
basic purpose of their conversations. There were slight 
differences between their styles and emphases. Reuman would 
take more initiative in presenting the opposing viewpoint 
and would do so with some passion. In his own assessment, 
he concluded that he had leaned, perhaps too much, toward 
speaking for the other side. This led to the problem of 
each side tending to identify him with the other, despite
his attempts to begin by establishing points of agreement. 
Warren, on the other hand, presented the opposite viewpoint
82
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primarily in response to comments made by the other side.
In his evaluation, he concluded that this quiet approach
produced openness in places where one would not usually 
83
find it. Finally, this interpretive function was not to­
tally confined to inter-party communication. Within the 
FRG, the QIARs often were in the role of interpreting 
between the SPD and the CDU. On occasion they even inter­
preted between people within the same party, as illustrated 
in 1969 by Beittel's communication of Bahr's assessment of
future possibilities for rapprochement with the GDR to the
84
newly elected SPD president of the FRG.
Focus on Interests Rather than Positions
When dialoguing with the East German Peace Council in 
1963, the Quaker team affirmed the need for "an understand­
ing of vital interests and ground rules within which we 
could rely upon one another to respect those interests, and
for a spirit within men that replaced indifference or
85
hostility with mutual respect and concern." This concern 
for mutual interests remained a central feature of the 
entire QIAR effort in Germany. Consequently, their efforts 
very much paralleled both theory and practice of principled 
negotiation. Furthermore, like the Harvard case, awareness 
of common and compatible interests increased dramatically, 
on both sides, at a point when the international climate 
changed significantly. Beittel credits the changed at­
mosphere to election of a new FRG government in 1969 and
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the emergence of superpower detente.
Even before this period, there was limited government
reco g nitio n  of common and compatible interests. Warren
reminded both East and West Berliners that they already
cooperated on some basic interests, such as maintenance of
a common sewage system, in order to get the authorities to
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consider other small steps. Reuman capitalized on compati­
ble interests on the part of Congressman Reuss (who wanted 
to see what the GDR was really like) and GDR officials (who 
were desperate for any de facto recognition by an American 
official) in arranging for the unusual dialogue which took 
place in 1964. However, the big convergence of interests 
took place around the issues of German unification and 
mutual recognition. Initially, it was FRG concern for 
reunification that stood in direct conflict with GDR con­
cern for recognition. It was only as the west, under 
Brandt, began to see these as possibly compatible that 
ostpolitik began. The FRG came to realize that the Hall- 
stein Doctrine would never bring reunification. If it were 
ever to come, it would be the result of a cooperation which 
required recognition of the realities, including the exis­
tence of the GDR. The GDR, on its part, had to be con­
vinced of the sincerity of Bonn and, therefore, be willing 
to acknowledge the validity of lesser FRG interests —  for 
example freedom of travel.
The QIAR presence in Germany helped build awareness of
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common and compatible interests throughout the eleven year 
involvement. There were many instances where their at­
tempts to nurture the emergence of common and compatible 
interests were rebuffed. However, they continued to en­
courage both parties to "create patterns of cooperation
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that interest our opposition as much as they do us." This
was done using various techniques recommended by principled
negotiation. One method was simply to ask one party how
they could meet the interests of the other. In 1969, for
example, Beittel asked Lord Mayor Schütz what he could
offer the GDR that would meet some of its interests. In
response Schütz admitted that improved economic relations 
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would help. Such a question frequently had the effect of 
changing the focus from past to future, from complaints 
about the other side's prior activity to what one would now 
like to see happen. This was especially significant in a 
context where past disputes dominated so much of the poli­
tical landscape. A typical illustration demonstrates the 
value of this approach. In 1969, Beittel asked an official 
from Bonn's Ministry for All-German Questions what steps 
they might take to move relations toward the desired re­
unification. The official responded by indicating the need 
to push for more and more contacts. At this point, Beittel
used this interest in contacts to suggest that the prere-
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quisite might be recognition. Linking FRG interests in 
contacts with GDR interest in recognition was the very kind 
of process which eventually changed the policy of the FRG.
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Another method used by the QIARs to build awareness of 
underlying interests was to raise with one party the rea­
sons why the other had not made the choice which the former 
desired. Again contacts with the Ministry for All German 
Questions provide a good illustration. Ministry officials 
finally recognized that GDR flexibility in its relations 
with the FRG were dependent on the degree of support the 
former had from its own population. Therefore the Ministry 
would be most helpful if it did nothing to alienate the 
East German population from the GDR regime. This accep­
tance of GDR interests came after years of QIAR contacts
with the Ministry during which questions were raised re-
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garding reasons for GDR intransigence.
In addition to building awareness of interests, the 
QIARs consciously attempted to extricate parties from their 
positions. Although, as previously noted, this task was 
given special emphasis by Reuman, each of the QIARs used 
many of the approaches advocated by principled negotiation 
to facilitate extrication. First, they frequently asked for 
advice and invited criticism. Second, they utilized posi­
tive statements within a party to ask for more movement, at 
the same time warning of the costs of intransigence. For 
example, in 1972, when an FRG official proposed making 
Berlin a center for the study of European security and 
environmental issues, Beittel pointed out that all such 
Proposals depended on ratification of the Eastern Treaties.
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The official, who opposed ratification at that time, agreed
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with Beittel's point. Third, they encouraged parties to 
find less threatening, and more effective, means by which 
to fulfill their interests. The Quaker team which visited 
the Germanies in 1963 wrote a letter to the U.S. State 
Department noting American interests in "a lessening of 
some of the more restrictive measures of Communist coun­
tries." In the letter they called upon the U.S. government 
to re-examine whether the present travel restrictions, as
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administered through the ATO, helped or hindered this goal. 
Fourth, they challenged whether a given party's position 
had been harmful to its interests in the past. For example, 
in meeting with an official of the FRG Foreign Office in 
1969, Beittel pointed out that policy toward the GDR had 
adversely affected the FRG's ability to develop any real 
opening of communication and cooperation with other social­
ist states. Despite his strong adherence to FRG policy,
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the official agreed. Fifth, they asked parties whether 
their solutions addressed the complete problem. When speak­
ing with an official of the GDR Foreign Office in late 
1969, Beittel listened to the usual catalogue of demands 
directed at the FRG government. He agreed, in part, and 
then went on to develop them into general problem catego­
ries in which both the Soviet Union and the United States,
as well as the two Germanies, had interests and involve- 
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ment. Sixth, they tried to strengthen moderate factions 
within parties. Reuman repeatedly contacted the leader of
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the Liberal Democrats in the GDR, presenting alternate 
perspectives and possibilities on a variety of issues, 
including value to the GDR of certain internal democratic 
changes. After the man finally agreed, at the end of 1965,
Reuman observed changes in GDR policy regarding the access
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of its pensioners to the west. Seventh, they interpreted
commitment to present positions in ways that weakened it.
Warren encountererd the same Liberal Democrat at an earlier
period and listened to his claim that the GDR was only
interested in peace and relaxation of tension. Warren, in
turn, pointed out many things which they were doing which
only strengthened the West's hawks and militated against
relaxation of tensions. According to Warren, this was a
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"light bulb experience" for this man. Eighth, they at­
tempted to de-emphasize commitment so that parties could 
back down from positions. In 1964, a political officer at 
the U.S. Embassy in Bonn predicted that the Soviets would 
eventually remove their troops from the GDR and that the 
regime would have to reform, provided the West kept the 
pressure on through the Hallstein Doctrine. Reuman ques­
tioned him on whether there was any room being left for a
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graceful capitulation to take place.
Finally, it is important to note one divergence from 
principled negotiation. Since they faced the opposition of 
official positions, the QIARs more frequently resorted to 
outright challenging of positions than did the principled
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negotiators at Harvard. In the tension filled week before
ratification of the Eastern Treaties, Beittel bluntly-
challenged the broad generalizations of one "wheeler-
dealer" CDU Bundestag representative, even as he responded
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with great empathy for a relatively open CDU colleague.
Tnvent Options Before Making Commitments
There is clear evidence that the QIAR work was a
catalyst for option creation. Beittel's job description
states as one of the QIAR tasks -- "identifying and
encouraging the individuals and organizations producing and
promoting ideas and activities aimed at the reduction of
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East-West tensions." A survey of Beittel's interviews
indicates that he regularly performed this catalyst
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function for influential officials. Furthermore, facili­
tation of option creation did not begin with Beittel. At 
the very beginning of the QIAR effort, Warren was invited, 
by Albertz, to perform exactly this role when the latter 
expressed interest in any possibility for negotiation that 
Warren might discover or develop. Throughout his term,
then, Warren assisted Albertz and others to think through 
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alternatives.
Reuman, on the other hand, tended more toward presen­
tation of his own options. He was engaged more in analysis 
and proposal making than in perception clarification. This 
wore direct approach was still valued by many, as demon­
strated by the interest generated by the International
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affairs Reports which he frequently used as the basis for 
103
discussion. To a lesser degree the other QlARs also 
engaged in option presentation, even as Reuman facilitated 
option creation. However, there was one major difference 
between QIAR efforts and those of Harvard's Nuclear Nego­
tiation Project in the previous case. The Quakers 
functioned much closer to the principles of principled 
negotiation in that they produced numerous "yesable propo­
sitions," a suggestion made by Fisher in order to reduce 
the chance that they would be perceived as positional 
statements. International Affairs Reports by both Reuman
and Warren always contained a series of proposal on a
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variety of subjects. Reuman exemplified the Quaker atti­
tude of humility when he concluded that it was not his
place to determine whether one option was better than 
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another.
Consequently, we can conclude that the QIAR effort 
successfully avoided the obstacles of premature judgment or 
closure and assumption of a fixed-pie, against which 
principled negotiation warns. Furthermore, they frequently 
wade the inventing problem explicit, indicating the lack of 
fair and credible solutions being presented by either side. 
The biggest hindrance in their approach was the relatively 
limited opportunity provided for group brainstorming, an 
activity recommended by principled negotiation as an 
excellent forum for option creation.
Still, there were some efforts to facilitate group
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interaction. Regular Conferences for Diplomats, and the
special conference at Gars for foreign policy specialists,
provided significant opportunities for option creation
within a mixed group setting. In preparation for these
conferences, great care was taken to select plenary and
small group leaders who were skilled in the facilitation of
creative dialogue and would make sure that all ideas got
expressed and all possibilities examined. However, there
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was no conscious brainstorming process. In typical Quaker
fashion, the structure was allowed to emerge, based on
faith in the ability of people to discover a process which
107
would lead to increased mutual understanding. On occa­
sion, specific proposals emerged, such as the previously 
mentioned peace treaty proposal discussed at Gars. Yet, 
even in the absence of such breakthroughs, conference par­
ticipants valued the receipt of new insights and perspec- 
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tives.
In pursuing the inventing process, the QIARs utilized 
most of the strategies proposed by principled negotiation. 
As with the Harvard case, they were unable to alter 
standard moves in a negotiating game since they were not 
functioning in an official third party capacity. However, 
they did influence the perception of the consequences, the 
nature of the decision being considered, and the nature of 
the game being played. One method of changing the 
perception of the consequences was to alter their
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legitimacy or character. For example, Reuman suggested
that the GDR could play down claims that any form of
negotiation would constitute recognition of its legitimacy
and sovereignty in exchange for all the practical benefits
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of being taken seriously.
The nature of the decision was altered by examining
the scope, strength, and operational feasibility of an
agreement. In order to change the scope, the QIARs
frequently utilized the common Fisher technique of
"fractionating" the conflict. For example, Warren's
proposals for easing the situation at the Wall in 1962
included examining many small steps, such as removing one
or more of the orders to shoot, prevention of dynamiting,
and opening of check points on the transit system in
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exchange for greater access. Any one, or combination, of 
these and similar steps could be negotiated. The scope 
could then be broadened over time, as Reuman suggested in 
1966. He affirmed the recently negotiated GDR pensioner 
travel passes as an excellent first and testing phase. He 
then proposed gradually and tentatively extending it to 
younger people, beginning with permission for students to 
study in the West. As an attempt to change the strength 
of the agreement, Reuman wrote that he was not so much 
proposing substantive solutions as procedural suggestions. 
For example, he suggested granting provisional diplomatic 
relations, contingent on guarantees for conducting reunifi­
cation negotiations. Or in another variation, he advanced
250
the possibility that the four powers or the UN could give 
the two Germanies a mandate to work out plans for reunifi­
cation or confederation over a limited number of years. 
Failing significant progress on this, the present borders 
would become final and both states would be accepted into 
UN membership. Considerations of operational feasibility 
influenced Reuman as he proposed to the FRG a possible 
option for the status of Berlin in 1966. He submitted the 
possibility that they treat West Berlin as a Bundesland (in 
keeping with their long-standing position), but in a spe­
cial relationship to the FRG. He advised perceiving Berlin
"as a bridge instead of a bridgehead," a center for contact
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and negotiation instead of a pressure point. A second 
attempt at an operationally feasible proposal was based on 
concretizing a general suggestion passed on by Albertz in 
1962, that the Americans favored negotiations over inci­
dents at the Wall. Later that year, Warren put flesh on 
this idea by recommending an independent investigating unit
composed of Germans, non-Germans, or some combination of 
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both.
The primary technique used to alter the nature of the 
game was to change the players or their roles. First, the 
QIARs focused their attention more on certain players than 
others, for example, the SPD party in the FRG. While it 
way have been questionable how significant this was in 
1962, by the time Brandt came to power, it had considerable
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significance. Second, the inclusion of the GDR diplomats
in the Clarens Conference in 1969 altered, at least in a
small way, the role that the GDR played in international
diplomatic relations. There was a kind of recognition
conferred on them by the Quaker action. Third, the QIARs
proposed the inclusion of various third parties to perform
a variety of supportive roles. In 1962, Warren suggested
that the International Red Cross be utilized to rescue any
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injured person in incidents at the Wall. In 1963, he
proposed that the UN peace keeping force might replace the
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Allied occupational forces in Germany. Fourth, Reuman
spent considerable time proposing ways in which the GDR
government might change the role of its own citizens. He
called upon the government to make the concerns of its
citizens for travel and information more of an active
factor in its decision making. In similar fashion, he
called upon the FRG government to accept the GDR as a
115
legitimate player.
Search for Objective Criteria
The process whereby the principal parties recognized 
common and compatible interests in the signing of the 
various treaties, was one which necessitated the acceptance 
of mutually acknowledged criteria for determining fairness. 
Certainly the Quakers did not have any direct say over 
final decisions regarding criteria adopted during 
negotiations. Yet, it is important to investigate the
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degree to which the QIARs attempted to influence the 
selection of criteria prior to this point. For the 
influence of the pre-negotiation stage on the selection of 
final negotiating criteria cannot be overlooked. The 
development and use of criteria as a valid form of 
persuasion, in order to legitimize one's position or 
interests, is as significant in the exploratory phase of 
pre-negotiation as it is in the distributive phase of 
formal negotiation. However, as in the Harvard case, the 
primarily pre-negotiation context will limit the search for 
criteria to the discernment for standards for fair 
resolution of substantive issues. Discovery of criteria for 
negotiating procedures, one of the stated aims of 
principled negotiation, was irrelevant.
Prior to 1972, the Quakers, unlike Harvard's Nuclear 
Negotiation Project, were not trying to legitimize any 
particular proposal. However, during the ratification 
process, Beittel shifted the focus to presentation of a 
convincing rationale for the Eastern Treaties to the CDU 
party in the FRG, and to a lesser extent to the U.S. and 
other NATO governments. This stage might properly be 
called post-negotiation, as the East-West process had come 
to a tentative conclusion, at least as regards these trea­
ties. Consequently, the search for fair criteria had two 
phases, a long stage of preparation for inter-party (East- 
West) negotiation and a short concluding stage of intra­
party (primarily internal FRG) conflict. What then was the
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Quaker role in formulating or suggesting conceptions of 
fairness or legitimacy during each of these phases?
When the first QIAR arrived in 1962, it was clearly
evident that two separate value systems had formed
divergent sets of "subjective" criteria for evaluating
fairness. Observing the role of ideology within the
conflict dynamic, Warren wrote:
The same situation, the same set of facts, becomes 
experienced and interpreted by each side through a 
process which selects and emphasizes only a part of 
the entire factual situation while neglecting other 
parts, and which casts these selected facts within the 
framework of a general ideological world view which 
gives them quite different meaning than the other side 
might give them.... these ideologies are the "notions" 
of the twentieth century, in the sense that [Quaker] 
George Fox asserted that the various theological sys­
tems were the "notions" of the seventeenth century.
Warren rightly concluded that this ideological warp made it 
possible for two intelligent and sincere people to have 
dangerously different conceptions of reality and justifica­
tion for behavior.
Each side in the East-West divide utilized many of the 
"objective" criteria, recommended by principled 
negotiation, to legitimize its own notions of justice. 
Fisher's preferred criterion of precedence was used by the 
GDR in its claim that the Wall was merely an expression of
every state's right to protect its borders and control both
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emigration and immigration. Other criteria employed in­
clude those based on reciprocity, public opinion, equal 
treatment, unavoidable cost, efficiency, legal require-
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merits, and moral standards. The GDR emphasized equal
treatment to legitimize its call for recognition. The FRG
focused on moral standards in legitimizing its opposition
to what it considered a prison state. In both cases the
legitimation process was buttressed by conflicting sets of 
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legal norms.
In this polarized context, the QIARs functioned more
in accordance with principled negotiation than did
Harvard's Nuclear Negotiation Project, which had more
invested in its proposed solution and rationale. Warren,
Reuman, and to a lesser extent Beittel, spent considerable
effort communicating the criteria of each side to the other
through their International Affairs Reports, as well as
conversations. In the reports, they also interpreted the
two sets of norms from the vantage point of their own
perspective and values. They accepted some criteria, chal-
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lenged others, and added some of their own. To state it 
in the language of principled negotiation, they functioned 
much like judges, weighing the merits of each suggestion 
and looking for a valid basis for decision. However, it is 
not quite accurate to call this a joint search for objec­
tive criteria, as advocated by principled negotiation. Due 
to the lack of direct contact between East and West, the 
QIARs had little opportunity to make this process a con­
scious one on the part of the principal parties. Neverthe­
less, this does not detract from the significance of the
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QIAR role in assisting the emergence of new rationales.
Reuman, in particular, undertook the task of examining
criteria for fairness. He did considerable personal
research to validate his findings and utilized many of the
criteria recommended by principled negotiation. In
evaluating the FRG claim that public opinion in the GDR did
not even support the government, he concluded there was
more basis than granted by the FRG, but less than presumed
by the GDR. This assessment was made after three weeks of
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interviews with over 200 people in the GDR. In challeng­
ing the FRG government on the Hallstein Doctrine, he exam­
ined in detail all the arguments of legality, morality, and
efficiency, concluding that the doctrine failed these tests
121
despite FRG claims. In his proposals for unification,
Reuman appealed for FRG recognition of the Oder-Neisse 
border with Poland on the basis of unavoidable cost, equal 
treatment, legal requirements, and moral standards. Like­
wise, he appealed for greater GDR respect for human rights
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and freedom, based on precedence and moral standards.
Evenhandedness in evaluation of both sides' criteria 
was characteristic of most of the QIAR effort. Beittel 
illustrated this when he acknowledged the legal rights of 
both parties regarding western access to West Berlin, yet
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also challenged each to recognize the rights of the other. 
When challenging the criteria presented by one party, it 
was not uncommon for the QIAR to do so using the very 
criteria raised by that party. Reuman illustrated this in
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a conversation about the legitimacy of the Hallstein Doc­
trine with an FRG official from the Ministry for All-German 
Questions. As he was to do later in his written report on 
the subject, Reuman responded in the context of the legal,
moral, and efficacy issues raised by his conversation 
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partner. However, there was one point at which the QIARs
may have deviated from the principled negotiation approach.
One searches in vain for an example of disengagement from
their own criteria. Though they granted the legitimacy of
other criteria, they continually defended their own. On the
other hand, when making proposals, they made it clear that
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theirs might well be questioned. Perhaps such humility 
also accompanied the use of their own criteria. But, if 
so, it was not obvious.
As events moved toward ratification of the Eastern 
Treaties, however, Beittel's tactics changed considerably. 
Although he still asked the CDU opposition for their 
rationales, he was no longer the impassionate judge, 
weighing the evidence. He more frequently dismissed their 
"poorly founded" arguments as mere slogans and refrained 
from representing their perspective to the other side. He 
still affirmed some of their aspirations —  reunification, 
self-determination, reduction of Wall incidents, and 
expanded contacts with the East block, but argued 
vehemently, on the basis of efficiency (now his preferred
criterion), that CDU policy would place these in jeopardy.
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conclusions Regarding Nature of the Intervention
It is important to examine carefully the exact blend
of advocacy/neutrality which the QIARs employed. As in the
previous case, I will divide this question into three
categories with respect to party, process, and outcome.
First, it is very clear that party advocacy was rejected.
Even the previously mentioned lobbying for the SPD position
on ratification was more outcome, as opposed to party,
advocacy. The attitude which characterized the eleven year
effort was stated well by Warren when he reflected on the
need to see both sides and not be captured by the "we
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against them" spirit. He repeatedly informed officials
that he was neither a marxist sympathizer nor a U.S. State
Department informer, either of which would have destroyed
his credibility. The QIAR endeavor to be non-partisan was
an extension of deeply held Quaker values and convictions.
A belief in the presence of "that of God in every person"
led to an affirmation of the worth of every party and
sensitivity to the emergence of new possibilities from any 
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source. Such a stance was not easy for Americans. Western 
officials tended to expect a sympathetic response from the 
QIAR and eastern officials initially responded with suspi­
cion. Even the attempt of other Quakers, to gain advocacy 
on behalf of American Quakers imprisoned in the GDR, had to 
be resisted. However, with time, trust was developed with 
officials on both sides. They began to see the QIAR as a
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friend, rather than an antagonist —  one with whom it was 
possible to disagree and from whom it was possible to 
receive judgment and learn. The extent to which the QIAR 
went to ensure this non-advocacy was illustrated by War­
ren's approach to conversations, where he very consciously 
carried the opposite party with him. Having someone "look­
ing over his shoulder" was an antidote to one-sided think-
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ing on his own part. The universally acknowledged credi­
bility and legitimation of the QIARs testifies to their 
success in not taking sides.
In complete consistency with principled negotiation,
the QIAR effort was an illustration of process advocacy.
They not only practiced a conciliatory approach themselves,
but actively advocated tension reduction steps to the
principal parties. Albertz acknowledged them as one of the
few influences which encouraged contact with the other side
and suggested concrete steps to move the process along. In
particular, he credited them with being one out of two
parties which carried messages and reported on the
perspective of the other side. This view was also corrob-
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orated by the accounts of East German officials. Warren, 
while making a disclaimer to any official message carrying, 
has indicated that there was a kind of unofficial go- 
between process. He never communicated anything at the 
request of another party, but on his own initiative would 
communicate a sentiment such as, "If they did so and so, it
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would be easier for us to do so and so."
The process which the QIARs practiced and advocated 
was, again, very much based in Quaker values and beliefs —  
such as freedom and worth of the individual, mutual accep­
tance, friendship and community, peaceful relationships, 
"speaking the truth in love," inner light and guidance,
addressing concerns, seeking clearness, building consensus,
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and bearing witness. These convictions had more affinity 
with western value systems. However, the personal integrity 
of the QIARs, and basic trust they placed in people, ena­
bled them to gain, in turn, the trust of officials in the 
East. The specific religious content of these values was 
expressed openly, but deference was not expected from the 
other parties. For example, frequent periods of quiet 
worship were an important part of preparation for the 
Quaker team which visited the two Germanies in 1963. The 
Quakers valued such practice, whether corporate or individ­
ual, for the added dimension it brought to personal prep­
aration. As a result they found themselves to be more 
courageous, more perceptive of inner conflicts (their own 
and others'), and more aware of personal limitation and 
failure. It was the combination of this religious dimen­
sion, with the insights of social scientific process, that 
formed the basis for their practical guidelines. According 
to the Quakers, when one believes that two persons in 
conversation stand under a higher authority and power, it 
follows that one will make every effort to acknowledge
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truth wherever one finds it, make no attempt to hide any­
thing, take great care not to misrepresent another, avoid 
self-righteousness, understand the difficulties of an offi­
cial's role, avoid unnecessary explosive issues, and act
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with total consistency on both sides of the divide. For 
example, due to a felt need for consistency, Warren deter­
mined that he would not concede a point on one side of the 
wall that he would not defend on the other. This was based
on the religious conviction that, "Our yeas must be yeas
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and our nays must be nays."
As has already been noted, the QIAR effort was not 
primarily one of outcome advocacy. There were no 
preconceived answers. They did not wed themselves to any 
political line until the ratification process. They did 
indicate their opinions and presented proposals in private, 
but the aim was not to gain passage of a particular treaty. 
However, the treaties negotiated in the early 1970's were a 
formulation of the mandated effort of the work —  to move 
toward detente, de-escalation, and reduction of tension. 
Moreover, Beittel's final move toward outcome advocacy for 
certain elements of the SPD position, would have been inap­
propriate and impossible at the beginning. But, by 1972,
lobbying for ratification was simply a natural extension of
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prior QIAR efforts. Against those who charged him with 
damaging the neutral image of the Quakers, Beittel replied 
that, although this image had a place, a plea for support,
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coming from so many with whom they had worked for years, 
must be acknowledged. Although German Quakers were divided
over this stance, he was supported by the AFSC home office.
Regarding the issue of advocacy, then, it is clear
that the QIARs were not only process advocates, but also
adopted a process remarkably close to that recommended by
principled negotiation. Furthermore, like principled
negotiation they were clearly not party advocates, and
primarily not outcome advocates. It is a misnomer,
however, to refer to their role as neutral. Reuman
described it in one of his International Affairs Reports.
as "... that of a person living between both sides,
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compassionately engaged with both...." He later described
the experience as one where:
Sometimes one feels as if he were trying to resolve 
German tensions by taking them into himself and car­
rying them there. This is ... unavoidable when you try 
to listen with compassionate concern and clear under­
standing to the people on both sides of the many walls 
of distrust and fear, ... and when you try to speak to 
and of the people on both sides with sympathy and 
respect.138
Immersed in all of the struggles, QIARs can hardly be said 
to have been detached from the conflict in some neutral 
capacity.
In conclusion, it has been amply demonstrated, by now, 
that the strategy used in the QIAR effort in the two 
Germanies was very similar to the methodology of principled 
negotiation. Attention was generally given to both 
relational and substantive issues, though there were few
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occasions in which the people issues were dealt with during 
separate sessions. Discovery of common and compatible 
interests was central to the effort, though this may not 
have been very visible during the ratification process at 
the very end. Facilitation of option creation resulted in 
many more "yesable propositions" than occurred in the 
Harvard case, despite the lack of use of formal brainstorm­
ing techniques. A search for objective criteria was cer­
tainly carried out by the QIARs through both development of 
their own criteria and communication/interpretation of 
others' criteria. This was true even if they were unable 
to make it a conscious search by the principal participants 
or disengage completely from their own rationales. Party 
advocacy was rejected, process advocacy affirmed, and out­
come advocacy employed part of the time. Therefore, like 
the Harvard case, this one demonstrates the applicability 
of principled negotiation for intervention by an uninvited, 
nongovernmental third party in a pre-negotiation process.
Furthermore, this case shows the adaptability of 
principled negotiation to a much more difficult context. 
Here, the third party has no specific outcome in mind and 
is a religious organization, which is frequently perceived 
as having less access to power structures than is generally 
the case with academia. One of the principal parties, the 
GDR, has a weaker identity and less power, though this is 
tempered by the relative power stability of East and West 
blocks. The political landscape is dominated by entrenched
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positions on old disputes, a factor which mitigates against 
easy resolution. Consequently, this case holds the po­
tential for modeling a creative intervention role for other 
religious organizations, even when confronted by intracta­
ble conflicts within asymmetrical power relationships.
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